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The Board of Directors of the Academy has elected C. Lowell Harriss Executive Director, effective July 1, 1981. Robert H. Connery will continue as President.

The Academy of Political Science
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Programs will be mailed to members of the Academy.
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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., discusses the tendency of American officials to undertake international obligations "casually," without calculating the possible cost of meeting those obligations and resolving to pay that cost if the occasion should arise.

BRUCE RUSSETT and DONALD R. DELUCA document, from numerous public opinion surveys, the recent shift in American opinion in favor of increased military spending and greater willingness to defend allies abroad. They also begin to offer some possible explanations for that shift, giving special attention to the treatment of foreign events by the mass media.

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON analyzes the possible responses of the Soviet Union to U.S. deployment of the MX missile system. He examines these options in light of an assumed desire by the Soviet leadership to maintain the survivability of Soviet ICBMs as well as of the capability to destroy a significant portion of the U.S. ICBM force.

GARY BRYNER reviews the development of equal employment opportunity policy in Congress, the federal courts, and the executive branch. He finds that administrative mechanisms created to foster equal employment opportunities are seriously flawed, and he calls for more awareness of the limits of the federal government's ability to implement its policies.

ROBERT C. SMITH looks at the impact of the black power concept on American politics. He concludes that it played an important role in the development of racial solidarity, racial interest organization, and the incorporation of blacks into the political system.

JOHN W. GARVER discusses how China's support for North Vietnam's war effort from 1968 to 1973 was affected by Peking's rapprochement with the United States. He argues that in the 1973 peace negotiations China urged Hanoi to accept a compromise settlement with the United States.

BENNETT C. RUSHKOFF examines high-level decision making in the Eisenhower administration during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis of 1954–1955. He argues that Dwight D. Eisenhower's personal handling of the crisis was responsible for a relaxation in early 1955 of the American commitment to the defense of the offshore islands.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Casual Commitment in International Relations

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

In late June, 1980, the new secretary of state of the United States, Edmund Muskie, flew from Europe to a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. En route, he read a draft prepared by his subordinates for him to deliver at the meeting. Referring to the recent invasion of Thailand by Vietnam, the text asserted that the United States would abide by its security commitments. When the secretary asked what his government intended to do in support of Thailand, he was startled to learn that no plans had been made. He then proclaimed his distaste for mouthing empty rhetoric and insisted that "if there isn't any substance to this, I am not going to say the words." Urgent messages to Washington stimulated officials to develop a program of aid which, thanks to the magic of radio, Muskie was able to announce soon after his plane landed.

The *Washington Post* treated this episode as front-page news.[1] One gets the impression that veteran officers of the Department of State were surprised that their new chief was naive enough to expect a seriously considered intention to be behind the assurance that he was expected to give to a beleaguered country. Perhaps he reminded them of Elwood P. Dowd, the hero of Mary Chase's "Harvey," who showed his ignorance of the conventions of polite conversation by replying to "What can I do for you?" with "What did you have in mind?" The journalists who acted on the assumption that the affair was newsworthy no doubt expected the popular reaction to be favorable to Muskie, who appeared

[1] Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. To Rush More Aid To Thailand," *Washington Post*, 28 June 1980; idem, "Muskie Rejects Shopworn Diplomacy," *Washington Post*, 29 June 1980.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., is Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. His writings on international affairs include *Swords Into Plowshares* and *Power in International Relations*

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to the outsider as a prudent rather than a naive fellow, a businesslike amateur set on challenging the meaningless routines of diplomatic professionals. Should not the public be disturbed to learn that the custodians of American foreign policy were astonished by the secretary's unwillingness to utter empty words, and that these officials had to be forced to supply substantive filling for the rhetorical shell that they had contrived?

The matter that aroused Muskie's concern was not an isolated or exceptional case. This affair calls attention to a persistent phenomenon in foreign relations, that of *casual commitment*: the acceptance and assertion of obligation without the seriously considered resolve to perform the actions that may be required to fulfill the obligation. This is one of three varieties of overcommitment: states may promise to do more than they *should*, more than they *can* in fact do, or, as in this case, more than they really *intend* to do. In practice, the three types of excess may be mingled. For instance, a state may exhibit no serious intention to back up a commitment because it realizes its incapacity to do so and concludes that the effort would be foolish. For analytical purposes, however, the three can be distinguished, and the incidence, the causes, and the consequences of states' promising without intention to deliver can be examined. In this article, attention will be devoted primarily to this phenomenon in the practice of the United States, although it is by no means a peculiarly American phenomenon.

The Tendency toward Casual Commitment

Concern about American overcommitment of any variety is relatively new, for the United States has long been considered excessively and even disastrously reluctant to accept international engagements. Before 1945, the United States did not always avoid involvement in international politico-military affairs, but it studiously avoided the obligation to become involved. Only since the end of World War II have American commitments been sufficiently numerous and extensive to make overcommitment, casual or otherwise, a significant possibility. In the early postwar period, reluctance to accept obligations gave way to an enthusiasm for commitment that inevitably stimulated doubts, at home and abroad, about the meaningfulness of some of the United States's formal engagements.

Such uncertainty was expressed as early as 1945 by Senator J. William Fulbright, in the Senate debate concerning approval of the United Nations Charter. Fulbright deplored the failure of senators whom he believed to be unwilling to accept the obligations entailed by membership in the United Nations to state their opposition; arguing that joining the new organization ought to be treated not as a mere gesture but as a solemn undertaking to bear onerous responsibilities, he challenged his colleagues to speak and to vote in conformity with their attitudes toward those responsibilities.[2]

[2] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 23 July 1945, 91, pt. 5: 7962.

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Skepticism about the seriousness with which the ratification of the United Nations Charter was regarded in the United States is reinforced by the fact that President Harry S. Truman described the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine and the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Rio Pact, *not* the acceptance of membership in the United Nations, as definitive evidence of America's abandonment of its traditional refusal to serve as a dependable bulwark of world order.[3] In taking this position, Truman implied that the United States had not meant what it said when it had ratified the Charter, although he presumably intended not so much to impugn the sincerity of the United States's acceptance of the obligations of United Nations membership as to emphasize the significance of the later undertakings, which substantially duplicated those stated in the Charter. One might argue, however, that promises tend to be undermined rather than buttressed by reiteration, with its implicit suggestion that "this time—unlike last time—we really mean it."

Alliances, no less than international organizations, may be affected by uncertainty about the intentions of their members. NATO's turn came as the Soviet Union developed a thermonuclear capacity that made the United States vulnerable to devastation. The question of whether the United States is—or should be—willing to defend its allies at the risk of losing its own major cities has haunted NATO ever since that development. The same Senator Fulbright who demanded in 1945 that commitments be taken seriously confessed in 1966 that when he had voted to approve the Southeast Asia Treaty and the protocol extending its protection to South Vietnam, "I did not anticipate . . . that this was a serious matter, I mean anything like it is. I thought it was just one other country among many to whom we were giving aid, and I really never became concerned about this matter until about the time of the Bay of Tonkin, and I paid no particular attention to it."[4] It became evident during the Vietnam War that Senator Fulbright had not been alone in promising to defend South Vietnam without in fact resolving to do so. The Johnson administration insisted that the performance of the United States in that case would be widely regarded as a measure of the reliability of its promises. The ultimate American reaction against this involvement encouraged the belief that American commitments tend to be casually undertaken, without a careful accounting of the potential cost of fulfilling them and a considered decision to pay that cost should the occasion arise.

The Vietnam experience challenged Americans to think more soberly about what their country should, could, and would do in the global arena and to tailor the United States's commitments to their answers. Prominent among the public worriers about overcommitment was Walter Lippmann, who had elegantly formulated the principle that commitments should be geared to national interest

[3] Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1956), pp. 106, 250.

[4] J. William Fulbright, *The Vietnam Hearings* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books Edition, 1966), p. 42.

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and balanced by national power, in a book published during World War II.[5] In late 1968, Lippmann argued that it was essential for the United States to retreat from the "grandiose idea" of "global commitment," the emergence of which he attributed to American leaders of the 1950s and 1960s, from Truman to Johnson.[6] Less than two months later, he had traced the origins of this excess to Woodrow Wilson, and he identified the reversal of the "Wilsonian inflation" of foreign commitments as the central task of the new Nixon administration.[7]

The overcommitment that Lippmann deplored consisted of "wild promises" unwarranted by American interests and unsustainable by American power. He was concerned not about the United States's neglecting to honor these promises, for lack of serious intent, but about the reverse; he criticized Lyndon Johnson because he "staked everything he had on validating these foolish promises, which he took literally."[8] Lippmann would have preferred that what he regarded as unnecessary and imprudent commitments not be made at all, but, if they were made, he preferred that they be made *without* the intention to uphold them.

Although Lippmann did not, in his later years, address the problem of casual commitment, it can be argued that he had earlier contributed to the development of that practice. There is a certain lack of generosity in his condemning Wilson as the foolish inflator of the foreign policy of the United States, for in 1916 Lippmann himself had both urged Wilson to adopt the policy of organizing a collectively enforced world order and praised him as a man of vision and courage when Wilson proclaimed that policy.[9] Moreover, some two years earlier, Lippmann had warned against casual commitment, insisting that the United States should "make no treaties which we are not ready to maintain with all our resources."[10] Hence, when he wrote about rejecting the "damnable thing" of using American strength "for purely national purposes" and committing it instead to the defense of the community of nations,[11] Wilson had every reason to take him seriously. If Wilson was the initiator of foreign-policy inflation, Lippmann was one of its instigators.

In defense of Lippmann, it must be noted that within months after writing the passages cited above he was suggesting that liberals—including himself—would agree to American participation in an international arrangement to enforce the peace only if the settlement were, from their point of view, a just and reasonable one.[12] An even more striking qualification of his earlier position appeared in a piece published on 17 February 1917, in which Lippmann elaborated the notion

[5] Walter Lippmann, *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1943), pp. 9–10.

[6] See his column, "Relapse into Isolationism?" *Newsweek*, 16 December 1968, p. 27.

[7] Lippmann, *Washington Post*, 9 February 1969.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Walter Lippmann, *Early Writings* (New York: Liveright, 1970), pp. 31–41.

[10] Ibid., p. 14.

[11] Ibid., pp. 38, 39.

[12] Ibid., pp. 44–45, 66–67.

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of an Atlantic community and asserted that the United States should dedicate its power, both then and for the future, to the defense of the *Western* world.[13] Hence, the mature Lippmann might have argued that, during World War I, he had advocated an American commitment to uphold only a liberal settlement within the Western world, whereas Wilson had imprudently expanded the scheme to global proportions and dropped the insistence on a peace that men of good will could acknowledge as worthy of support.

Perhaps the early, like the late, Lippmann was in fact a liberal Atlanticist, and he can be acquitted of the charge of having first approved the global commitments that he subsequently deplored. In that case, he stands convicted of having promoted casual commitment. He may have intended that the United States confine its endeavors to the Western world, but he used the vocabulary of globalism. Lippmann encouraged Wilson to talk about the world while hoping that he would mean Europe, and about upholding the status quo while hoping that he would help to sustain only a morally acceptable settlement.

In this apparent advocacy of ambitious rhetoric supported by modest intent, Lippmann showed himself afflicted by pseudoabsolutism, the common human tendency to overstate one's positions. People in all walks of life frequently mean less than they say, and Lippmann's connections with intellectualism, journalism, and politics may have contributed to the strength of that tendency in his case. Despite his well-expressed aversion to abstract principles, he could not avoid the temptation to cloak a regional specific in global abstraction. He was neither the first nor the last to say "mankind" when he meant "our kind of people," or "the world" when he meant "the West." Indeed, Lippmann illustrates the perennial tension in American thought between globalism and Atlanticism. American liberal internationalists of the twentieth century have been, by and large, Atlanticists who have thought that they were globalists. They have tended to use the language of globalism, but their Atlanticism has shown itself in moments of truth. The liberal internationalists' tendency to intend less than they promise owes something to Lippmann.

This conviction of Lippmann does not exonerate Wilson. The man who presided over American foreign policy during World War I clearly set out to commit the United States to play a major role in maintaining order throughout the world. His effort, frustrated during his lifetime, succeeded a generation later. Lippmann was correct in attributing to Wilson a great deal of the praise or blame for the expansive course of American foreign policy after World War II. If the United States has veered toward overcommitment, the continuing influence of Wilson's thought must be counted as a factor in that shift. Leaving aside the issue of whether Wilson advocated commitments irrelevant or inimical to American interests, or incompatible with the limits of American power, it is instructive to consider whether he encouraged casual commitment.

[13] Ibid., pp. 69–75.

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Casual Commitment and Woodrow Wilson

The centerpiece of Wilson's plan for world order was the League of Nations. The key requirement for the success of the organization was, as he saw it, the loyal and vigorous participation of the United States. Indeed, one might argue that Wilson and his British and French colleagues at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 conceived the League as the necessary vehicle for the exercise of American leadership in the management of the international (European?) system. The heart of the League Covenant for Wilson was, as he frequently asserted, Article X, which embodied the essence of the theory of collective security. In summary, Wilson's scheme was to have the United States accept the commitment to take a leading part in the collective enforcement of world order. Aggression, conceived by Wilson as the effort to achieve change by violent means, was to be prevented or squelched by the predictable opposition of members of the League, led by the United States.

Article X, providing that "the Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League," was the heart of the matter for critics and opponents of the League, as well as for Wilson and his supporters. This was an extraordinary commitment, breathtaking in the audacity of its demands. The least of its requirements was that states should refrain from aggression; it pledged states to regard aggression against each other as aggression against themselves and to defend all others as they would defend themselves. Not surprisingly, a number of prominent Americans cautioned against the casual acceptance of such an obligation. One of these was former president William Howard Taft, a leading champion of the League, who said: "the League will involve momentous consequences, and . . . the people of the United States ought to understand exactly what those consequences are and the burdens that they would assume in entering such a League. It would be a great deal better not to enter such a League than to suffer the humiliation of having made an agreement and then repudiate it."[14] Another was a prominent critic of the League, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who said: "I beg my fellow countrymen to consider well before they give this promise to invoke the mighty power of the United States in order to enforce a guaranty which extends to the boundaries of every State on the face of the earth. It is a tremendous promise, and if we give it this country must carry it out."[15]

As one might expect, those who were skeptical of or opposed to the League tended to make more of this cautionary theme than those who strongly advocated American membership. Among the participants in the political struggle concerning the establishment of the League, the most conspicuously forthright were the senators who came to be known as the "irreconcilables." They read Ar-

[14] Theodore Marburg and Horace E. Flack, eds., *Taft Papers on League of Nations* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1920), p. 76.

[15] Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925), p. 244.

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ticle X as a solemn pledge, they considered and rejected the implications of fulfilling it, and they therefore refused to make the pledge. Although Senator Lodge purported to be a "reservationist" rather than an "irreconcilable," this was substantially his position as well: he refused to make a commitment that he was unwilling to carry out.

At the other extreme were most of the leaders of the British and French governments, who rejected the theory of collective security and disdained the very thought of fulfilling the obligations contained in the League's Covenant, but who nevertheless took their countries into the League. The United States was not the only state to reject the implications of participation in the general guarantee stated in Article X, but it was the only one to declare its rejection of those implications by the device of refusing membership. For reasons of their own, Britain and France ratified the Covenant while rejecting the commitment that lay at its heart. This was a case not merely of casual commitment, but of cavalier commitment.[16]

In the matter of casual commitment, Wilson and other major proponents of American entry into the League stood between the two groups just described. Wilson's role as chief elaborator of the idea of collective security and promoter of an organization to put that idea into practice is well known. He was virtually alone among the pushers and planners of the League in giving unwavering support to the notion of a collective guarantee of every state's security, to be upheld by military action if necessary.[17] With utter steadfastness—usually characterized as stubbornness—Wilson refused to countenance any compromise that seemed to him to undermine the universal guarantee. To him, the League was a deterrent scheme that rested squarely on the general acceptance of the commitment to unite in resistance to any aggression; he believed that this commitment, and only this commitment, would save the world from war. Nevertheless, there is room for doubt whether he seriously contemplated the *implementation*, as distinguished from the *proclamation*, of the commitment.[18]

Wilson said markedly different things about Article X when he was praising its putative benefits than when he was discussing its probable costs. In the former case, he described it as a means of putting the world on notice that any aggressor would certainly be overwhelmed by the combined opposition of the international community; clarity and certainty were the crucial features of the commitment that the United States, along with other states, would make. When

[16] See George W. Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978).

[17] Warren F. Kuehl, *Seeking World Order: The United States and International Organization to 1920* (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969), pp. 342–43.

[18] I owe the raising of this question to Herbert Nicholas, who suggested in a paper presented in a symposium at Princeton University in October 1979 that Wilson never seriously envisaged even economic sanctions, much less military ones. I took issue with this statement, citing Wilson's rhetorical commitment to an enforcement scheme. On reflection, however, I believe that Nicholas was challenging Wilson's seriousness about performing, rather than promising, and that challenge may well have been justified. See Nicholas's paper in Arthur S. Link, ed., *Woodrow Wilson and a Revolutionary World, 1913–1921* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming).

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his critics forced him to the defensive by expressing concern about the costs of the commitment, however, Wilson invariably converted it into an obligation so vague and uncertain as to entail very limited costs.

The proposition that by joining the League the United States would assume an obligation abridging its sovereignty and, in particular, diminishing the constitutional authority of Congress to control entry into war, was exclusively an argument of Wilson's opponents. Wilson always responded by minimizing the obligations of membership. He argued that the commitment to participate in the universal guarantee against aggression carried not legal but moral obligation, and, while he insisted that moral obligation is more binding and solemn than the legal variety, he held that its distinguishing characteristic is that it leaves one free to exercise judgment "as to whether it is indeed incumbent upon one in those circumstances to do that thing."[19] He constantly reiterated the theme that "there is nothing in the Covenant which in the least interferes with or impairs the rights of Congress to declare war or not declare war, according to its own independent judgment, as our Constitution provides."[20] Whereas Lodge took the position that honor would require the United States to follow the recommendations of the League Council about use of armed force against aggression,[21] Wilson never conceded that membership in the League would alter the freedom of the United States to determine its own course of action. He stressed the point that the Council would be authorized only to give advice, and that it could do that only if the United States voted for the advice. He concluded, "I am not afraid of advice which we give ourselves."[22]

Wilson's position was paradoxical, for Article X as he interpreted it was virtually identical with Article X as Lodge and his supporters proposed to make it by reservation—and yet Wilson vigorously deplored the reservation as a total rejection of the Covenant and a repudiation of America's essential engagement to join the upholding world order.[23] If Article X meant what Wilson said it did when he was defending it against its critics (as contrasted with the meaning that he attributed to the article when he praised it as the heart of a system of deterrence), Lodge's reservation was unnecessary but innocuous. Wilson never seemed to recognize, much less to solve, the problem of reconciling his declaration that an American promise to resist aggression was essential to the maintenance of world order and his assurance that America would make no promises by ratifying the Covenant.[24]

I am aware of no evidence that Wilson ever urged Americans to weigh the

[19] Text of Wilson's conference with members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 19 August 1919, reproduced as appendix IV in Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, p. 322.

[20] Ray S. Baker and W. E. Dodd, eds., *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: War and Peace* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), vol. 2, p. 505.

[21] Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, p. 249.

[22] Baker and Dodd, *War and Peace*, vol. 1, p. 632.

[23] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 381.

[24] See his exchange with Senators Harding and Brandegee at the conference of 19 August 1919, in Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, pp. 351–58.

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possible costs of taking part in the operations of a global enforcement system and to make their decision about joining the League contingent upon their willingness to pay those costs. On the contrary, he tried to turn the discussion away from the possibility of America's having to fight against aggression. On occasion, he deplored the attention being given to Article X, arguing that it was in the background rather than in the foreground of the Covenant and that the "heart" of the scheme was arbitration and discussion rather than coercion.[25] He suggested that the emphasis of Article X properly lay on the obligation to *respect* rather than to *preserve* the integrity and independence of states; he intimated that American participation in military sanctions would be restricted to certain regions; and he sometimes attributed such potency to the pressure of opinion and to economic boycott that he dropped all reference to collective force as the last resort of the League.[26] Far from insisting that the nation should enter the League with the firm resolve to make whatever sacrifices might be required for upholding the general guarantee against aggression, Wilson told his fellow citizens: "If you are timid, I can assure you that you can do it without shedding a drop of human blood. If you are squeamish about fighting, I will tell you you will not have to fight."[27]

The conclusion is inescapable that Wilson encouraged Americans to indulge in casual commitment. By assuring them that the United States could solemnly promise to defend all members of the League against aggression and yet remain as free as before to decide about participating in wars, and by insisting that such a promise would obviate the need for performance, he sought to overcome their reluctance to accept an unprecedentedly sweeping commitment. They were not to worry, for they were giving up nothing and risking nothing. Wilson's tactic was that of the salesman. In trying to induce the United States to join the League, he resisted every effort to call attention to the costs, actual or potential, of membership.

Wilson's assurance that the commitment enshrined in Article X entailed no consequences that should give Americans pause rested upon the theory of deterrence. He evidently believed, as he asked his countrymen to believe, that the pledge of collective opposition to aggression would effectively discourage most disturbances that might require action under that pledge. Unlike Lodge, who saw the Covenant as a commitment to go to war, the president saw it as a means of preventing war. In the unlikely event that aggression should occur, Wilson expected that moral and economic pressures would almost certainly stop it, so that military resistance would not be needed. In short, he never seriously invited attention—nor, I suspect, *gave* attention—to the possibility that the occasion might arise for fighting to uphold the guarantee. Here was the essential contrast between Wilson and Lodge: the former, assuming the success of deterrence, thought that the commitment would reduce the probability of America's becom-

[25] Baker and Dodd, *War and Peace*, vol. 2, pp. 255, 258.
[26] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 631; vol. 2, pp. 313, 351.
[27] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 363.

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ing involved in armed conflict; the latter, anticipating the failure of deterrence, believed that the commitment would increase that probability. To Wilson, it seemed unnecessary for the American people to count the cost of delivering what they would promise in Article X, for that cost was purely hypothetical.

Although the logic of deterrence may provide the major part of the explanation of Wilson's casualness about commitment, certain elements of his temperament and personal style should also be taken into account. Wilson was widely regarded as a compulsive rhetorician, whose verbal facility sometimes exceeded the clarity of his thought and the firmness of his policy. His advocacy in 1916 of a postwar organization to enforce the peace, accompanied by his continuing reluctance to intervene in the war then in progress, led the Allies to wonder whether he was dedicated to action, or merely to words, against aggression.[28] Recognizing this, Walter Lippmann warned early in 1917 that "our pledge to resist aggression in the future would be discounted by our failure to resist it in the obvious present."[29] Lodge made so low an estimate of Wilson's courage and resoluteness, outside the realm of oratory, that, after the United States entered the conflict, he believed the president had to be prodded to treat the war as a serious military enterprise, and he implied that Wilson was among those "who wish to have the world's peace assured by force, without using force to do it."[30]

A number of Wilson's most enthusiastic supporters turned away from him in disillusionment as they came to regard him as a mere preacher, adept at proclaiming abstract principles but unable or disinclined to translate these principles into practice. As John Maynard Keynes put it:

> the President had thought out nothing; when it came to practice his ideas were nebulous and incomplete. He had no plan, no scheme, no constructive ideas whatever for clothing with the flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered from the White House. He could have preached a sermon on any of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their fulfillment; but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of Europe.[31]

Harold Nicolson painted him as a weakling who collapsed under pressure, betraying the idealists who had relied on him to fight for the principles that he had so eloquently espoused.[32] In a meeting of the Council of Four, when Wilson objected to a scheme for trying Germans accused of treaty violations and atrocities, British statesman David Lloyd George lectured the president about applying, rather than merely proclaiming, his principles: "As I see it, it would be a great mistake for us to say solemnly, 'Here is the principle that we are establish-

[28] Egerton, *Great Britain*, pp. 31-33.

[29] Lippmann, *Early Writings*, p. 76.

[30] Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, pp. 78-79, 82, 289.

[31] John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), pp. 42-43.

[32] Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919* (London: University Paperbacks, Methuen and Company, Limited, 1964), pp. 164, 184, 196-204. See also Lippmann, *Early Writings*, pp. 86-89.

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ing and the terrible things that we will do next time; but this time, we will be content to lay down the principle.' The world would not take us seriously."[33]

This is not the place to make a general assessment of the fairness of Wilson's critics, who were numerous and not always reluctant to indulge in hyperbole. It seems reasonable to suggest, however, that Wilson was somewhat intoxicated with the rhetoric of collective security, and that he found it more agreeable to formulate the ideal of a world made safe by the solidarity of law-abiding states than to contemplate the grim necessity of organizing military action when deterrence failed.

The Implications of Casual Commitment

Wilson's campaign to institute a global system of collective security did not initiate the phenomenon of casual commitment, but it contributed to the strengthening of the tendency of twentieth-century statesmen to promise to do more than they have firmly resolved to do. Our era has seen the simultaneous growth of pressures to extend commitments and to restrict performance, with consequent enlargement of the gap between them.

Expansiveness in regard to commitments is a function not only of the acceptance of deterrence theory (of which the theory of collective security is one version), but also of the awareness of increasing interdependence, the flourishing of multilateralism, and the consequent searching for a "Grand Design for One World." It has become increasingly fashionable to "think big" about world order—to insist on the universal and the systematic rather than the partial and the improvised. The selective-security orientation of the coalitionists has tended to be compared unfavorably, concerning both its breadth of vision and its moral elevation, with the collective-security orientation of the globalists. The intrusion of democratic idealism into the foreign policy of states and the constant use of multilateral forums have enhanced the influence of the Wilsonian notion that small commitments are to be associated with narrowness, selfishness, and rivalry, and large ones with high-minded concern for the global community. What manner of statesman would face the assembled representatives of members of the United Nations and declare his government to be unconcerned about the safety and welfare of the smallest, weakest, and remotest of those units of the international system? Harold Nicolson argued that false decisions and disastrous misunderstandings frequently occur in international relations because of the affability and good manners of diplomats, and he warned that diplomacy by conference is particularly likely to produce unwise results, including excessive rhetoric about high intentions, because participants find difficulty in "remaining disagreeable, to the same set of people, for many days at a stretch." When statesmen gather at international conferences, their personal acquaintance may

[33] Quoted in Paul Mantoux, *Paris Peace Conference 1919, Proceedings of the Council of Four* (Geneva, Switzerland: Librairie Droz, 1964), p. 93.

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breed friendship—and, according to Nicolson, "there is nothing more damaging to precision in international relations than friendliness between the Contracting Parties."[34] One who represents a democratic society in a multilateral forum may find it difficult to say no when he is asked to put his country on record as joining in a common dedication to protecting the weak by squelching the disorderly. The pressures and temptations to make grandiose promises bear heavily on today's statesmen.

When the issue shifts to performance, the incentives run toward prudent limitation. The technological intensification of warfare has nourished a growing quasi pacifism among some populations, including that of the United States, with the result that avoidance of war has come to be regarded as virtually identical with prevention of war. To make a commitment to the defense of other states is noble and constructive; to act in fulfillment of that commitment is wicked and foolish. Casual commitment is not a matter of cynical treaty breaking or deliberate deception, but a manifestation of deep-seated ambivalence. The aversion to war that inspires commitment to a cooperative peace-enforcement scheme also engenders the determination to avoid involvement in military ventures under all but the most compelling circumstances. The democratic ideology that commands statesmen to serve the community of mankind also insists that they be faithful trustees of the interests of their constituencies. The discrepancy between promise and intention results from the tension between the urges to assume international responsibility and to maintain national freedom of action. Casual commitment represents an effort to have it both ways.

Have we identified a problem as well as a phenomenon? Does the tendency of governments to make empty promises and idle threats significantly complicate the management of international relations? It might be argued that this phenomenon poses a problem only for persons with an academic passion for tidiness and a naive insistence on clarity and straightforwardness. Richard Cohen writes of an old man who, upon being reproached for lighting up under a "No Smoking" sign, retorted that "It doesn't say 'positively.'" From this episode, Cohen derives the lesson that one should "enjoy, appreciate, and even thrill in, ambiguity—in the wonderfulness of fudge, in gray rather than black and white."[35] It is true that much of the ambiguity and pretense that prevail in international relations, as in the rest of human affairs, ought to be not merely tolerated but welcomed and valued; some fictions are useful and even necessary. There is something to be said for expecting statesmen to be sufficiently worldly to make appropriate allowances for the rhetorical excesses to which they are exposed in diplomatic encounters.

On the other hand, there are some obvious disadvantages in the steady debasement of meaning that may begin with the acknowledgement that "No

[34] Nicolson, *Peacemaking 1919*, pp. 67–68, 208.

[35] Richard Cohen, "They're Making It Illegal To Break a Promise," *Washington Post*, 10 August 1980.

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Smoking" means "Smoke If You Wish." The secretary of state who declined to make empty promises at Kuala Lumpur later found himself suggesting that the obligation to resist the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was met by formal condemnation, a grain embargo, and an Olympic boycott.[36] Thus has the maxim of collective security been changed from "We must not let the aggressor succeed" to "We must show the aggressor our displeasure." The difficulty is that skepticism about the meaningfulness of commitments is cumulative: casual commitment leads to the expectation that commitments will be made without clear intent to honor them and ultimately to the inability to take commitments seriously, which destroys their value as devices for warning and for reassuring.

This is not a hypothetical danger, but an unfortunate feature of contemporary international relations. The multistate system is severely handicapped by the unavailability of international guarantees worthy of the name. Many of the most intractable international disputes might be settled if it were possible to assure the states involved that third parties would reliably uphold the terms of settlement. The state whose sense of insecurity inhibits it from displaying generosity or even reasonableness might be willing to make the concessions required for a negotiated settlement if an international guarantee, honestly offered and confidently accepted, could end its anxiety about compromising its safety. The major difficulty about international guarantees today is not that states are unwilling to offer them, but that other states are unwilling to accept them—for the very good reason that states are known to make such commitments far more readily than to honor them. The world can ill afford to have international engagements taken lightly. States would do well to restrict their commitments to those that they seriously intend to uphold.

[36] See the addresses by Secretary of State Edmund Muskie on 7 August and 22 September 1980, in *Department of State Bulletin* 80 (September 1980), Special Section, pp. A–C and ibid. (November 1980): 57–60.

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"Don't Tread on Me": Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the Eighties

BRUCE RUSSETT
DONALD R. DELUCA

Public opinion on national security issues has proven to be extraordinarily changeable. At the beginning of the 1970s it turned extremely "dovish" on such matters as reduction of the American defense budget and the defense of United States's overseas allies. Indeed it reached a level of dovishness unprecedented since the early days of the cold war, inspiring some of us to write articles with grandiloquent titles like "The Revolt of the Masses" and "The Americans' Retreat from World Power."[1] Coming as it did after a period of stability at a moderately "hawkish" level from the early 1950s well into the 1960s, and following the wrenching tragedy of Vietnam, it looked for a time as though public opinion might well stabilize on a new and relatively dovish consensus, forcing a sharp and long-lasting reduction in the American military establishment and alliance commitments. Furthermore, many Americans, including "elite" professionals, admitted to having changed their minds about preferred security policies and elaborated what appeared to be convincing reasons

[1] Bruce Russett, "The Revolt of the Masses: Public Opinion on Military Expenditures," in *New Civil-Military Relations,* eds. John P. Lovell and Philip S. Kronenberg (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), and idem, "The Americans' Retreat from World Power," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Spring 1975): 1-22.

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for their turnabouts.[2] Too, the new dovishness seemed concentrated among younger voters (especially those under thirty, who would presumably remain in the electorate for a long time) and among citizens of upper socioeconomic status (who presumably would be especially effective, as "opinion leaders," in molding the attitudes and voting preferences of others). In this light, and given some evidence of long-term generational variation in American attitudes toward foreign policy over the previous two centuries, it was not unreasonable to hypothesize that a rather stable shift to dovishness had occurred.[3]

Not unreasonable, perhaps, but wrong. It is now clear that public opinion has again shifted, back toward a much more assertive, or hawkish, posture in world affairs, toward a widespread determination to rebuild American military capabilities and to reaffirm a readiness to use those capabilities in defense of perceived interests abroad. The purpose of this article is to document this recent change, using public opinion survey material where virtually identical questions have been asked many times over a long time-period. We also will suggest some reasons for this turnabout, even though this is necessarily a much more fragmentary and speculative enterprise.

Billions for Defense

We begin with responses to a question that has been asked very frequently in national surveys almost since the beginning of scientific opinion polling. The precise wording sometimes varies slightly, but is now asked regularly in a standard form by the American Institute for Public Opinion (AIPO, Gallup Poll) and some other national survey organizations. This standard question is now phrased: "There is much discussion as to the amount of money the government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?"[4] The responses on thirty-one different national surveys since late 1968 are arrayed in Table 1 and Figure 1. This is, to our

[2] Bruce Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen* (San Francisco, Calif.: W.H. Freeman, 1975), esp. chap. 4.

[3] See, for example, Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Fall 1976): 411–32, and Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (Fall 1974): 563–88. The generational argument is substantially contradicted by more recent data in Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, "Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44 (Spring 1980): 1–22.

[4] We now have enough experience with survey methods to have some idea of what changes in wording are likely to make any significant difference in the responses. Where any differences from this standard form occur in the following table, we have indicated that, but these differences we judge to be trivial and not to have a significant impact on the longitudinal trend portrayed. Where the question is asked in a seriously different form we either arrayed those responses in a separate table (the material resulting when respondents are given a list of various kinds of federal expenditure and asked whether each should be expanded or reduced) or simply left it out altogether (for example, a variant sometimes used by Louis Harris Associates, "President Carter has announced that he wants to increase federal spending on defense. Do you favor. . .?").

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TABLE 1

Public Preferences for Increased or Reduced U.S. Defense Spending, 1969–1981

Survey	Date	Defense Spending ?	
		Too Much	Too Little
AIPO 784	7/69	53%	9%
AIPO 793	11/69	46	7
AIPO 814	9/70	49	11
AIPO 825	3/71	50	11
Harris	10/71	49	11
AIPO/Potomac	8/72	42	9
Harris	8/72	38	11
AIPO 864	2/73	42	8
AIPO 878	9/73	46	13
AIPO/Potomac	4/74	37	17
AIPO 914	9/74	44	12
Harris/CCFR*	12/74	44	12
NBC	12/75	41	25
AIPO 945	1/76	36	22
AIPO/Potomac	5/76	24	28
Harris	12/76	32	13
NBC	12/76	41	26
AIPO 979	7/77	23	27
NBC	10/78	21	28
AIPO/CCFR	11/78	16	32
NBC	12/78	22	24
NBC	9/79	16	38
AIPO 1145-G	12/79	21	34
NBC	12/79	9	51
NBC	1/80	8	63
NBC	1/80	5	69
CBS/*New York Times*	1/80	14	46
AIPO 1147-G	1/80	14	49
CBS/*New York Times*	3/80	5	76
NBC	3/80	13	55
AIPO 1186-G	1-2/81	15	50

* Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Questions for CBS/*New York Times* January 1980 and all AIPO questions except September 1970, August 1972, April 1974, May 1976, and November 1978 are identical with questions given in text; others differ trivially. The AIPO/Potomac question asked whether "spending for defense and military purposes should be increased, kept at the present level, reduced, or ended altogether?" The percentage of people responding "too much" in the above table includes both "reduced" and "ended altogether."

knowledge, a comprehensive list of all comparable questions on this topic asked over this time span by these organizations.

From July 1969 to September 1973 Americans expressed low sentiment in favor of more defense (and conversely, high sentiment in favor of less defense). After that period the shift begins, to the point where by 1976 or 1977 the two proportions are about equal. Thereafter sentiment grows ever more strongly in favor of increased defense spending, perhaps under the impact of claims and

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FIGURE 1

*Public Preferences for Increased or Reduced U.S. Defense Spending, 1969–1981**



* When there were two or more surveys in the same month, we used the average.

counterclaims by the proponents and opponents of SALT II. This trend becomes a virtual landslide after the seizure of American hostages in Iran in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in January 1980. (Unfortunately no survey was conducted between these two events, so there is no way to disaggregate the relative effect of each event.) This new peak of preference for a larger defense budget not only exceeds anything since 1968, it is approximately at the historic high registered in the early cold war years of the late 1940s and early 1950s.[5]

Table 2 and Figure 2 present responses to a somewhat different type of question. Here, instead of asking the respondent to express an opinion about defense or military spending only, the interviewer lists a variety of federal expenditures (education, health, welfare, space exploration) and asks the respondent, sequentially, whether spending on each is too much, too little, or the right amount. In this context the budgetary or tax tradeoffs between one category and another are likely to be more apparent to the respondent (though the respondent is rarely asked to make those tradeoffs explicit). This question also has been asked in vir-

[5] Russett, "Revolt of the Masses." Inferences from sample surveys to attitudes in the general population are always subject to sampling error. In light of that, and because of slight differences in question wording and survey procedures employed by different organizations, percentage differences from one survey to another of less than five should not be treated as substantively significant.

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TABLE 2

Public Preferences on Defense Spending When Presented with List of Expenditures

Survey	Date	Spending for Defense: Too Much	Spending for Defense: Too Little
Roper	10/71	34%	15%
NORC	Spring 73	37	11
Roper	12/73	32	14
NORC	Spring 74	31	17
Roper	12/74	32	13
Harris/CCFR*	12/74	42	14
NORC	Spring 75	31	17
Roper	12/75	27	20
NORC	Spring 76	27	24
NORC	Spring 77	23	24
NORC	Spring 78	22	27
CBS/*New York Times*	1/79	16	34
NORC	Spring 80	11	56
CBS/*New York Times*	1/81	7	61

* Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Source: Surveys on deposit in The Roper Center archive.

tually identical form by four different national survey organizations over the past decade.[6]

The pattern here is almost exactly the same as shown in the first table and figure, save that the recent upswing to "more defense" is perhaps diminished slightly by the more apparent tradeoffs. The shift toward greater willingness to spend on *defense*, moreover, is much greater than that—in either direction—for any other kind of spending. Only one expenditure item moves by as much as 14 percent in the Roper and National Opinion Research Center (NORC) surveys—the environment from an early high of 65 percent favoring more spending to a more recent low of 51 percent. The only other category of spending to show a significant shift of public sentiment in favor of increasing expenditures is "the space exploration program," which rose from a low of 8 percent in 1973 to a high of 20 percent in 1980. Space exploration of course also has defense and national security overtones.

Defense of Allies

A similar trend over time can be seen in survey questions about Americans' willingness to use military force to defend other countries against an attack by

[6] The National Opinion Research Center and the Roper Organization have used identical question wording: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little, or about the right amount." The Harris and CBS/*New York Times* prefatory wording varies slightly.

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FIGURE 2

*Public Preferences for Defense Spending When Presented with List of Expenditures**



* When there were two or more surveys in the same month, we used the average.

the Soviet Union or other Communist country. Here there is somewhat less precision in comparing responses due to fewer instances of question use in comparable form, but the pattern is nonetheless obvious in the following table, which measures the public's willingness to use military force to defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack.[7]

Defend Europe	1972	1974	1975	1976	1978	1979	1980 (Feb)	1980 (July)
Agree	52	48	48	56	62	64	70	74
Disagree	32	34	34	27	26	26	17	19
Don't Know	16	18	18	17	12	10	13	7

Two other questions (in a form not fully comparable to the one reported in the table above) also asked about willingness to defend Western Europe. In December 1974 and February 1980, Louis Harris Associates asked: "There has

[7] Sources: Surveys for Potomac Associates, 1972–1979 and July 1980, excerpted from William Watts, *Americans Look at Asia: A Need for Understanding* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1980), p. 48. February 1980 excerpted from William Watts and Lloyd Free, "Interna-

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TABLE 3

Willingness to Defend Other Countries, 1972–1980
Percentage "Willing to Use Military Force"

	1972	1974	1975	1976	1978a	1978b	1978c	1979	1980a	1980b
Japan "if attacked by Russia or China"	43	37	42	45	NA	42	50	54	57	68
Taiwan "if attacked by China"	NA	17	NA	NA	16	20	32	34	NA	43
Yugoslavia "if the Soviets invade"	NA	11	NA	NA	16	18	NA	NA	NA	36
South Korea "if North Korea invades"	NA	14	NA	NA	19	21	32	32	NA	38

Sources: Data for 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978c, 1979, 1980b (except Yugoslavia) from William Watts, *Americans Look at Asia: A Need for Understanding* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1980), p. 48; 1978a from *Roper Reports* July 1978, reported in *Public Opinion* (March-May 1979):26; 1978b from AIPO survey for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations; 1980a from William Watts and Lloyd Free, "Internationalism Comes of Age . . . Again," *Public Opinion* (April-May 1980):48; 1980b Yugoslavia comes from Louis Harris Associates s/s 1,198 of February 1980; NA indicates data not available for given year.

been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel that if Western Europe were invaded you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement?" This question, not explicitly mentioning the Soviet Union as the invader, produced the same trend but slightly lower levels of willingness to use the military: 39 percent favored such use in 1974, rising to 67 percent in 1980; the percentage opposed fell from 41 percent in 1974 to 23 percent in 1980. Surveys by the Roper Organization in July 1978 and by AIPO for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in November 1978 found 43 percent and 54 percent, respectively, in favor of using military force: "There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. . . . Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe?" Table 3 shows similar results over time for hypothetical attacks on several other countries.

Despite the uniform rise in willingness to defend essentially all areas or countries, American public opinion still varies substantially on what areas warrant military involvement, and against what kinds of threats. Earlier work demonstrated this selectivity, showing that the proportion of the American population willing to use military force to defend another country varied especially with the geographical proximity of that country to the United States, and to a lesser

tionalism Comes of Age . . . Again," *Public Opinion* (April-May 1980): 48. Question is, "Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States should come to the defense of its major European allies with military force if any of them are attacked by the Soviet Union."

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degree was higher for helping non-Communist governments (whether democratic or not) and states with substantial trade linkages to the United States.[8] There are not enough comparable items to make a systematic test of those results here, but Table 4 shows that this selectivity did not hold very well in 1980.

As it happens, proximity now appears relatively unimportant. While we do not have recent data on willingness to defend spots in the Western Hemisphere, it is nonetheless notable that two quite distant areas, Japan and the Persian Gulf, do about as well as Western Europe in attracting over two-thirds of the populace as willing to use force on their behalf. Similarly, Iran and Pakistan are fairly high, clearly indicating—along with the Persian Gulf region—a perception that U.S. access to oil is truly a vital national interest. The countries with the smallest percentage of the American public willing to defend them are either Communist states (China and Yugoslavia) or very distant ones (Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand). It also makes a significant difference how and whence the threat is posed. A passive and indeterminate description of Western Europe as "invaded" invokes 7 percentage points fewer than does "attacked by the Soviet Union," and three of the four bottom items refer to an attack by a state other than the great rival superpower, the Soviet Union.

Perceptions of Other Countries

Americans' willingness to defend other countries is also closely linked to general favorable or unfavorable perceptions of those countries. A standard question frequently used on AIPO and NORC surveys asks respondents to rate various countries on a scale from plus five to minus five in order to yield a general approval score. It was asked for a large number of countries in 1976, and there are data from 1975 on willingness to defend. The results for those ten countries included in both surveys are displayed in Figure 3.[9] The correlation between the two is very high ($r^2 = .74$).

It is impossible to separate entirely the individual effects of various influences on popular perceptions of other countries, but it seems likely that willingness to defend is dependent on—in addition to proximity and economic interest—this

[8] Miroslav Nincic and Bruce Russett, "The Effect of Similarity and Interest on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Spring 1979):68–78.

[9] Figure 3 displays responses to the following questions: Defend question is, "If _____ were attacked by Communist-backed forces" would respondent be willing to "send American troops, send military supplies but not send American troops, or refuse to get involved." We include only individuals willing "to send American troops." The survey is by AIPO, reported in *Current Opinion* (June 1975): 56. The favorability question is, "Here is an interesting experiment." Respondents were handed a card with ten numbered boxes running from plus five to minus five. "You notice that the boxes on this card range from the highest position of plus five—for something you have a very favorable opinion of—all the way down to the lowest position of minus five—for something you have a very unfavorable opinion of. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate _____?" The survey is by AIPO, reported in *Gallup Opinion Index* (November 1976). We report the percentage of all respondents ranking a given country as at least plus 1.

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TABLE 4

Willingness to Defend Various Countries or Areas if Attacked by Various Antagonists, 1980

Country (attacked by or invaded by)	Percentage Favoring Military Force	Percentage Opposing Military Force
* Persian Gulf, where oil comes from (Russians)	75	18
Major European Allies (Soviet Union)	74	19
* Western Europe (invaded)	67	23
Japan (Russia/China)	68	28
* Pakistan (Russia)	53	35
* Iran (Russia)	53	37
China (Russia)	45	42
Taiwan (China)	43	42
South Korea (North Korea)	38	51
* Yugoslavia (Soviet Union)	36	48
Thailand (Vietnam)	30	55

* These refer to "U.S. military involvement, including the use of troops," and are from Louis Harris Associates s/s 1,198 of February 1980. All others not marked by an asterisk refer to "the U.S. should come to the defense of _____ if it is attacked by _____," and are from Watts, *Americans Look at Asia*.

general dimension of "favorability." Favorability in turn has earlier been shown to result substantially from a combination of "objective" economic (trade and investment) and military (U.S. bases and personnel there) interest and socioeconomic similarity to the United States (based on race, religion, language, political system, and level of economic development). Indicators for these two dimensions "explain" about two-thirds of the variance in favorability.[10] Clearly all these aspects—similarity, interest, favorability, and willingness to defend—are closely if somewhat amorphously linked in popular opinion.

These perceptions, however, are not static. Favorable impressions of other countries can wax or wane over time, depending in large part on the role of those countries in American foreign policy and in world politics generally. Figure 4 shows trends in the percentage of the American population expressing a generally favorable opinion of particular countries over a fairly long time period, sometimes extending back to 1956.[11] Changing perceptions of world politics clearly matter, most obviously in the rise (which peaked at 45 percent favorably perceived in 1973) and then the fall (to 13 percent in 1980) of détente with the Soviet Union. Not only has the Soviet Union's popularity fallen off since the mid-1970s, a similar rise and fall (albeit from still lower levels of

[10] Nincic and Russett, "The Effect of Similarity and Interest on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries."

[11] Source for Figure 4: AIPO and NORC data as reported in ibid., p. 76, AIPO surveys 1123-G and 1138-G conducted in February and September 1979, from Roper Center archive, and *Gallup Opinion Index* (March 1980). First datum for West Germany is 1954 rather than 1956.

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FIGURE 3

Percentage Willing to Defend Particular Countries Attacked by Communist-Backed Forces, and Percentage Expressing a Favorable Opinion of Those Countries, 1975



favorability) has occurred for Cuba, while Communist China—now a major antagonist of the USSR—was by 1980 favorably perceived by 42 percent of the population. Iran, having moved from a status as America's close ally to that of the hostage keeper, dropped below 7 percent perceiving it favorably.[12] And

[12] It may be worth noting that whereas only 6 percent of American whites had any favorable opinion of Iran in 1980, 14 percent of non-whites expressed favorable opinions. Among them, sym-

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FIGURE 4

Percentage of Population Favorable Toward Various Countries, 1956-1980



Egypt, following the Camp David accord and its new alignment with the United States, is virtually as well liked as is Israel. Favorable perceptions of America's long-term allies, for example, Canada and Germany, persist.

To probe the phenomena of behavior in world politics as affecting perceptions of other countries it is useful to look at a systematic collection of events data on international behavior. Edward Azar has collected and made generally available information on states' behavior toward one another on a variety of symbolic, economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. He and his colleagues have counted events as reported in both standard and sometimes obscure sources and, with the help of "expert" judgments, coded them for the degree of conflict or cooperation manifested.[13] Table 5 arrays those scores for

pathies with postrevolutionary Iran as an antagonist of imperialism and the white global establishment were not trivial.

[13] Edward E. Azar, "The Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) Project," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24 (March 1980): 143-52.

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TABLE 5

Favorable Opinion and International Events by Country, 1976

Country	U.S. Public Favorable	Cooperation/ Conflict Score U.S. as Actor* (mean)	Cooperation/ Conflict Score U.S. as Target (mean)
Canada	91%	11.00	11.25
Switzerland	88	23.75	27.00
England (U.K.)	87	7.31	3.60
Australia	85	16.88	10.13
Holland	85	0.00	6.00
Sweden	77	20.50	27.00
West Germany	77	16.88	18.44
Japan	75	7.46	5.14
France	74	4.20	3.67
Mexico	74	3.00	– 0.50
Philippines	74	8.67	– 11.40
Italy	68	– 1.00	3.67
Brazil	66	18.33	11.75
Israel	65	6.09	– 0.90
Poland	60	29.00	0.00
Argentina	60	– 3.00	6.00
India	56	2.75	2.56
Taiwan	55	2.83	31.00
South Africa	54	8.36	13.83
Chile	51	– 4.22	5.67
Egypt	49	14.43	10.52
Iran	48	1.84	2.67
Soviet Union	21	1.30	– 4.11
China	20	14.56	7.75
Cuba	15	– 13.54	– 14.75

* Cooperation/Conflict scores are computed by summing scores for all acts (positive for cooperation, negative for conflict) and dividing by the total number of acts to give a score that represents the average act directed to or by that state. These scores were kindly provided by Edward Azar; public opinion data are as cited in Nincic and Russett, "The Effect of Similarity and Interest on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Spring 1979):76.

the first eleven months of 1976, along with the favorability scores that have been compiled from November 1976 for twenty-five countries.

The data reflect events or initiatives only during the eleven-month period—not the longer-term temperature of interstate relations—but public perceptions are likely to be most affected by recent events except where there is major incongruity between recent and longer-term developments. Judgments of the degree of conflict or cooperation involved in any particular act of one state toward another are unavoidably subject to some variation in interpretation, but Azar's scores, applying a standard score for all acts of a given type (for example, troop movements, economic sanctions, state visits, extending loans) are generally well regarded.

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There is a modest but far from perfect fit between public attitudes toward particular countries and the acts being directed to or by the governments of those countries. Generally favorable attitudes, and good relations, apply to most of America's traditional allies. There is evidence, both in the opinion and events data, of strained relations with the South American military regimes of Argentina and Chile. A significant lag is apparent in public perceptions of some of the relationships long embittered by the cold war. Public attitudes toward Egypt and China remained largely unfavorable (especially in China's case) despite substantially warmer diplomatic relations with each country in the years just prior to Azar's study, and the existence of détente (indicated by not-too-conflictful events scores) found little reflection in the public. Perceptions are very slightly more strongly correlated with what the American government is doing toward other countries ($r^2 = .15$) than with what other states are doing and saying to the United States ($r^2 = .13$).

Explaining Opinion Shifts

How then can analysts hope to explain shifts in popular attitudes on foreign-policy and national security issues, especially the great changeability evidenced in the willingness to spend more on defense? The puzzle is intensified by knowledge that the American public's experience has not been shared widely with American allies. For example, the fluctuations in public attitudes in Japan and Great Britain on this issue (see Figure 5) are much more moderate than in the United States, and there is no sign of a significant recent upsurge in attitudes strongly in favor of increased defense spending.[14] This is attributable in part to the much smaller impact of the Vietnam War on those societies a decade ago, but also it seems clear that neither country shares current American worries about the global military balance.

Americans, in wishing to increase the share of their resources devoted to military purposes, are responding to world events—or at least to their *perceptions* of world events. This is clear from examining responses to another standard question, regularly asked by AIPO, concerning what Americans consider the "most important problem" facing the country. In the 1950s and 1960s, foreign affairs and national security issues typically were cited as "most important" by 50 or 60 percent of the population, reflecting strong, persistent fears about communism and the danger of war. In the mid-1960s, this concern was

[14] Figure 5 displays the responses to the following questions.

Britain: "Do you think the Government is spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on armaments and defense?" Reported in Connie de Boer, "The Polls: Our Commitment to World War III," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45 (Spring 1981): 243.

Japan: "The defense budget for fiscal 19____ amounted to $_____billion, or approximately _____% of the national budget shown. From the standpoint of national defense, do you think this should be increased, maintained at its present level, or reduced?" Reported in Japan Defense Agency Public Information Division, *Defense Bulletin* III (September 1979): 21–22.

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FIGURE 5

Percentage Favoring Increased Defense Spending in Britain and Japan, 1968–1980



overtaken by the civil-rights movement, and then returned (though not to the previous heights) during the Vietnam War period. After Vietnam it dropped to absolutely unprecendented lows, being replaced by the economy and inflation, from which it only recently emerged in highly volatile fashion. Figure 6 illustrates this movement since 1968, in a graph drawn to the same scale as was used for the Figure 1 data on attitudes toward defense spending.

Comparing this with the fluctuations in defense-spending preferences, especially as shown in the more detailed depiction of Figure 1, shows a peculiar reversal in the relationship. From 1969 to 1973, concern for foreign affairs once again appeared very high, at a time when willingness to spend money on defense was very low. In this period it would seem that the salience of foreign policy was associated with antimilitarism, but that may be deceptive. The category "foreign affairs" was, overwhelmingly, in fact Vietnam, which then accounted for roughly 70 to 90 percent of the items so categorized. But in February 1973, after Richard Nixon's second inaugural, the percentage of the population mentioning Vietnam dropped to only 3 percent, never rising above that point thereafter, and indeed soon was dropped from the coding scheme. From February 1973 onward, the salience of foreign affairs is very closely related to the desire to spend more on defense. For the last eight years, it seems that the salience of foreign affairs really indicates a sense of *threat from abroad*, presumably to be met with a stronger military establishment.[15] The Iranian hostage affair and the Soviet in-

[15] The relevant survey question is "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" Data through 1976 are from Tom W. Smith, "America's Most Important Problem:

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FIGURE 6

Percentage Choosing Foreign Affairs as the Most Important Problem Facing This Country



vasion of Afghanistan thus immediately precede the peak in both the salience of foreign affairs and the sentiment favoring increased defense spending.

Yet the examples of Iran and Afghanistan are merely examples, however dramatic. It is easy enough to imagine other foreign-affairs events that might have triggered a strong popular response as measured by the polls—the Yom Kippur War and oil embargo of 1973, the fall of the Shah in January 1979, or the "discovery" of the Soviet brigade in Cuba in the summer of 1979—but they did not. The holding of American hostages in Iran, by contrast, became a media spectacular in both countries, with television coverage playing a key role in the bargaining. Curiously, most efforts to uncover a systematic relationship between world events and public opinion on national security issues have failed. That is, if instead of starting with a jump in opinion and looking for the event that might have triggered it one starts with an "objective" coding of events by their seriousness and then looks at the opinion data, the results are inconclusive.

A study by Sophia Peterson, for example, found no relationship between public favorableness toward the Soviet Union and conflictual actions, whether those actions were initiated by the United States or by the USSR. Similarly, Mark Mellman found no relationship whatever between a "state of the world"

A Trend Analysis" (Paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, June 1979). Data since then are from Roper Center files. Save for the most recent defense-spending question, we have been able to find a "most important problem" question either on the same survey, or on another occurring no more than two months from the survey asking the defense question. The most recent gap is three-and-a-half months from the "most important problem" data point (early October 1980) to the defense datum (January-February 1981). Sometimes we have had to use the same "most important problem" response to correspond with more than one defense response. Technically this gives some difficulty in computing a correlation coefficient, as certainly does the problem of autocorrelation where the intervals between data points in time series are unequal. Hence the visual juxtaposition of the two trendlines should be taken more seriously than any correlation coefficient.

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indicator from the Azar data of world conflict directed toward the United States and preferences for defense spending. Farid Abolfathi did find a relation between defense-spending attitudes and international tension levels, but the analysis is so seriously flawed methodologically that it is of doubtful utility. Recall the weak cross-sectional relationship found earlier in this article between "favorableness" and Azar's events data on relationships between the United States and other countries. Finally, John Mueller uncovered a small but significant relationship between changes in the international environment and public expectations of war. His measure of the changing international environment, however, was derived from another study of front-page coverage of events in the *New York Times.* In other words, it showed a relationship not between opinion and events, but between opinion and what a major news medium chose to *identify* and *interpret* as events.[16]

Thus the relationship between events and public opinion on specific issues is at best tenuous, and although further, more sophisticated studies may uncover something, at the moment inconclusive findings predominate. Some other efforts to provide a systematic explanation of changes in American public opinion on foreign policy also have been inconclusive. Louis Kriesberg and Ross Klein, for example, document the shift in public opinion on defense spending but are unable to account for it. They examine aspects of personality, generational experience, ideology, and economic experience, but none of those have varied enough in the population over the past decade even remotely to account for the change in defense and security attitudes.[17] (Possibly the shift toward a more conservative ideology may show enough variation, but the correlation/causation inference to be made there is very dubious.)

The Role of the Mass Media

Explanation, because it is speculative, is thus much more difficult than description. Nevertheless, there are clues—for example, in Mueller's mildly positive findings using the *New York Times* events coverage and in the relationship we found between defense-spending attitudes and perceptions of the "most important problem." A further hint is contained in the well-established relationship

[16] Sophia Peterson, "Events, Mass Opinion, and Elite Attitudes," in *Communication in International Politics,* ed. Richard Merritt (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972); Mark Mellman, *News Media and Public Opinion toward Defense Spending* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, forthcoming); Farid Abolfathi, "Threat, Public Opinion, and Military Spending in the United States, 1930–1990," in *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies,* vol. 5, *Threats, Weapons, and Foreign Policy,* eds. Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980); and John E. Mueller, "Public Expectations of War during the Cold War," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (May 1979): 301–29. Abolfathi's coding of events is extremely simple and appears very subjective; moreover, his "survey data" for fifteen of the forty-four years are not hard data at all, but are either interpolations from other years or subjective estimates. There are serious technical problems in Mueller's analysis as well.

[17] Louis Kriesberg and Ross Klein, "Changes in Public Support for U.S. Military Spending," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24 (March 1980): 79–111.

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between socioeconomic status and defense-spending attitudes. In the 1950s and early 1960s, when military spending was popular, those favoring cuts in it were drawn disproportionately from low-income, low-status groups. At the peak of antimilitary sentiment during the Vietnam War, however, antimilitary attitudes were concentrated disproportionately among professional groups, and among those of high income and considerable education—precisely among those most likely to take an interest in international affairs. Moreover, these very groups shifted opinion again at the end of the decade, when military preparedness again became popular. In January 1980, for instance, 49 percent of the general populace was in favor of increased military spending, but 52 percent of the college-educated population favored it, as did 55 percent of those with incomes over $23,000 per year.[18]

In the early years of the cold war, Gabriel Almond worried about the volatility and "instability of mood" that he thought characterized American attitudes about foreign policy. Several more recent analyses have implied that public opinion on foreign policy, at least on central, continuing issues, is not especially volatile.[19] Some stability also can be seen in our data, but opinions are hardly set in concrete—people do change their minds.

The association of change with upper-status characteristics suggests how this may happen. People of upper socioeconomic status are also the most likely to be exposed to those elements of the mass media that discuss foreign affairs and security policy. For example, higher-status individuals were most likely to change their opinions on the Vietnam War as it ran its course, and controlling for socioeconomic status, the higher a person's exposure to the mass media the more likely he or she was to turn against the war. A content analysis showed that media coverage of the Vietnam War had greater impact on Johnson and Nixon's popularity than did any other kind of news, and another study found that the media coverage of the Tet offensive by the Viet Cong in 1968 had a massive psychological effect on the American public.[20] In an empirical analysis too elegant to summarize justly here, Mark Mellman has shown that although there is no discernible association between systematic measures of events and opinion on military spending, there is a close relationship between the treatment of events on national network television news and the public's opinion on military spending. That is, the greater the evaluative content of television news suggesting the need for stronger defense forces, the greater the immediately subsequent sentiment for such forces in mass attitude surveys. Also, great symbolic

[18] *Gallup Opinion Index* (February 1980):10.

[19] Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950); William Caspary, "The 'Mood' Theory: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June 1970):536–47.

[20] Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity: The Johnson and Nixon Administrations," in *Perspectives on the Presidency,* ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975), and Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

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content, as compared with merely "factual" content, of the media favoring greater defense carried an additional impact. The mass media, as interpreters of the world to Americans, appear to be powerful shapers of opinions on foreign policy and national security.[21] Administrations, and lobbyists on all sides, do their best, with news conferences, briefings, and leaks, to influence media coverage.[22]

International and security issues are remote for most Americans, even those of upper socioeconomic status. Only a small proportion of the population benefits directly from the "military-industrial complex"; in any given year relatively few Americans travel abroad and even fewer directly obtain much information relevant for evaluating complicated foreign-policy issues. Americans know they can be incinerated instantly in a nuclear war—but few of them have immediate experience with which to formulate policy for dealing with that threat. The kind of experiential relationship they are likely to have with economic issues (unemployment or inflation), or even with some social issues such as race or abortion, is less tenuous. Foreign policy is thus a prime candidate for what Donald Kinder and his colleagues have termed "symbolic" or "sociotropic" politics.[23] In an earlier era Americans, in addition to depending on newspapers, magazines, and radio, depended heavily on personal contact with "opinion leaders" who relayed information and interpretations from elites to masses.[24] In the electronic era, John Chancellor, Dan Rather, and Frank Reynolds occupy key pumping stations for a more direct flow.

Now, even after some re-consolidation after the wrenching effect of the Vietnam War, Americans remain deeply divided in their attitudes on foreign-policy questions. This division provides both a potential constraint on public policy and an invitation to leaders to try to win a majority of the populace to their side (for example, Jimmy Carter's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Simple left-right, hawk-dove, internationalist-isolationist characterizations will not do, partly because the opinion structures themselves are complex and partly

[21] Mellman, *News Media and Public Opinion*. Importantly, Mellman also shows that the media coverage of events also is little related to objective measures of the overall degree of conflict and cooperation directed toward the United States. Media coverage thus is very selective and not at all random.

[22] On the dependence of media coverage on official sources of information see David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entmann, *Media Power Politics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1981).

[23] Donald R. Kinder, "Presidents, Prosperity and Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1981): 1-21; Kinder and R.D. Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 3 (1979): 495-527. See also D.O. Sears et al., "Self Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting," *American Political Science Review* 74 (September 1980) : 670-85. David R. Segal, "Communication about the Military: People and Media in the Flow of Information," *Communication Research* (January 1975) also suggests the special direct relevance of media on military issues precisely because they are of low salience for most people and are infrequently discussed in everyday conversation (pp. 68-78).

[24] Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (New York: Free Press, 1955), and Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on a Hypothesis," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (Spring 1957): 61-79.

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because Americans do not divide on such dichotomous lines. A large proportion of elite Americans fall somewhere between the hawk and dove extremes, but even within that centrist group there exists no consensus on lessons to be learned from Vietnam or on the proper means for conducting foreign policy.[25] At least, many have become convinced that the policies of the immediate post-Vietnam years—a diminished willingness and capability for military intervention abroad—are no longer compatible with the security of a dynamic capitalist economy. The speed with which the conviction spread from elites through the population is impressive. While we cannot provide a full political and sociological explanation, the following elements are worth consideration.

Opponents of the "activist" American foreign policy that was mainstream until the late 1960s were diverse, including assorted leftists, pacifists, and libertarian isolationists as well as many disillusioned "centrists." Thus they failed to produce a coherent and widely accepted ideology to counter that of resurgent "cold war liberals" and traditional conservative hawks. In addition, the spreading acceptability of conservative domestic economic ideology may have helped legitimate conservative or hawkish foreign-policy prescriptions, even though the logical connection between the two might seem tenuous.

Opponents were unable to muster an effective use of symbols to counter the powerful impact of apparent American humiliation in Iran, portrayed on the world's mass media.

The doves, unlike the hawks, lacked a clear base of economic interest. Groups that stood to benefit materially from détente (for example, multinational corporations seeking markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) faced only prospective gains, whereas groups like military contractors faced real, immediate losses from antimilitary sentiments. People, including many in the "establishment," who felt damaged by the major social dislocation resulting from the Vietnam War did not feel so endangered by "ordinary" peacetime military spending and alliance maintenance. Moreover, the basic economic prosperity of the country has seemed threatened by shortages of raw materials (especially oil) from abroad.

Meanwhile, analysts should be impressed by how much they do not know about the causes or stability of foreign-policy attitudes. It would seem foolhardy to make very firm predictions about whether present attitudes will remain constant for long.*

[25] Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, "Cold War Axioms in the Post Vietnam Era," in *Change in the International System*, eds. Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and Alexander George (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), and Holsti and Rosenau, "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," *World Politics* 32 (October 1979): 1-56.

* We wish to express our thanks to the Roper Center and its Office of Teaching and Research at Yale University for providing most of the information in this article from its archive and for helping with some of the analysis.

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Soviet Responses to MX

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON

The 1979 decision by President Jimmy Carter to go ahead with full-scale development and deployment of the MX ("Missile Experimental") is certain to have set off a process of evaluation by the Soviet leadership concerning the available response options.[1] This process was certain to have been complicated by the continued shifts in the preferred U.S. basing mode—that is, the way the missile is deployed and launched—and ongoing suggestions of alternative modes, including air mobile and sea basing.[2]

The election of Ronald Reagan and the consequent suspension of SALT II negotiations have added to the uncertainty—both for the Soviet leadership and for analysts' attempts to discern likely Soviet responses to MX deployment. The apparent Soviet observance of the SALT II limits and the Reagan administration's desire that they continue to do so pending talks on the renegotiation of the treaty, however, give some initial structure to the problem.[3]

This article examines the options available to the Soviet Union in responding to MX. It is assumed that the Soviet leadership is inclined to continue observing the limits established by SALT II, at least until it decides whether an acceptable SALT III agreement can be reached. It is also assumed that the Soviet leadership sees the Reagan election victory as sharply increasing the chances of either

[1] Rudy Abramson, "U.S. Will Build Mobile Ballistic System," *Los Angeles Times,* 9 June 1979; Eliot Marshall, "MX Missile to Roam 200 Racetracks," *Science*, 12 October 1979, pp. 198-99.

[2] Within the last two years, the preferred basing modes have included multiple protective structures (MPS), racetrack, and grid. President Carter's science adviser favored air mobile.

[3] Charles R. Gellner, "SALT II Treaty: US and Soviet Observance of its Terms" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1980); Charles R. Gellner and Judith A. Freedman, "The SALT Process: Reagan Administration Policy" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1980); and Walter Taylor, "Haig Says U.S. Will Observe SALT Limits," *Washington Star,* 15 March 1981.

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deep reductions in the limits of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) equipped with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) (either the 820 limit or the heavy missile sublimit) or a complete breakdown of SALT. Finally, it is assumed that MX is to be deployed, at least eventually, in a land-based shell game basing mode, for example, multiple protective structures (MPS), racetrack, and grid. Given the concern of the Reagan administration defense officials about ICBM vulnerability and the maintenance of the triad (the combination of ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs], and bombers), this seems to be a reasonable assumption.[4]

Fundamental Soviet Objectives

In considering the desirability of various options, one can expect Soviet planners to be influenced by two fundamental objectives: to guarantee the survivability of their own ICBMs, and to maintain the ability to threaten U.S. ICBMs. At present, a majority of Soviet warheads are implaced on ICBMs. Likewise, the bulk of Soviet hard-target (a target able to withstand extraordinarily high levels of blast pressure) kill capability and equivalent megatonnage is concentrated in these warheads. This situation will become even more pronounced by the early 1980s when the Soviets will have completed the replacement of single- or triple-warhead SS-9s with the ten-warhead SS-18 and will have further deployed the MIRVed SS-17 and SS-19 missiles. Given the projected capabilities of an MX warhead against even superhard (3,500 pounds per square inch [psi]) silos, a force of 200 missiles and 2,000 warheads would certainly, in the Soviet view, represent a significant, if not disarming, capability against their strategic nuclear forces.

In addition to insuring the survivability of its own ICBMs, the Soviet Union would want to maintain a war-fighting, damage-limiting capability through and beyond 1989, when MX deployment is scheduled to be completed. This would require the continued ability to destroy a high percentage of U.S. ICBMs in a first strike, thereby diluting the retaliatory capability of the United States. It has often been noted that Soviet strategic doctrine stresses the importance of "breaking up" or "preempting" an aggressor's attack by destruction of its capability to launch a nuclear attack.[5] The extent and nature of the Soviet buildup over the last ten years indicate the strength of the Soviet commitment to this objective.

In choosing between options or combinations of options, the Soviet leadership will be influenced by several factors: costs, technological capability, time

[4] See the Carnegie Panel on U.S. Security and the Future of Arms Control, *Challenges for U.S. National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981) for a discussion.

[5] See Joseph Douglas and Amoretta Hoeber, *Soviet Strategy in Nuclear War* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1979); and Fritz Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security* 3 (Fall 1978): 138–55.

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required to implement an option, institutional and political considerations, possible U.S. counterresponses, and likely effects on the SALT process.

The Fractionation Option

One option available to the Soviet Union would be to fractionate the number of warheads on the SS-18 beyond the present ten on MIRVed SS-18s, which is the maximum number that would have been permitted under the SALT II treaty. Similarly, the Soviet Union could fractionate the SS-19 and SS-17 beyond their present loads of six and four reentry vehicles.

Recent U.S. intelligence reports indicate that the Soviets have already tested the SS-18 with twelve release simulations (the maneuvers involved in releasing a warhead toward its target).[6] Robert Soule and Richard Davison estimate that it would be possible to place twenty-five warheads, each of 200 kilotons, on an SS-18.[7] A 200-kiloton warhead with a circular error probability (CEP) of .08 nautical miles (a CEP which experts estimate can be achieved in the early 1980s) would have a single-shot kill probability of .91 against a shelter hardened to 1,000 psi—the maximum hardness that has been suggested for any of the shelters associated with an MX force deployed in a mobile basing mode. Similarly, it should be possible to more than double the warheads carried by the SS-17 and SS-19 missiles. Soule and Davison estimate that fourteen 200-kiloton warheads could be fitted on each SS-17 and SS-19 launcher.[8]

Obviously, the extent of fractionation will be only one variable in determining the total number of warheads available for use against an MX system; the other variable is the number of missiles. At the low end of the scale is the SALT II limit of 820 MIRVed missiles. Even if the Soviet buildup of MIRVed missiles stopped at 820 in 1982—as was required under SALT II—such a fractionation program, coming on the heels of a collapse in the SALT II negotiations, could (assuming 308 SS-18s, 412 SS-19s and 100 SS-17s) give the Soviet Union 14,868 warheads by 1989. Such a figure would be in line with that of the most recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).[9] This would allow two-on-one targeting of the presently envisioned 4,600 shelter system and a surplus of 5,668 warheads. With two-on-one targeting, such an attack would be expected (given the assumptions of cross-targeting and a .8 overall warhead reliability) to produce destruction of 92 percent of the shelters; and hence, 184 of the 200 MX missiles.

Several factors, in addition to cost, could be expected to influence the Soviet leadership's ultimate decision. Fractionation would require a two- to three-year

[6] Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of the SALT II Negotiations* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 264.

[7] Robert R. Soule and Richard H. Davison, *The MX Missile and Multiple Protective Structure Basing: Long Term Budgetary Implications* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, 1979), p. 131.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Michael Getler and Robert G. Kaiser, "Intelligence Estimate Said to Show Need for SALT," *Washington Post,* 31 January 1980.

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period for conversion and testing.[10] Thus, the United States would have substantial warning time and could seek to counter the Soviet move by building additional shelters. If an additional 2,000 shelters were built, this would preclude a two-on-one attack and the need to maintain a substantial reserve. Obviously, a larger building program for additional shelters would further negate the effects of fractionation.

Of course, the Soviets would consider that the United States may not respond. Public reaction to the increased cost of several billion dollars may be quite hostile. Those groups vigorously opposing the initial MX decision may acquire new allies to block a further expansion of the MX system. The same reaction may also result from an attempt to gain support for adopting an antiballistic missile (ABM) defense system of MX sites as a means of countering fractionation.

Even if Soviet leaders were reasonably sure that the United States would not respond, there may be some hesitation in making a major commitment to the fractionation option. Since it involved a significant conversion of the mainstay of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, the leadership may well be extremely hesitant about accepting the uncertainties, however small, in attempting to increase sharply the load of present Soviet missiles while maintaining low CEP.

Furthermore, the Soviets may consider it necessary, or at least advantageous, to maintain a significant hard-target capability against very hard (2000 psi) targets. Although a 200 kiloton warhead is quite effective against 1,000 psi targets, it is much less effective against 2,000 and 3,000 psi targets, having .76 and .67 single-shot kill probabilities, respectively, These translate into .85 and .79 kill probabilities for two cross-targeted warheads with .8 reliability. Thus, if the Soviets desire to maintain a significant capability against 2,000 psi and 3,000 psi targets (U.S. Minuteman silos are hardened to 2,000 psi), this, within the context of 820 MIRVed missiles, could be achieved only at the expense of a sharp reduction in potential warheads. If 2,000 warheads with significant kill probabilities aganist 2,000 psi targets were required, maintaining 200 SS-18s in the ten MIRV configuration would mean an overall reduction of 3,000 warheads that could be produced by the fractionation program.

Another potential problem with fractionation is CEP degradation. Unclassified estimates of the maximum number of warheads with the required hard-target kill potential are usually based on the lowest yield which, given the projected CEP of the first warhead, would still produce an adequate kill probability. This ignores the well-known fact, however, that accuracy decreases as the number of warheads released increases. Hence, when there are large numbers of warheads, there may be a point well before the last warhead is released at which CEP has increased to such an extent that the accuracy of subsequent warheads is insufficient to produce a significant hard-target kill capability.

[10] Testimony of Cyrus Vance, *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Part II* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979).

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The effects of a heightened perception of deep reductions in MIRVed ICBM limits resulting from SALT III on Soviet attitudes toward fractionation are not clear. If the deep cuts were to occur in the number of heavy missiles, a Soviet negotiator may demand the right to fractionate the SS-17 and SS-19 missiles to carry ten or more warheads. On the other hand, the perception that SALT III may well involve deep cuts in heavy missiles with no increase in the allowed warheads for the SS-17 and SS-19 would lead the Soviet leadership to consider options other than fractionation.

A final issue is survivability. While fractionation would increase the expected number of surviving warheads from a U.S. attack, it would not increase the expected number of surviving missiles. As the number of missiles surviving aproaches very low levels, the fact that each contains a large number of warheads may not provide enough reassurance to the Soviet military or political leadership. Thus, Soviet leaders may feel that such an option does not provide a significant hedge against even a moderate increase (for example, twenty-five) in the number of U.S. MX missiles. Of course, a complete breakdown in SALT would allow for fractionation of some or all present SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS-19s and for the construction of more of these missiles as well as subsequent versions.

The Option to Expand Missile Arsenal

An alternative to fractionation would be expansion of the Soviet arsenal of MIRVed ICBMs beyond the SALT II limit of 820, which experts project will be reached in 1982. Given the present production rate of 125 missiles a year, maintaining production at that level until the 1989 Final Operational Capability (FOC) date for MX would give the Soviets 1,700 MIRVed missiles, which would be consistent with estimates of about 1,400 MIRVed ICBMs by 1985 should the treaty not be ratified.[11]

If the distribution among the 1,700 Soviet MIRVs figured 400 SS-18s, 1,000 SS-19s, and 300 SS-17s, Soviet planners would have 11,200 hard-target, kill-capable warheads available for attacking an MX system. If the United States does not respond to such a move, this would allow two-on-one targeting and maintenance of a reserve of 2,000 warheads. With the assumptions of two-on-one (cross) targeting, .8 overall warhead reliability, CEP of .08 nautical miles, and present warhead yields, two cross-targeted warheads would have a kill probability of .96 against 1,000 psi silos. Hence, Soviet planners could "expect" to destroy 192 of the 200 MX missiles in their shelters.

Such an option might be preferred to the fractionation option on several grounds. First, there would be no need to depend on significant changes in warhead configuration, and hence no need to accept the uncertainties involved and engage in a period of extensive testing (or any new testing at all). Second, additional capability could be attained simply by keeping existing production

[11] Soule and Davison, *The MX Missile*, p. 49.

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lines open and functioning at present rates. Even in the event of a SALT III agreement similar to SALT II with respect to MIRVed missile limits, such missiles could be produced and stored. Rapid deployment of SS-19s in SS-11 silos would be possible if desired. Finally, not only would adoption of this option preserve the preeminence of land-based forces in the Soviet strategic forces, as would the fractionation option, but it would do so in the safest, most conservative manner.

It should be noted, however, that under the assumptions discussed, this option provides a smaller reserve than that provided by the fractionation option—2,000 versus 5,668—and therefore allows less leeway in case of a U.S. decision to build additional shelters. Also, it is not clear which would be the costlier option—the one involving fractionation and testing and warhead production, or the one involving missile and warhead production and the construction of several hundred new superhard silos. Also, the possibility of deep reductions in MIRVed ICBM limits, especially SS-18s, would mitigate against the option to expand the arsenal.

Ten-Warhead ICBM

The SALT II treaty would have allowed each nation the right to develop and deploy one new type ICBM during the life of the treaty. It was originally thought that the Soviets would use the right to deploy a single-warhead successor to the SS-11. It has been recently suggested, however, that a ten-warhead successor to the SS-17 and SS-19 may be chosen instead.[12] Such a missile could be functionally equivalent to the MX, having a .335 megatonnage yield for each warhead and a CEP of .08 nautical miles.[13]

Selection of such an option would produce an increase under the SALT II regime of 2,500 warheads (with high single-shot kill probabilities against even 3,000 psi targets) above the number the Soviets could attain by 1985. This would result in a total of 8,200 warheads which, unless the Soviets were to develop significant capabilities to detect the location of MX missiles, would exhaust all 8,200 warheads and still be 1,000 short of the requirements for a two-on-one attack on the presently envisaged MX system. Also, selection of such an option would still leave such forces vulnerable to attack. A two-on-one attack with MX warheads on 820 MIRVed ICBM sites would be expected to destroy 722 sites. While the number of surviving warheads would obviously be greater, this would not be a significant increase given the small degree of fractionation as opposed to the more than doubling of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 loads that would result from selection of the fractionation option.

On the other hand, such an option might be considered attractive on several grounds. First, if it were adopted, it would be compatible with SALT II requirements and would provide an open production line. If SALT III were to col-

[12] William Beecher, "Did the U.S. Err on SALT II?" *Boston Globe*, 3 June 1979.
[13] Soule and Davison, *The MX Missile*, p. 131.

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lapse, the production could simply be continued beyond the limit that would have been specified by SALT II. Conversely, if the United States were to demand reductions in either the number of SS-18s or MIRVed ICBMs, the Soviet Union could probably demand and get the right to replace some of the eliminated (SS-18) or remaining (SS-17 and SS-19) missiles with new ten-warhead "light" ICBMs.

A second advantage of the ten-warhead ICBM option is that it would allow the maintenance of significant capability against 2,000 and 3,000 psi targets. Third, while involving the uncertainties of new missile developments, it would not, as in the case of fractionation extend the uncertainty to the entire MIRVed ICBM force since the SS-18 force would be unaffected. Fourth, and possibly most important, it provides the Soviets with a good deal of political and military flexibility, inasmuch as they can pursue their program under SALT II restraints and yet still be prepared for a breakdown in SALT III or a decision for breakout in 1985.

Land-Mobile, ABM, and Sea-Basing Options

One option that at least theoretically offers the possibility of attaining both objectives—survivability and ability to threaten U.S. ICBMs— is that of deployment of a Soviet mobile missile. Of course, one would not necessarily expect the Soviets to go mobile in the same manner as the United States. It is somewhat difficult to imagine conservatively minded Soviet generals adopting a multiple aimpoint, zipper trench, or racetrack basing mode. With considerably more land mass available and no environmental restrictions, the Soviets could go to an off-road, railway, or truck mobile system. The Soviet experience with the SS-20 as well as other intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) may push them in such a direction.

A mobile system would have the prospect of reducing Soviet vulnerability to an attack by MX warheads. On the other hand, it is questionable whether such a system would be able to duplicate SS-18 or SS-19 performance characteristics and capabilities. Deploying the SS-18 or SS-19 themselves in a mobile mode would require a very large transporter for each missile. Combined with the large number of such missiles (even if only half of these missiles were deployed in a mobile mode, that force would be double the size of the MX force) the costs of such a system may be too large to be acceptable.[14]

The only land-mobile missile the Soviets have had under development is the solid-fuel SS-16—a single-warhead ICBM obtained by adding a third stage to the SS-20 and removing two of the three reentry vehicles. The SS-20 has a range of 3,000 nautical miles. By removing the two warheads and adding the third stage, the range of the SS-20 is increased to 5,000 nautical miles.[15]

Two major obstacles exist with respect to the adoption of this system. First,

[14] William Kincaide, "Will MX Backfire?" *Foreign Policy* 37 (Winter 1979-1980): 43-59.

[15] *Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, p. 135.

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under the terms of SALT II the Soviets have agreed not to produce the third stage of the SS-16, test or deploy the SS-16, or produce its targeting device for the duration of the treaty. Thus, unlike the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, the Soviets could not produce and stockpile the SS-16. More importantly, it is questionable whether such an option would be a wise choice even if it would not endanger SALT III. With only a single warhead, even if it had great accuracy, a large force of SS-16s could not pose a significant threat to MX. Moreover, during various tests the missile has either blown up or fizzled. As one U.S. official put it, the SS-16 was "a dog of a missile—it was just no good, and it wasn't getting any better."[16] Thus, the Soviets would be faced with investing a great deal of time and money in the production of a new mobile missile with greater requirements than the one that had been a failure.

A defensive option that could enhance the survivability of the Soviet ICBMs would be the development and deployment of a Soviet ABM system placed around missile silos. U.S. strategic analysts have proposed numerous systems of defense that would provide protection for missile silos but not for urban areas.[17] Deployment of such systems would, therefore, not threaten either side's countervalue retaliatory capability. Such an alternative has its advocates in the United States despite the ABM Treaty, and one might expect there to be advocates of such a course in the Soviet Union.[18] Certainly, both the Strategic Rocket Forces and the PVO Strany (air defense forces) would have vested interests in such a system.

Of course, ABM defense by itself, while enhancing the survivability of Soviet missiles, would not put mobile-based U.S. ICBMs in jeopardy. In fact, if such a move were to stimulate a similar program in the United States, it may lead to reduction in the damage the USSR could do in a first strike, even with an increased number of missiles and warheads. A second factor that would have to be considered is the state of ABM technology, which may well be in a transitional phase—where antiballistic missile missiles are the only feasible means of such defense but close to a time when space-based laser- or particle-beam systems will be feasible. If the Soviets believe such advanced systems can be developed in the near future, they may hesitate to make a commitment to conventional ABM technology that would be outmoded in several years.

Another mobile system that may offer the possibility of attaining both Soviet objectives would be shifting a large part of the Soviet strategic capability to sea-based (SSBN) systems. The newly deployed SS-N-18 carries three independently targetable warheads but has been tested with seven. Recent reports indicate that the Soviets have under development a new SSBN and related missile,

[16] Talbott, *Endgame*, p. 134.

[17] Richard Garwin, "Effective Military Technology for the 1980's," *International Security* 1 (Fall 1976): 50–77.

[18] IPFA Conference Report, *The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1979).

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the Typhoon.[19] This submarine may be considerably less subject to antisubmarine warfare detection than present SSBNs, partially due to the intercontinental range of the missile, which gives the new submarines a vastly increased patrol range over older SSBNs. Equally significant, the Typhoon may be capable of carrying ten to fourteen independently targetable warheads.[20] Under SALT II the USSR could obtain a maximum of 13,200 warheads. Under a SALT III agreement that required a sharp reduction in the total of MIRVed ICBMs such an option could look attractive. Of course, substantial improvements would have to be made in SLBM warhead accuracy to make such warheads significant hard-target threats.

Selection of such an option would represent a significant departure from Soviet strategic doctrine and thus engender significant resistance from the Strategic Rocket Forces and its supporters. This specific institutional resistance plus general reluctance to make radical changes would make selection of this option highly unlikely.

Increased Intelligence and Surveillance Activities

One option available to the Soviet Union that does not involve producing additional weapons systems and is compatible with SALT II or any reductions that might occur in SALT III is an increase in intelligence activities concerning MX, specifically trying to identify the actual location of each missile at each point in time. Even moderate capabilities for accurate detection can sharply reduce the number of warheads required for an effective attack on MX.[21] This is particularly true if the United States eventually adopts an MPS basing mode.

Intelligence activities designed to produce the required information would include human intelligence gathering (HUMINT), implantation of sensors in the unguarded portion of territory around MX sites, and improved satellite reconnaissance capabilities that would allow detection of those silos that contained missiles.

Such activities would be compatible with SALT II as well as with SALT III reductions. They would also be far less costly than the development and deployment or modification of weapons systems. On the other hand, if war begins, access to intelligence information can be denied the enemy either by discovery of sensors or by antisatellite action. Also, it is impossible to determine either the accuracy or validity of the information gathered.[22] It is unlikely that such an op-

[19] Justin Galen, "The SALT Decade: Accepting Soviet Strategic Superiority," *Armed Forces Journal* 118 (May-June 1979): 19.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Multiple Aim Point Basing: Vulnerability and Verification Problems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 23 (May 1979): 613–28.

[22] Purposeful disinformation would, however, be extremely unlikely unless it was believed by the United States that war was a certainty. Letting the Soviets believe that they knew exactly which shelters/silos contained missiles, especially with respect to an MPS system, could only increase the probability of a Soviet attack.

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tion would be considered in itself an adequate response. It is certain, however, that such activity would be pursued as a complement to any other option.

Conclusion

Given the uncertainties in the U.S. and Soviet political scenes, the lack of assurance that observance of SALT II limits will be continued, the exact form of SALT III (if there is one), and the uncertainties involved in strategic weapons developments of the next ten years, it would be difficult to predict which option will become the Soviet response to MX. It does seem likely, however, that given the conservative nature of the Soviet political and military leadership, as well as the intensity with which fundamental Soviet strategic objectives have been pursued, the Soviet leadership will select one of the options that allow for the maintenance of the primacy of land-based ICBMs and a significant hard-target kill capability.*

* I would like to thank Frederic Leykam for helpful comments and suggestions.

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Congress, Courts, and Agencies: Equal Employment and the Limits of Policy Implementation

GARY BRYNER

In January 1979, Sears, Roebuck and Company filed a suit in the Washington, D.C., federal district court against ten federal agencies that share responsibility for the administration of equal employment policies in the United States.[1] In its thirty-two page complaint, Sears charged the federal government with promulgating conflicting requirements in federal employment laws; failing to provide a diverse work force by not enforcing fair housing and education statutes; failing to develop adequate statistical data with which private employment figures could be compared; and fostering discriminatory practices within the federal government itself. Among the fifteen specific reliefs requested by Sears was an "injunction requiring the defendants to coordinate the enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes and, specifically, to issue uniform guidelines which instruct employers how to resolve existing conflicts between affirmative action requirements based on race and sex and those based on veteran's status, age, and physical or mental handicaps."[2]

Sears placed much of the blame for the diffidence of the federal government in its equal employment opportunity efforts on post-World War II statutes that required that special consideration be given veterans in the employment prac-

[1] Douglas E. Kneeland, "Sears Sues U.S. over Job Bias," *New York Times*, 25 January 1979.

[2] U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 79-244, order of May 1979. For a complete description of Sears's position see brief filed by Charles A. Morgan, *Sears, Roebuck and Co., etc.*, Plaintiff, v. *Attorney General of the United States et. al.*, Washington, D.C., District Court, 1979. The case was eventually dismissed by the Court which found no "case or controversy" present.

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tices of federal agencies.[3] Since relatively few women were in the armed services, veteran preference requirements greatly advantaged men in employment.

The Commission on Federal Paperwork's 1977 study echoed Sears's complaint, finding that: "To a certain extent, the current duplication, overlap and delay in Federal EEO [equal employment opportunity] programs are attributable to an evolving consciousness by lawmakers and administrators who have had to grapple with a difficult and sensitive issue over the past twenty years. For quite some time, however, it has been apparent that the welter of confusing laws, regulations, policies and practices of a multitude of Federal agencies has militated against effective enforcement and informed public policy."[4]

As a result of the number of equal employment laws and their varying interpretations by courts and federal agencies, for example, employers are subject to a charge of discrimination in virtually every employment decision they make. If employers discriminate against employees or potential employees, they are subject to private and government-sponsored lawsuits. If employers voluntarily implement an affirmative action plan to increase female and minority employment, however, they are subject to charges of "reverse discrimination" by males and nonminorities. Employers may be required to give special consideration to applicants or employees of each minority group, to females, to handicapped people, and to veterans; yet when there are limited opportunities for employment or advancement, the selection of an individual from any one of these protected classes can result in charges brought by those not selected. And individual employees, upon whom enforcement of the law depends, are similarly confronted by a confusing array of policies which create rights that are enforceable in the courts.

The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act promised great progress in ending discrimination. Alexander Bickel, writing soon after the act was passed, heralded it as a "momentous statute, comparable in importance to such organic measures as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the reforms of the first Wilson Administration and the first two administrations of Franklin Roosevelt."[5] There is considerable evidence, however, that points to the failure of this important policy effort, from unemployment rates for blacks that are still twice those for whites, to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) case backlogs; from complaints of civil-rights groups to official findings of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.[6]

The problem of the federal government's equal employment policy can be traced to three features of that policy. First, Congress gave insufficient consideration to the way the law was to be implemented and to the need for clear guidelines, or at least subsequent legislative guidance as the need arose. Second,

[3] Veterans Preference Act, 1944, 5 USC 2108.

[4] Reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978,* 95th Cong. 2d sess., 1978, p. 277.

[5] Alexander Bickel, "The Civil Rights Act of 1964," *Commentary* 33 (August 1964): 38.

[6] See, for example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *The State of Civil Rights, 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

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Congress delegated responsibility for administering and enforcing the law to a variety of federal agencies and to the federal courts, with little effort to coordinate efforts. Third, the courts, in particular, have assumed a crucial role in the equal employment opportunity efforts of the government, a role for which they are unsuited. These three features will be examined in detail below, in an effort to explain why the federal government's attempt to ensure equal employment opportunity is ineffective and, more generally, how this effort is indicative of other regulatory activities.

Congressional Intent and Legislative Drafting

Congress spent a great deal of time writing, debating, and amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act, yet it was neither really careful to specify some important provisions nor willing to oversee the implementation of the act. This is especially true of Title VII, the section concerned primarily with employment discrimination. In what is perhaps the most important amendment to that title, sex was added to the list of protected categories, although that amendment was accepted without any debate or study, much to the surprise of its sponsor who introduced it as an attempt to eventually kill the entire title. The consequence of this addition to the development of equal employment opportunity have been enormous. The law does not specify how scarce employment opportunities are to be allocated among blacks, women, and other minorities. Thus, competition between the protected classes has increased. One prominent psychologist has suggested that perhaps there are now "so many protected groups that none are protected."[7] A corporate executive recently argued that "the women threw a monkey wrench into the affirmative action process—many were educated, well-to-do and militant, and when the barriers came down they jumped in, head-to-head with blacks, and the women won."[8]

Congress, as it has done in so many other areas, refuses to make difficult choices, finding it easier to extend benefits to all who demand it rather than limit the effort of government on behalf of one group. As a result of affirmative action efforts directed at women, blacks and other minorities have suffered. Women have been much more successful than blacks in advancing their careers. In 1972, for example, women constituted 30 percent of total employed persons while blacks made up 10.6 percent. By 1978, the percentage of employed persons who were female increased to 41.2 percent; the figure for blacks was only 11.2 percent. In some specific occupation categories, moreover, women's gains far exceeded those of blacks and other minorities. Between 1972 and 1978, for instance, the number of women lawyers and judges grew from 3.8 to 9.4 percent while for blacks and other minorities the numbers grew from 1.9 to 2.6 percent. The figures for female college and university teachers increased from 28 to 33.8

[7] Thomas A. Johnson, "A Debate over Affirmative Action: Will Blacks Lose to Other Groups?" *New York Times,* 12 August 1980.

[8] Quoted in ibid.

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percent while for blacks and others, the numbers decreased slightly from 7.2 to 7.1 percent. For broader categories, such as managers and administrators, the figures for women grew from 17.6 to 23.4 percent while for blacks and others the growth was from 4 to 5 percent.[9] Women have been much more successful than blacks and other minorities in gaining employment on professional and managerial levels.

A second area in which Congress has been unable to resolve conflicts is in defining what kinds of actions are requird (or prohibited) of employers, the standard or test to be used in identifying a discriminatory practice, and the remedies available to victims of discrimination. All employers are prohibited from treating employees differently on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, national origin, or age. Government contractors have been given the additional requirement of taking affirmative action to increase employment opportunities for veterans and the handicapped. Federal departments are to grant preferential treatment to minorities, females, veterans, and handicapped individuals through numerical goals set by each department. The differentiating factor here seems to be a simple one of different standards for different kinds of employers.[10]

The debate in Congress preceding passage of Title VII, the basic equal employment statute, included discussions of a variety of requirements for employer action, but clearly indicated an intent to provide only for a prohibition of intentional discrimination or unequal treatment of individuals on the basis of race. Title VII defines "unlawful employment practices" to be acts of employers "to discriminate" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.[11] Specific prohibitions include actions to "limit, segregate or classify employees or applicants" on the basis of these categories or to "deprive or tend to deprive employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect the employee's or the applicant's status."[12]

One of the major concerns expressed in the debate centered on whether hiring quotas for minorities would be required under law. Proponents of the bill, in response, stated that "Title VII does not require an employer to achieve any sort of racial balance in his workforce by giving preferential treatment to any individual or group."[13] "What the bill does," explained one sponsor, "is to simply make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment."[14] An amendment to the bill was subsequently added that prohibited "preferential treatment to any individual or group . . . on account of an imbalance which may

[9] U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), pp. 416–17.

[10] The relevant statutes are: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Equal Pay Act of 1963; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1973; the Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Act of 1973; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.

[11] Section 703a, Civil Rights Act of 1964. PL 88 352, 78 Stat 241, 42 USC 2000e.

[12] Section 703a(1), Civil Rights Act of 1964.

[13] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record,* 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, 110, pt. 10: 12712.

[14] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record,* 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, 110, pt. 8: 10388.

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exist with respect to the total or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed . . . in any comparison with the total number or percentage in any community, state, section or other area or in the available workforce in any community."[15] Sponsors of the amendment, as well as the bill's sponsors, emphasized that this addition would prohibit "reverse discrimination," "quotas," and other preferential treatment.[16]

Congress defined the test or standard to be used in determining the existence of discrimination to be one based on intentional discrimination; thus, the law would be enforced only where the employer had "intentionally engaged in unlawful employment practices." In defining the powers of the courts in remedying discriminatory practices, proponents of Title VII stated that "inadvertent or accidental discrimination will not violate the title . . . it means simply that the respondent must have intended to discriminate."[17]

Congressional emphasis on requiring the showing of an intent to discriminate is reflected in two other amendments. Opponents to the bill had argued that special protection be afforded the use of employment selection tests. Referring to a ruling by the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission that prohibited the use of a general intelligence test as part of an employment selection procedure because the test resulted in a failure rate for blacks that was significantly higher than that of whites, an amendment was proposed and passed that provided that employers could "give and act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such a test, its administration or actions upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate."[18] Proponents of the bill agreed during the debate that tests would be protected under the law, provided that they were not used for purposes of discrimination.[19]

The second amendment related to seniority systems, permitting different treatment of employees, based on seniority, provided that such systems were not the "result of [an] intention to discriminate."[20] Proponents of the provision emphasized that the effect of Title VII on seniority was to be "prospective not retrospective."[21]

In providing for remedies to be made available to victims of discrimination, Congress delegated to the federal courts broad discretion, empowering them to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay . . . or other equitable relief as the Court deems appropriate."[22]

[15] Section 703j, Civil Rights Act of 1964.

[16] See Francis J. Vaas, "Title VII—Legislative History," *Boston College Industrial and Commercial Law Review* 7, no. 2 (1966): 431–58.

[17] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record,* 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, 110, pt. 10: 12723.

[18] Section 703h, Civil Rights Act of 1964.

[19] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record,* 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, 110, pt. 9: 11257.

[20] Section 703h, Civil Rights Act of 1964.

[21] U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record,* 88th Cong., 2d sess., 1964, 110, pt. 6: 7213.

[22] Section 706g, Civil Rights Act of 1964.

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The three major policy concerns—the level of employer action required, the test for discriminatory action, and the remedies provided for—vary in statutory clarity. And congressional debate over the 1972 amendments to Title VII (which expanded coverage of the law to public employers and gave to the EEOC the power to initiate court actions against employers) did little to clarify Congress's position. Debate in 1972 included a claim, unchallenged by proponents of the amendments, that reiterated congressional opposition to imposing hiring quotas on employers[23] yet the Senate voted down an amendment that would have prohibited the government from requiring employers to practice reverse discrimination by hiring applicants of a particular race or sex in order to reach a quota.[24] In rejecting that amendment, Congress upheld the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs's (OFCCP) "Philadelphia Plan" which required federal contractors to employ a fixed percentage of minority employees.

Preferential treatment has been provided for in limited forms, applying only to government contractors and the executive agencies. Yet Congress as a whole has not responded to issues raised by other actors in the equal employment sector related to preferential treatment, neither opposing nor assisting in the development of a policy of affirmative action in the private sector. Congress has acted to overturn court decisions only once, concerning the 1978 amendments to Title VII, which provide that pregnancy leave be treated as any other temporary disability.[25] This was in response to the opposite position taken by the Court in a case in 1976 involving General Electric.[26]

Congressional insistence on a showing of intention to discriminate would render equal employment efforts largely ineffective, and Congress has accepted the Court's rejection of that position. The Congress's failure to provide some meaningful guidelines for the determination of discriminatory practices, used in triggering remedial efforts, has left a gaping hole in equal employment policy. As a result, the most difficult decisions related to the policy have been left to administrators of equal employment laws. All this has come under question by the Reagan administration which has promised to end preferential treatment requirements.

Federal Agencies and Federal Courts

Table 1 demonstrates the fractured structure of the equal employment sector created by Congress. Until 1978, more than twenty agencies besides the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission were responsible for administering employment discrimination laws. Although the 1978 Carter Reorganization

[23] See, for example, U.S., Congress, Senate, *Congressional Record,* 92nd Cong., 2d sess., 1972, 118, pt. 2: 1662-3.

[24] For a summary of this and other amendments and debate, see *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1973), pp. 250-1.

[25] See the 1978 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

[26] *General Electric* v. *Gilbert,* 429 US 125 (1976).

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TABLE 1

The Administration of Equal Employment Opportunity Policies: An Overview

*Administered by**				
pre-1978	*1979*	*Policy*	*Requirement*	*Applies to*
EEOC	EEOC	Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964	Nondiscrimination on basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin	Private and public non-federal employees & unions
DOL-Wage & Hour Division	EEOC	Equal Pay Act	Nondiscrimination based on sex	same as above
same as above	EEOC	Age Discrimination in Employment Act	Nondiscrimination based on age	same as above
CSC	EEOC	EO 11478 & above policies	Nondiscrimination based on above categories	Federal government
DOL-OFCCP Departments of Commerce Defense Energy Interior HEW HUD Treasury Transportation EPA GSA SBA	OFCCP	EO 11246 & 11375 & selected grant programs	Affirmative action for protected classes listed above	Federal contractors
CSC	EEOC	Vietnam Veterans Readjustment Act,	Affirmative action for for veterans and	Federal government
OFCCP	OFCCP	Rehabilitation Act	handicapped	Federal contractors
DOJ	DOJ	Title VII, EO 11246	Nondiscrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin	State and local government employers

* The complete titles of the agencies listed above are as follows: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC); Department of Labor (DOL); Office of Federal Contracts Compliance Programs (OFCCP); Civil Service Commission (CSC); Health, Education and Welfare (HEW); Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); General Services Administration (GSA); Small Business Administration (SBA); Department of Justice (DOJ).

Plan remedied this to some extent, it still left the courts, the Office of Federal Contracts Compliance Programs, and the EEOC with shared responsibilities for applying the law to employer practices.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is an independent agency within the executive branch and is charged with the responsibility of administering Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The commission began operating in

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1965 with two primary functions. First, the EEOC was to issue interpretative guidelines to assist employers in complying with the law. The first guidelines were issued in 1965, defining "bonafide occupational qualifications" (BFOQs) that were to guide employers in claiming exemptions to Title VII. Subsequent guidelines defined BFOQs for religion, established requirements for the use of employee selection tests, and provided standards for affirmative action efforts.

The commission's second function was to assist victims of discriminatory employment practices in obtaining redress. The EEOC was limited to attempting to gain voluntary compliance by employers through conciliation and could only recommend cases to the attorney general for prosecution (individuals could also bring suit against employers, and this constituted the most significant enforcement effort). The 1972 amendments gave to the commission the power to initiate suits where there was evidence of a general pattern of continuing discrimination in a large company or an industry. Nonetheless, the most striking feature of the EEOC is its lack of enforcement powers, a point made forcefully by James Freedman:

> For a country of two hundred million people, in which discriminatory practices were deeply embedded in a broad, historical pattern of discrimination against minority groups, this would unavoidably be a major legal and social undertaking. No one at the time should have been in doubt that an administrative effort of unusual force and effectiveness would be necessary to secure its achievement. Despite the magnitude of the task, Congress gave the commission powers that were remarkably weak and unconventionally limited.[27]

Congress explicitly rejected here the traditional model of administrative regulation where the agency is empowered to impose administrative sanctions such as cease and desist orders. This greatly weakened form of administrative agency powers constituted a fundamental compromise made by proponents in order to gain passage of the bill. More than anything else this indicates the nature of support in Congress for an effective equal employment policy and directs attention to the importance of congressional deference to the courts.

The EEOC, however, has not been without power and influence. The power of the EEOC to issue guidelines has been a basic element in the development of equal employment policy, and the commission has been in competition with other administrative agencies in defining policy. The Office of Federal Contracts Compliance Programs has been the most important source of administrative policymaking competition for the EEOC. The OFCCP was created in the Department of Labor in 1965 to administer Executive Order 11246 which required affirmative action by government contractors in recruiting minority employees.

The OFCCP guidelines developed between 1968 and 1971 are particularly important in that they have provided the basis for all subsequent affirmative ac-

[27] James O. Freedman, *Crisis and Legitimacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 107.

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tion efforts. In 1968, the OFCCP began requiring affirmative action plans for all major government contractors.[28] Although the executive order required only affirmative action to increase minority employment through a positive recruitment effort, the OFCCP began requiring: a self-analysis of employer practices; compilation of data related to hiring and promotional practices and to the relevant labor market; and goals and timetables to remedy disproportional hiring and promotion efforts.

Analysis of employment practices involves a review of all personnel practices including collective bargaining agreements, hiring questionnnaires, employment prerequisites, examinations, performance evaluations, job classifications, compensation programs, and other potential problem areas. Applicant flow data, which compared the hiring rates of minorities, women, and nonminorities, were to provide the basis for identifying discriminatory practices. In addition, the employer's work force was to be classified according to the percentage of minorities, women, and nonminorities in each job category. Similar calculations were to be made for the external labor force, defined by the OFCCP as the labor force in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) in which the employer was located. These participation rates were then to be compared in order to identify statistical disparities between the employer's work force and the labor market from which employees were recruited. For example, the percentage of black employees in a particular occupational category within a firm would be divided by the percentage of black employees in that same occupational category for all firms in the relevant labor market. If the resultant ratio was less than 80 percent, employers were to conclude that their employment practices had discriminatory effects, and these practices were to be altered until they resulted in a more appropriate ratio. Goals and timetables would be developed to guide the employer in achieving an employee distribution similar to that of the labor market. These goals, the OFCCP has emphasized, "may not be rigid and inflexible quotas" but were to be considered as "targets" attainable through "good faith efforts."[29]

In 1969, the OFCCP began implementing its requirements for affirmative action in the construction industry among government contractors in order to remedy the effects of past discrimination which had restricted minority membership in construction crafts. Known as the "Philadelphia Plan," this became the basis of OFCCP action in the construction industry; the plan itself was based on the decision of a federal district court that had ordered such a remedy in response to a similar situation in 1967.[30] The Philadelphia Plan was

[28] Major contractors are defined as those with fifty or more employees and contracts exceeding $50,000 per year.

[29] For a more complete description of affirmative action plans see American Management Association, *How to Eliminate Discriminatory Practices: A Guide to EEO Compliance* (New York: American Management Association, 1975).

[30] *Ethredge* v. *Rhode,* 268 FSupp 83 (SD Oh 1967).

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subsequently challenged by contractors in the Philadelphia area, but the plan was upheld by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 1971.[31]

The OFCCP, because of its powers to grant or terminate lucrative contracts, has been able to play a significant role in developing policy. Until 1978 there was a clear failure to coordinate requirements for employers who were subject to both EEOC and OFCCP requirements. Nonminority employees and applicants were pursuing claims of reverse discrimination through the EEOC against employers who were trying to comply with OFCCP regulations and regulations of other executive agencies such as the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) which had established equal employment guidelines for recipients of funds under their control. The EEOC, after being caught in the middle between minority and nonminority grievants for several years, developed guidelines in 1978 that promised employers who were in compliance with the provisions that they would be free from suits of reverse discrimination backed by the commission.

Finally, President Carter's 1978 reorganization plan transferred to the EEOC responsibility for the administration of equal employment opportunity policy in federal employment (formerly a responsibility of the Civil Service Commission), in the areas of equal pay and age discrimination (from the Department of Labor), and all other equal employment compliance efforts of federal executive agencies except the OFCCP, in an effort to develop clear and comprehensive guidelines for employers.

Equal employment policy in the administrative agencies, as in Congress, has centered on the same concerns of what actions are required of employers, what tests are to be used in demonstrating that discrimination has occurred, and what remedies are provided for. Affirmative action, once limited to government contractors, has now become the accepted standard for all employment practices. Until 1978, administrative policy was best characterized as fragmented, unclear, and inconsistent. Since the EEOC's acceptance of OFCCP standards for affirmative action in 1978, administrative policy has begun to be more consistent, even though it is very much at odds with apparent congressional intention. All this only emphasizes that when statutory and administrative requirements differ so significantly, policy implementation and effectiveness suffer.

Title VII provided for the federal courts to be the forum for the resolution of employment discrimination disputes arising under the Civil Rights Act, and the courts have become central actors in the equal employment sector. The federal courts began hearing cases after 1964; the first statistics available indicate that 344 cases of employment discrimination were filed in federal district courts in 1969. By 1978, the total number of cases had jumped to 5,718.[32] The Supreme Court accepted its first case in 1970. Between 1970 and 1980 the Court decided some 45 cases related to employment discrimination. Through these decisions

[31] *Contractors Association of Pennsylvania* v. *Schultz*, 442 F 2d 195 (3rd cir 1971).

[32] *Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the US Courts* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), table c-2.

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the Court has not only resolved differences among the lower courts over the substantive and procedural issues involved, but also has acted to resolve conflicts between congressional, executive, and administrative policy positions in attempting to define ultimately the nature of the policy itself. While a detailed analysis of the role of the Court follows, the emphasis here is on the shared responsibility with the administrative agencies assumed by the federal courts for equal employment opportunity.

The Role of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court, in its decisions on equal employment opportunity practices, has focused on three concerns: determining the action required by statutory provisons, defining the criteria to be used in determining the occurrence of discrimination, and establishing appropriate remedies once discrimination has been shown.

The Court did not directly attempt to determine the nature of employer action required by Title VII until its 1979 *Weber* case.[33] In that case, the plaintiff, a white male employee, argued that a 1974 collective-bargaining agreement that reserved 50 percent of the openings in a training program for black employees violated Title VII. The plan had been adopted voluntarily—in response to data that had indicated that although blacks constituted 39 percent of the local work force they represented only 1.8 percent of the company's skilled craft workers—and was to operate until the percentage of blacks in the craft equaled that of the local work force.

The Court upheld the affirmative action plan for several reasons. First, the Court argued that Title VII does not prohibit voluntary, race-conscious action, but, rather, Congress intended to encourage such action. While section 703 prohibits the *requiring* of preferential treatment on account of a racial imbalance, the section did not specifically prohibit a *voluntary* effort. Moreover, the plan was temporary and was "not intended to maintain racial balance but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance." Third, the plan "does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees" or "require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black hirees."

In its most recent case, *Fullilove* v. *Klutznick,* the Court for the first time explicitly upheld granting of federal benefits based on the recipient's race.[34] The Court upheld a 1977 federal works program that set aside at least 10 percent of the grant funds for "minority business enterprises," finding that Congress need not act in a "wholly color-blind fashion" in remedying racial discrimination.[35] However, the decision was limited to the "broad remedial powers of Congress"

[33] *United States* v. *Weber,* 443 US 193 (1979).

[34] Linda Greenhouse, "Justices Back Affirmative Action," *New York Times,* 3 July 1980; Supreme Court Dkt #78-1007.

[35] From Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion, reprinted in Linda Greenhouse, "Justices Back Affirmative Action," *New York Times,* 3 July 1980.

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to "enforce equal protection guarantees [and to] induce voluntary action to assure compliance with existing federal statutory or constitutional antidiscrimination provisions."[36]

Two other significant Court cases outside of the area of employment discrimination have relevance for this issue. In *United Jewish Organization* v. *Carey,* a 1977 case involving voting districts, the Court ruled that the legislature could consider the impact of redistricting on racial groups even though the redistricting effort was not made in response to a demonstration of previous discrimination.[37] In a second case, *University of California* v. *Bakke,* the Court rejected the university's affirmative action plan that had established a quota of sixteen admissions for minority applicants, indicating that such quotas were only appropriate in response to specific discriminatory actions declared as such by the courts or by administrative bodies.[38] Four justices argued that such quotas, when used to further minority interests, were acceptable; they were joined, to some extent, by Justice Powell, whose opinion formed a majority opinion. Powell, however, indicated that racially based decisions were subject to strict judicial scrutiny and required a showing of a compelling state interest. Overcoming the effects of past societal discrimination or remedying minority underrepresentation in particular professions would not qualify as compelling interests, Powell argued, but the university's objective of a diverse student body would. Thus, although the quotas were struck down, race was permitted to be a consideration, along with the other factors used by the school.

The *Bakke* and *United Jewish* decisions appear to be somewhat broader in their application, since much of the basis for the decisions was constitutional rather than statutory, in the areas the Court acts alone in policymaking rather than sharing its power with Congress or administrative agencies. *Bakke* and *Weber*, then, need not be consistent, according to the Court, since the latter involves only statutory interpretation. In contrast, the *Fullilove* decision fully supports the concept of preferential treatment but limits it, in this case, to specific action permitted by Congress.

In the second area of substantive policy, the criteria to be used in determining whether discrimination has occurred, court decisions have centered on the burden of proof. In *Griggs* v. *Duke Power,* the Court ruled that any employment practice resulting in an adverse *impact* on minority applicants or employees indicated a prima facie violation of the law.[39] Thus, the burden of proof shifted to the employer, in such situations, in showing that the practice in dispute was nondiscriminatory in purpose. The Court also emphasized unequal treatment in proving a prima facie case. In *McDonnell Douglas* v. *Green,* a prima facie case was required to show that the grievant was qualified but not

[36] Ibid.

[37] *United Jewish Organization* v. *Carey*, 443 US 144 (1978).

[38] *Regents of the University of California* v. *Bakke,* 438 US 265 (1978).

[39] *Griggs* v. *Duke Power,* 401 US 424 (1971).

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hired and that the employer continued to seek applicants.[40] Again, the burden of proof shifted to the employer to show a lawful purpose in his or her decision.

In these two cases the Court determined that both discriminatory intent and effect constituted a violation of the law. The Court emphasized, however, that because of the difficulty in proving the existence of intentional discrimination, such intent could be inferred from a disproportionate impact. Cases of different treatment were relatively easily decided by the Court in 1977, but it also addressed the difficult question of the use of statistics in proving a case of discrimination. In *Teamsters* v. *United States,* the Court retreated from its *Griggs* decision, deciding that a statistical disparity was, alone, insufficient proof of discrimination and that it therefore must be accompanied by other evidence of purposive discrimination.[41] A statistical comparison, based on the percentage of minorities and women in the employer's work force vis-à-vis the population as a whole for the relevant labor market, the Court ruled, was an appropriate first step in proving a case of discrimination. In contrast, the Court's decision in the Hazelwood School District case determined the appropriate statistical comparison to be the percentage of minorities in particular occupations for the individual firm and for the labor market.[42]

While the Court's *Griggs* ruling is in agreement with the EEOC and OFCCP guidelines, it conflicts with the wording and legislative history of Title VII. Apparently, the Court borrowed this emphasis on discriminatory effect from its 1969 case, *United States* v. *Gaston,* where it found a literacy test unlawful because of its discriminatory impact on blacks.[43] Here, the Court seems to be primarily concerned with consistency in discrimination cases rather than with adherence to legislative intent, arguing as well that Congress really meant to use discriminatory impact as the test of discrimination, since to require a showing of intent would render Title VII useless.

The shift in the Court's emphasis on requiring a showing of intent first came in the 1976 decision, *Washington* v. *Davis,* which was based on the Fifth Amendment.[44] In *Davis,* the Court ruled that the Constitution required the stricter test of an intent to discriminate. This rule was similar to those announced by the Court in its school desegregation cases, including *Brown* v.

[40] *McDonnell Douglas* v. *Green,* 411 US 807 (1973).

[41] *International Brotherhood of Teamsters* v. *United States,* 431 US 324 (1977).

[42] *Hazelwood School District* v. *United States,* 433 US 299 (1977).

[43] *United States* v. *Gaston,* 395 US 285 (1969). The Court's decisions related to the right to a fair trial based on the Sixth Amendment have permitted the use of a statistical underrepresentation of minorities as a prima facie case of discrimination (see *Turner* v. *Fouche,* 396 US 346 [1970]). In 1977 the Court refined that position somewhat by requiring a finding of an intent to discriminate, which could, however, be inferred from a statistical disparity otherwise unexplainable (see *Castenda* v. *Partida,* 430 US 485 [1977]). Such an inference would then shift the burden of proof to the local government to show a lawful reason for the imbalance. The remedies required by the Court have been limited to ending practices with a disproportionate impact on minorities but have not, as yet, required a quota for allocating jury positions to minorities.

[44] *Washington* v. *Davis,* 426 US 229 (1976).

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Board of Education as well as the more recent decisions in *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg* and *Milliken* v. *Bradley*.[45] Again, the Court moved apparently to make its rulings more consistent for discrimination cases.

Unlike the *Griggs-Davis* split where the Court created different standards for constitutional and statutory litigation, in its 1974 *Geduldig* v. *Aiello,* a case brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, and its 1976 case *General Electric* v. *Gilbert,* brought under Title VII, the Court uniformly upheld disability benefit programs that excluded pregnancy leave.[46] The Court found no difference in these two cases, since such a policy was not "gender based," that is, there was no *intent* to discriminate shown.

The third substantive policy issue relates to the development of remedies once discrimination has been shown to have occurred. In *Albemarle* v. *Moody,* the Court ruled that back pay was to be generally awarded in order to "make whole" victims of unlawful practices. Retroactive seniority was similarly emphasized in *Franks* v. *Bowman*.[47] The debate over Title VII and the addition of an amendment to protect the seniority system clearly indicate congressional opposition to retroactive remedies and emphasized that back pay was to be an optional award rather than a guaranteed one. In another about-face, however, the Court in the Teamster case refused to enjoin the use of a seniority system that perpetuated the effects of past discrimination, because, according to the Court, Congress had already granted special protection to seniority systems. Such a narrow interpretation of Title VII was quite uncharacteristic of the Court.

The most significant impact of the Court on the equal employment sector has been the inconsistencies among its rulings and the inconsistencies between its rulings and the official policy statements of Congress and the administrative agencies. These problems in the decisions of the Court are a result of several aspects of the equal employment sector of the federal government. First, the Court has attempted to integrate equal employment opportunity cases with other disputes related to discrimination in education, jury selection, voting requirements, and voting district redistrictings as it has based some of its decisions of previous discrimination cases in these other areas. These cases have not been decided in a consistent pattern, and, in addition, the Court has emphasized the distinctive nature of equal employment opportunity litigation, thus making it less likely that its civil-rights cases will be united.

A second problem relates to the Court's interpretations of the legislative history of Title VII. Both majority and dissenting opinions, for example, have attempted to develop a justification for the differing views of the justices by referring to the prepassage debate, yet the two opinions interpret that debate differently. (*Teamsters* v. *United States, TWA* v. *Hardison* are two cases where this was particularly true.) The legislative history of Title VII can and has been

[45] *Brown* v. *Board of Education,* 347 US 483 (1954); *Swann* v. *Charlotte-Mecklenburg,* 402 US 1 (1971); and *Milliken* v. *Bradley,* 418 US 717 (1974) and *Dayton* v. *Brinkham,* 433 US 267 (1977).

[46] *Geduldig* v. *Aiello,* 417 US 484 (1974).

[47] *Albemarle* v. *Moody,* 422 US 405 (1975); and *Franks* v. *Bowman Transportation Co.,* 424 US 747 (1976).

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used to justify a wide range of views.[48] Few opinions, with the exception of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in *United States* v. *Weber,* address legislative intent except in passing.

Third, the Court, in its early decisions such as *Griggs* v. *Duke Power,* gave "great deference" to EEOC guidelines; yet in later cases, including *General Electric* v. *Gilbert,* the Court's decision contradicted those guidelines that were, according to the justice writing the opinion, inconsistent with earlier commission guidelines, and were, in any event, entitled to only *some* consideration in the Court's decision.

A fourth problem directly relates to the nature of adjudication itself. As contradictions develop between administrative agencies or between the agencies and Congress, the Court is expected to be the final authority, the expositor of national law. The majority opinion in the Court's most recent Title VII case reflects this concern. The *Weber* opinion was based, according to Justice Brennan, upon a consideration of the purpose of the "spirit" of Title VII rather than the literal wording of the law. Yet he also emphasized the narrowness of the ruling: "We need not define in detail the line of demarcation between permissible and impermissible affirmative action plans."[49] Thus the Court is caught in a contradiction: Although it sees itself, and is expected to act, as the final expositor of national law and feels no constraint to limit itself to a literal reading of statutes, it also insists on confining its decisions to a consideration of a specific set of circumstances, cautioning that its decisions are not to be generalized. The Court has been expected to develop a consistent set of policy guidelines for equal opportunity in employment, fill in the legislative gaps in relevant laws, reconcile statutory and administrative differences, integrate employment-related decisions with other discrimination cases, and resolve the specific dispute at hand. That the Court has not been able to do all that is not surprising.

A fifth concern focuses on the basis of judicial activism and how it is justified. Given the limitations of relying on legislative purpose, the Court has here, as in many other areas of the law, attempted to "balance" the competing demands brought before it. The Court has been unable to develop a clear and consistent body of law, relying instead on shaping its decisions around the specific features of each case. While such an approach may do justice to the case at hand, it centralizes the Court's power and assures that new demands will be generated for Supreme Court hearings. Lower courts do not have sufficient guidelines for subsequent cases; potential litigants are encouraged to see their case as requiring a particular balancing that can only be struck in the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court. The case load grows at all levels of the federal system, and interested observers confront what has recently become an annual event: the Court issues a "landmark" decision followed by announce-

[48] See Ronald Dworkin, "How to Read the Civil Rights Act," *New York Review of Books,* 20 December 1979.

[49] *United States* v. *Weber.*

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ment that another case, addressing a related question, has been accepted for hearing the next term.[50]

Not only is the judicial decision-making process unable to administer equal employment policy, but relying on the federal courts for the enforcement of the law requires that victims of discrimination understand the law and have the resources to seek legal redress. Many victims of discrimination are unable to initiate enforcement proceedings, and the EEOC has insufficient resources even to begin to assist such victims.

Conclusion

The efforts of the federal government to effect equal employment opportunity have been plagued by inconsistencies and conflicts. The EEOC, OFCCP, and other administrative agencies have often been unable to agree on basic standards for employment practices. Congress, except for the 1978 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, has been unwilling to involve itself in a review of EEOC and OFCCP guidelines or to develop consistent definitions of required employer action and guidelines for government enforcement. Presidents, similarly, have only supported reorganization efforts and have not intervened to address the substantive policy issues.[51] The EEOC has generally acted independently of Congress in developing guidelines. It has not sought to provide a comprehensive approach to the balancing of interests and concerns that Congress should have done but has been content to pick and choose among the specific aspects of equal employment opportunity it wishes to address. Its powers to promulgate guidelines are more significant than its enforcement responsibilities, which are limited to seeking voluntary compliance and judicial resolution of the conflict.

By default and design, Congress has delegated to the courts the responsibility for formulating and implementing equal employment opportunity policy. By design, in a compromise aimed at Southern congressmen, Congress created an enforcement agency with no enforcement powers and lodged enforcement power with the courts, giving employers subject to government action a haven

[50] For more general arguments on the limits of judicial activism, see Henry Abraham, *The Judicial Process* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Richard Y. Funston, *Constitutional Counterrevolution, The Warren Court and the Burger Court: Judicial Policy Making in Modern America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1977); Harold J. Spaeth, *An Introduction to Supreme Court Decision Making* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1972); Alexander M. Bickel, *The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962); and Donald Horowitz, *The Courts and Social Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977).

[51] See U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, *Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978* (Equal Employment Opportunity), 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1978) for the president's reorganization statement, defense by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and congressional and interest-group responses.

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of process and delay in resisting governmental intervention.[52] By default, Congress failed to consider and subsequently failed to respond to a number of fundamental elements of equal employment opportunity policy. Not only were statutory provisions unclear, and legislative history contradictory, but periodic confusion and controversy over agency and court decisions were almost always met by congressional inaction. The two exceptions support the general observation. The 1972 amendments, for example, did not address any of the substantive disputes, but primarily extended the coverage of the law and altered the enforcement procedure. The 1978 amendments did address a specific substantive issue, and, in response to lobbying by women's groups, reversed a court decision that permitted employers to exclude pregnancy leave from coverage under disability insurance programs. No congressional attempt was made to view the equal employment opportunity efforts of the government as a whole.

Table 2 summarizes the key variables and issues over which equal employment opportunity policy has been diffused. The variety and contrariety of basic policy decisions—from the different kinds of employment practices that are prohibited and how they are defined to the different kinds of employer actions required to avoid violations of the law—demonstrate the fruits of congressional inaction, agency weakness, and judicial legislation. There is still no clear definition of discrimination in terms of how it is to be identified in employer practices. Actions required of employers vary according to the nature of the employer, whether the discrimination evidenced is attributed to specific employer action, industry-wide discrimination, or the result of general, societal discrimination. Remedies imposed vary from an end to employer practices to specific goals and timetables for hiring of minorities or women. And while nondiscriminatory action relating to all protected classes may be required, employers may also be expected to take affirmative action on behalf of several different groups, all competing for preferential treatment.

This is not simply an attack on Congress or the courts or the EEOC but rather an attempt to instill a sober awareness of the limits of American governing institutions. Equal employment opportunity reflects a commitment to constitutional principles and national ideals, a promise to assist minorities and women in overcoming the effects of discrimination. Despite the good intention of lawmakers and law enforcers, the elimination of employment discrimination—especially that suffered by minorities—remains an important and largely unachieved governmental objective. The administrative mechanisms created for this effort are seriously flawed. Recent attention to this problem has not focused on how to achieve this policy objective but has only highlighted arguments between those who favor preferential treatment and those who oppose it.

The experience of the federal government's effort to ensure equal employment opportunity of the last fifteen years identifies some limits to what govern-

[52] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1973), pp. 247–56.

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TABLE 2

Equal Employment Opportunity Policy: What is the Law? What does it Require?

	Kind of Discrimination		
Kind of Employer Action Required	*Specific Employer Practices**	*Industry-wide Practices*	*General Societal Practices*
Private Employers			
Nondiscrimination	Title VII Title VII cases EEOC guidelines	Title VII Title VII cases EEOC guidelines	Title VII Title VII cases EEOC guidelines
Affirmative Action	EEOC guidelines	EEOC guidelines	Higher education admissions case EEOC guidelines
Goals and Timetables	School desegregation cases Title VII cases (lower federal courts) EEOC guidelines	Title VII case (if employer sets goals "voluntarily")	
Federal Agencies and Contractors			
Nondiscrimination	Title VII Title VII cases EEOC and OFCCP guidelines Executive orders	Title VII Title VII cases EEOC and OFCCP guidelines Executive orders	Title VII Title VII cases EEOC and OFCCP guidelines Executive orders
Affirmative Action	EEOC and OFCCP guidelines Executive orders	EEOC and OFCCP guidelines Executive orders	Statutes for Veterans and Handicapped; all protected classes in federal agencies
Goals and Timetables	EEOC and OFCCP guidelines Title VII cases (lower federal courts)	Federal Works Statute Federal Works Statute case Title VII cases (lower federal courts) OFCCP guidelines	

* Even within this category of kinds of discriminatory practices, there are three major differences: discriminatory intent, disparate treatment, and disparate impact. Congress has generally interpreted discrimination to be unequal treatment while the Supreme Court has ranged from intent, for constitutional cases, to impact, for Title VII cases. The EEOC guidelines prohibit all three kinds of discrimination.

ment can achieve in this area and has implications for other regulatory efforts as well. Policies require that difficult choices be made, that some groups be given attention at the expense of others. Judicial enforcement is limited by the resources of the courts as well as by the resources of those upon whom a court-enforcing mechanism relies. The debate between those who favor preferential treatment and those who insist on a nondiscrimination standard ranges from

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scholarly discourses on constitutional law in legal journals to letters to the editor in local newspapers. The debate goes on, with little progress being made and little attention given to some important questions. Instead of fifteen years of experience dealing with equal employment opportunity, the federal government has more nearly produced one year of experience fifteen times.

In addition, the Court does not have the resources or expertise to make difficult policy choices.[53] For example, legislators must consider such political questions as whether minorities really benefit from affirmative action or if it encourages a patronizing of beneficiaries and reinforces beliefs of inferiority.[54] Does affirmative action engender conflicts between protected classes that undermine the consensus of 1964 and threaten to defeat the prospect for meaningful governmental intervention to promote employment opportunities for minorities and women?[55] Do affirmative action efforts encourage employers to locate plants outside of black areas thus reducing employment opportunities?[56]

The debates in Congress need to address these issues rather than deferring to the courts. The "civil-rights" basis of the efforts to effect equal employment opportunity has resulted in excessive reliance on the courts for the development of policy. As claims for governmental action are based on invocations of constitutional rights, the policy focus shifts from a political one to a constitutional and judicial one. Constitutional decisions are viewed as an almost exclusive responsibility of the courts, an area where their particular expertise is most appropriate. The Supreme Court, in turn, has ruled that policy issues such as costs, benefits, or the interests of others cannot condition individual rights.[57] While nondiscrimination is clearly an issue within the purview of constitutional law, preferential treatment through government-imposed goals and timetables on private employers goes beyond anything provided for in the Constitution and thus should be evaluated as a political choice.[58]

The debate over equal employment opportunity needs to look at a wider range of policy alternatives, from outreach, training, and educational programs

[53] Robert J. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood, *The Politics of Policy Implementation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), pp. 85–108; and Donald Horowitz, *The Courts and Social Policy*, pp. 22–67.

[54] See Midge Decter, "On Affirmative Action and Lost Self Respect," *New York Times*, 6 July 1980; and Meg Greenfield, "How to Resolve the Bakke Case," *Newsweek*, 24 October 1977, p. 128.

[55] Johnson, "A Debate over Affirmative Action: Will Blacks Lose to Other Groups?"

[56] Bernard Meltzer, "The Weber Case: Double Talk and Double Standard," *Regulation* 3 (September-October 1979): 40.

[57] See, for example, *Watson* v. *City of Memphis*, 373 US 526 at 537, cited in Jeremy Rabkin, "Office for Civil Rights," in *The Politics of Regulation*, ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: Basic Books, 1980). Rabkin makes a similar argument about civil rights in the context of HEW's school desegregation efforts.

[58] See, for example, Alan H. Goldman, *Justice and Reverse Discrimination* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979); J. Skelly Wright, "Color Blind Theories and Color Conscious Remedies," 47 *University of Chicago Law Review* 2 (1980): 213; William Van Alstyne, "Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court and the Constitution," 46 *University of Chicago Law Review* (1979): 775.

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to greater use of tax incentives for hiring the chronically unemployed. Alternatives to litigation in the courts for the resolution of specific charges of discrimination need to be studied. This calls for a renewed effort at implementing equal employment opportunity, not a reduced concern for it, and a more careful effort based on an understanding of what government intervention is able and unable to achieve.

Government regulatory efforts, whether they be designed to achieve equal employment opportunity for all individuals or some other objective, must be based on a consideration of the imperatives of implementation. They require a clear statutory basis, based upon general political support. The responsibility of making and shaping fundamental policy decisions cannot be delegated to the courts and administrative agencies. A failure to consider the politics of implementation is likely to render any policy objective—however important or worthwhile—weak and ineffective.*

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Black Power and the Transformation from Protest to Politics

ROBERT C. SMITH

In a retrospective examination of black power in 1977, Dianne Pinderhughes analyzed a sample of the speeches and writings of individuals and organizations that had been prominent in the development and articulation of the concept. She found that there was only a narrow area of common agreement on the elements of black power and that on close examination even in this narrow area the common elements were so vague and general "as to be meaningless as far as giving specific direction to participants at the grassroots level."[1] Joel Aberbach and Jack Walker found similar evidence at the grassroots level. In their study of the attitudes of a sample of Detroit residents, black and white, they found that the overwhelming majority of whites evaluated black power negatively, while opinion among blacks was divided: 42.2 percent were favorable and 49.6 percent were unfavorable. Those who evaluated it favorably saw black power as a call for black unity and an expression of a desire for a fair share of society's opportunities; those who viewed it unfavorably saw it as meaningless.[2] And in the early scholarly commentaries on the meaning of black power, one finds similar disagreement.[3] Thus, at the elite level, at the

[1] Dianne Pinderhughes, "A Retrospective Examination: The Failure of Black Power," *Journal of Afro-American Issues* 5 (Summer 1977): 256.

[2] Joel Aberbach and Jack Walker, "The Meaning of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June 1970): 370.

[3] See Harold Cruse, *Rebellion or Revolution* (New York: William Morrow Co., 1968), pp. 193–258; idem, *Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders* (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1968), p. 225; Bayard Rustin, *Down the Line* (Chicago, Ill.: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 154–65; Christopher Lasch, *The Agony of the American Left* (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp.

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grassroots, and at the level of scholarly analysis the black power symbol was a source of confusion.

I have argued elsewhere that this ambiguity and the confusion surrounding the black power symbol was in large part by design; that is, Stokeley Carmichael and his colleagues deliberately elected to use the vague, ambiguous, emotional, and provocative phrase black power because of its propaganda value.[4] And as Donald McCormack argues, in its formative years (1966–1967) "the ambiguity of the slogan was very much a source of its vitality."[5] Thus, the confusion surrounding the early interpretations of black power was perhaps inevitable given the extraordinary controversy occasioned by the initial debate. Given the vantage point of a decade, the cooling of the rhetoric, and with the help of appropriate social-science conceptual apparatus, however, it is now possible to move beyond the ambiguity toward clarification of the structural significance of black power in United States politics, which is the purpose in this article. Using William Gamson's heuristic model of the operations of the American polity, this article is an attempt to specify the relationship between black power and the often spoke of transformation from protest to politics that occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[6] It is as a factor in this transformation that one can discern the most important political consequence of black power.

Stable Unrepresentation in American Politics

In an important essay William Gamson renders a critique of the theory of pluralist democracy in the United States and offers an alternative model of the operation of the American political system.[7] Gamson's essay is important because, unlike most critics of pluralism, he attempts to construct an alternative that provides a more accurate and valid description of the operation of the polity. And he provides a mechanism that allows one to treat a central problem in contemporary pluralist interest-group theory—the transformation of "potential groups" into formally organized "interest groups."[8] It is for these reasons that

117–68; Robert Allen, *Black Awakening in Capitalist America* (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1969) and Donald McCormack, "Stokeley Carmichael and Pan Africanism: Back to Black Power," *Journal of Politics* 35 (May 1973): 386–409.

[4] Propaganda is used here in the Lasswellian sense as "political symbols manipulated for control of public opinion" (see Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* [New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950], pp. 111–13). For a detailed explication of black power using the Lasswell and Kaplan framework see my "The Impact of the Black Power Symbol on American Politics" (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, 3–6 March 1980, Atlanta, Georgia).

[5] McCormack, "Stokeley Carmichael and Pan Africanism," p. 390.

[6] Bayard Rustin, "From Protest to Politics," *Commentary* 39 (February 1965): 25–31.

[7] William A. Gamson, "Stable Unrepresentation in American Society," *The American Behavioral Scientists* 12 (November-December 1968): 15–21.

[8] David Truman developed this theoretically useful distinction between "potential groups" and

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Gamson's model of this conversion process is especially useful in understanding the emergence of interest-group formations among oppressed strata in the United States.

Gamson presents his model as a "heuristic device" designed to explore the conditions under which unrepresented groups achieve (or fail to achieve) representation in the competitive interest-group establishment. That is, the model accepts the existence of a high degree of pluralism in the polity but postulates that certain groups are systemically denied entry into the process and only gain entry "through the breakdown of the normal operation of the system or through demonstration on the part of challenging groups of a willingness to violate the 'rules-of-the-game' by resorting to illegitimate means for carrying on political conflict."[9] It is the central argument of this article that the propagandistic symbol black power and the ghetto rebellions of the 1960s constitute a contemporary case of the demonstration on the part of a challenging group, in this case the blacks, of a willingness to violate the "rules of the game" by resorting to unconventional methods of political conflict.

In the explication of the model, Gamson distinguishes two types of societal groups—solidary groups and interest groups. Solidary groups are defined as "collections of individuals who think in terms of the effect of political decisions on the aggregate and feel that they are in some way personally affected by what happens to the aggregate." Interest groups are defined as the "formally organized manifestations of solidary groups."[10]

Given these definitions, Gamson's model can be summarized in three propositions: the American political system normally functions to keep unrepresented groups from developing solidarity and from organizing in political groups; the American political system discourages the effective entry of unrepresented groups into the competitive establishment if and as they become organized; and such unrepresented groups achieve entry only by use of illegitimate means of political struggle.

Gamson's model of the American political system enables scholars to assay more fully the role and function of black power in recent American politics. To state the central thesis of this article in terms of the Gamson model, it argues that black power: contributed to the development of racial solidarity; stimulated the formation of black interest organization; and in conjunction with the ghetto riots facilitated entry by blacks into the pluralist political arena.

"interest groups," but as Balbus points out he failed to use the distinction to develop an explanation of the conversion of potential groups to interest groups. See Truman's *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951), and Isaac Balbus, "The Concept of Interest in Pluralist and Marxian Analysis," *Politics and Society* 1 (February 1971): 151–77.

[9] Gamson, "Stable Unrepresentation," p. 18.

[10] Ibid., p. 19.

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The Development of Race Solidarity

Historically, blacks in the United States, unlike most European ethnic groups, have lacked a strong sense of communal solidarity.[11] Writing of the black community of the late fifties and early sixties, Singer observed that blacks were not an ethnic group, but rather were a collection of individuals "without the community of tradition, sentiment and so forth that has marked and given rise to ethnic groups such as Italian immigrants."[12] Singer's observation is an overstatement. Blacks were in this period more than a mere collection of individuals. The problem was that the black ethnic tradition in politics was not as highly developed as that of other ethnic groups in the United States.

More specific evidence in this regard is offered by Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson. In their effort to explain the weakness of the Negro subcommunity in urban politics observed in the 1950s, Banfield and Wilson focused on two interrelated factors: the class structure of Negro society and the character of urban political systems.[13] Aside from the problems posed by the very existence of a large lower class and a small, underemployed middle class, they argued that urban black communities were handicapped in city politics by the relative inability or unwillingness of the middle class to identify with the lower class and provide leadership for it: "The relatively small Negro middle class is separated from the lower class by differences of ethos and interest."[14] Banfield and Wilson argued that the major cleavage between the lower class and the middle class was in terms of "status" and "welfare." Lower-class blacks were said to favor welfare goals (for example, concrete benefits in terms of housing and welfare) while the middle class favored status goals (destruction of the principle of discrimination and vindication of equal rights and integration). As a result, blacks in city politics were disadvantaged vis-à-vis other groups in the city, in part, by the absence of racial solidarity and a viable ethnic political tradition.

The civil-rights revolution, by facilitating the growth, development, and diversification of the black middle class and by removing the legal basis of status inferiority, contributed to the development of a black ethnic tradition in politics; the movement also encouraged the emergence of new leadership and muted the status-welfare dichotomy in urban black politics.[15] The central contribution of black power was to make race-specific this emergent communal

[11] Gamson lists eight examples of forces that discourage solidarity and initial political organization. Studies of the urban ghetto have shown that all, save one, of these (rates of interaction and organizational participation) are characteristic of urban black ghetto life. See Gamson, "Stable Unrepresentation," p. 20, and Kenneth Clark, *Dark Ghetto* (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

[12] L. Singer, "Ethnogenesis and Negro-Americans Today," *Social Research* 29 (Winter 1962): 429.

[13] Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 294.

[14] Ibid., p. 298.

[15] See the report on Charles Hamilton's in progress research on class politics in urban black communities in Alex Poinsett, "Class Patterns in Black Politics," *Ebony* (August 1973): 35–42, and Robert C. Smith, "The Changing Shape of Urban Black Politics: 1969–70," *The Annals* 39 (September 1978): 22–24.

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solidarity and thereby to contribute directly to the incipient representation of blacks in the polity. Aberbach and Walker present evidence that suggests that black power contributed to the development of a specifically black political culture, a culture cutting across the divisions in ethos and interests observed by Banfield and Wilson in the 1950s.

> Upper status blacks who have broken free from traditional moorings have become part of a *black political community* which includes persons from all social classes. The responses of these upper status blacks to questions about the interpretations of significant events and the evaluation of leaders are more strongly affected by their sense of empathy and identification with their racial community than by their feelings of achievement or even their personal expectations about the future. They share a set of beliefs and a mood of protest about racial issues with those lower status segments of the black community who have also assimilated the secular culture typical of the urban north.[16]

There is also evidence that black power contributed to an increase in personal efficacy and psychological security among segments of the black community.[17] Thus by providing a symbolic basis for the crystallization of racial solidarity among United States blacks, black power laid the foundation for the initial effort at organizing independent black political organizations. It did more than merely lay the foundation, however; it was directly related to the formation of a number of important black interest organizations and to their eventual incorporation into the policy process.

The Development of Race Organization

Although as a propagandistic symbol black power was by design characterized by a high level of generality and ambiguity, substantively from the beginning it was related to the formation of black interest organization. For example, in their initial effort to conceptualize the black power idea, an effort that was characterized by considerable analytic confusion, Carmichael and Hamilton nevertheless presented the following as the "fundamental premise" of black power: "Before a group can enter the open society, it must close ranks. . . . black power is a call for black people to begin to define their own goals, to lead their own organizations and to support those organizations."[18] While this as a fundamental premise of the book was betrayed by other parts of the analysis and was by and large repudiated by Carmichael before the book was even published, it continued, in terms of its major substantive consequence, to be the prevailing interpretation of black power, an interpretation that gained increasing support among black and white elites as time passed.

Hamilton, in particular, became a vigorous and articulate advocate of this in-

[16] Aberbach and Walker, "The Meaning of Black Power," p. 380. See also Smith, "The Impact of the Black Power Symbol.

[17] See A.P. MacDonald, "Black Power," *Journal of Negro Education* 44 (Fall 1975): 547–54.

[18] Stokeley Carmichael and Charles Hamilton, *Black Power* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 44.

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terpretation in his lectures, articles, and essays, while his colleague was moving toward a more revolutionary interpretation of the symbol. In a 1968 lecture at the Justice Department, Hamilton defined black power as the formation of political organizations by blacks independent of the "white power structure." He argued further that black power provided a mechanism to mobilize the black population and that this was both democratic and a clear alternative to violence. In an essay published later that year in the *New York Times Magazine,* Hamilton further developed this interpretation.[19] Increasingly, then, as the sixties progressed middle-class blacks began to see the formation of independent political organizations as the essential structural way to give meaning to black power.

This view of the initial definition of black power as it relates to its structural, as opposed to symbolic, meaning finds support in one of the few systematic social-science treatments of the concept and symbol. Donald J. McCormack writes: "Between May 1966 and January 1967 the inscrutable slogan 'black power,' particularly as it was being defined by Stokeley Carmichael, stood essentially for the employment of conventional group-theory tactics to attain greater political and economic benefits."[20]

Empirical support for this interpretation can be seen in the veritable explosion of new black interest organizations between 1966 and 1972. Afram, in its *Directory of National Black Organizations,* lists 350 organizations. Of this number, the dates of formation are provided for 166. Of this 166, 73 (44 percent) were founded after the emergence of black power (1966), most between 1967 and 1969. These new organizations cover a broad range of concerns and interests—business and economic, educational, cultural, professional and occupational, and political.[21]

These new black power organizations, however, posit a variety of rationales for their formation. Charles Sanders, a co-compiler of the Afram directory, observes that these groups were heavily influenced by the new "ideologies" of black power and black nationalism.[22] Unlike the traditional black trade and professional organizations formed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these groups were formed not because blacks were excluded from the majority-dominated, established associations.[23] Rather, they broke away either

[19] Charles V. Hamilton, "An Advocate of Black Power Defines It," *New York Times Magazine,* 14 April 1968.

[20] McCormack, "Stokeley Carmichael and Pan Africanism," p. 390.

[21] *Directory: National Black Organizations* (New York: Afram Associates, 1972).

[22] From a paper presented by Charles Sanders at a meeting of the National Association of Black Social Workers, cited in C. Gerald Fraser, "Decade's Change in Blacks Studied," *New York Times,* 16 April 1972.

[23] The formation of separate black interest associations in this period is evidence of one parallel between black power and the philosophy and program of Booker T. Washington. Between 1880 and 1915, the age of Booker T. Washington, there was again a veritable explosion of "separatists" black interest and self-help organizations. For a discussion of the origins and purposes of these organizations, see August Meier, *Negro Thought in America 1880–1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), pp. 121–38.

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as separate entities or as black caucuses within these associations because of what they saw as the "white nationalism" of the established groups and their consequent failure to speak to the needs of blacks in the society. For example, speaking of the formation of the black social workers organization, Jay Chunn, its president and the dean of the Howard University School of Social Work, stated, "we formed at the 1969 national social welfare conference first as a separate caucus and later as a separate association because we did not feel the conference was addressing the needs of blacks in the social welfare field."[24]

In general, these organizations are more explicitly political than the traditional "Negro" organizations.[25] That is, rather than defining their goals narrowly in terms of particularistic economic or professional concerns, these organizations have a much broader focus, viewing themselves, in Sanders words, as "technical support groups for the black liberation movement."[26]

In addition, a number of such caucus-type organizations have been formed among black elected and appointed officials: the National Black Legislative Clearinghouse, an organization of black state legislators formed in 1969 to increase the effectiveness of minority state legislators; the National Black Caucus of Local Elected Officials, organized in 1970 by black delegates to the annual meeting of the National League of Cities to serve as a vehicle to increase black influence in the League and in the United States Conference of Mayors; the Judicial Council of the National Bar Association, an organization of black elected and appointed judges formed in 1971; the National Caucus of Black School Board Members (1971); the Southern Conference of Black Mayors (1972); the National Association of Black County Officials (1975); the Council of Black Appointees, the organization of forty to fifty high-level, "supergrade" officials in the federal government formed during the Nixon administration; and finally the best-known nationally of such organizations, the Congressional Black Caucus, the organization of the black members of the United States House of Representatives formed in 1969.[27]

Thus by the end of the 1960s black power had fostered two remarkable developments in black politics in the United States: It had contributed to the development of a black ethnic tradition and to the development of an emergent independent black organizational structure. These developments, however, constitute only the first steps in the process of the achievement of stable representation by a previously unrepresented group. Gamson's model forewarns of the probability that such a group will fail to achieve effective entry into the system even if it develops solidarity and organization, unless it demonstrates to the authorities a willingness to go beyond the normal routines of politics. Black

[24] Personal interview, 16 July 1974, Washington, D.C.

[25] Robert C. Smith, "Black Elites and Black Groups in the Federal Policy Process: A Study in Interest Articulation" (Ph.D. diss., Howard University, 1976), pp. 43-127.

[26] Quoted in Fraser, "Decade's Change in Blacks Studied."

[27] In addition, a number of black state legislators have formed caucuses along lines similar to that of the Congressional Black Caucus. See Paul Delaney, "Increasing Numbers of Black Legislators Beginning to Have Impact on Issues Throughout the Nation," *New York Times,* 19 March 1972.

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power as it was articulated by Carmichael and some of his colleagues after 1967 and the several summers of ghetto revolt provided this demonstration and thus was the final link in the progression of blacks from stable unrepresentation to incipient representation.

Black Power, Ghetto Revolt, and Black Incorporation

Considering first the role and function of the riots, there is some dispute in the literature concerning the proper interpretation of the political significance of the ghetto disturbances. Edward Banfield, among others, argues that the riots (and especially the rioters) had no political import. Rather, he suggests that they were simply rampages conducted by young ghetto men largely for fun and profit.[28] This view has been challenged by more serious students of the phenomena. For example, David Sears and John McConahay in their careful study of the Watts riot argue that the riots were indeed political events, representing a revolt of the urban black lower class.[29]

For purposes of this analysis, it is not necessary to determine whether the ghetto riots were mere aimless youthful rampages or purposeful political events for in the minds of the authorities they were demonstrably the latter. Indeed, the burden of Banfield's polemic is precisely that government officials, academics, civil-rights leaders, and the media misinterpreted the riots as political events and thereby made them so. More recently, James Button in a detailed investigation of the policy effects of the riots at the national level shows that federal executive officials interpreted the riots as politically purposeful behavior intended to make demands upon those in the authority structure.[30]

The riots were of course not viewed in isolation. They were intimately linked in the minds of many authorities with the threat of black rebellion, or in J. Edgar Hoover's words, a "real mau mau in America, the beginning of a true black revolution."[31] Black power, especially as articulated by Carmichael and Brown after 1967, seemed to many to symbolize this threat of revolution. Carmichael increasingly began to move away from the conventional interest-group interpretation of black power toward a stance that saw the slogan as symbolizing the beginnings of violent revolt against "white western imperialist" America.[32]

[28] Edward Banfield, *The Unheavenly City: The Nature and Future of Our Urban Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 185–209.

[29] David Sears and John B. McConahay, *The Politics of Violence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1970).

[30] James W. Button, *Black Violence: Political Impact of the 1960s Riots* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[31] From a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to FBI field offices relative to the COINTEL PRO (Counter Intelligence Program). The memorandum was cited in Susanna McBee, "Hoover Ordered FBI to Plant Spies, Forge Papers against Extremists," *Washington Post*, 8 March 1974.

[32] The ghetto riots almost certainly affected this shift in Carmichael's interpretation of black power. Matthew Holden, Jr.'s observation on the relationship between black power and violence illustrates this point: "SNCC was soon charged with, or praised for, advocating violence. But this

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This threatening symbolism of black power, this clear break with the normal rhetoric of American politics was made emphatic for the authorities by Carmichael's attendance as guest of honor at the Organization of Latin American Solidarity which took place at Havana in August 1967. At this meeting of Communists, socialists, and revolutionaries from throughout the hemisphere, Carmichael declared, "America is going to fall and I only hope to live long enough to see it."[33] This type of rhetoric and the behavior of Carmichael, and the emerging national prominence of the Black Panther party, during this period was a clear demonstration to national elites of a willingness on the part of some sectors of the black community to go beyond the accepted routines of American politics in their pursuit of power.[34] And the riots of course appeared to give a degree of reality to the rhetoric. By 1968, then, most federal policy elites, black elected officials, civil-rights leaders, and influential media had come to accept Hamilton's interpretation of black power as both reasonable and well within the framework of traditional American ethnic interest politics.

For example, in 1967 the *New York Times* published a survey that showed "significant support" for black power among white liberals "because they feel integration is impossible in the immediate future and favor instead building up Negro institutions."[35] As an example of changing elite perceptions, in early 1968 the Ford Foundation, a central support institution in the civil-rights movement and a symbol of liberal corporate power, announced that it would support black leaders and groups of "good will" whether they believed in integration or separate black power.[36] And, at its 1968 convention, Whitney Young, one of the more vocal critics of black power, announced that the Urban League had changed its position and would now support the concept "where it emphasizes self-determination, self respect and participation and control of one's community affairs."[37]

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charge or praise seems to have been, at first, overreaction by both whites and blacks. . . .The wave of near-panic is related less to what SNCC did than to the *imagery* of incipient black revolt. . . .Instead, it seems much more likely that SNCC fell accidentally into the posture of appearing to advocate aggressive violence. . . .Having done so, it found political benefits in never discouraging the idea that this was its policy (*The Politics of the Black 'Nation'* [New York: Chandler, 1973], p. 76).

[33] Quoted in John Gerassi, "Havana: A New International is Born," in *Latin American Radicalism: A Documentary Report on Left and Nationalists Movements*, eds. Irving L. Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 532. Later in the year Carmichael took a tour of Third World socialist and Communist countries (including North Vietnam) where he made similar declarations. Upon his return he wrote an article in which he argued that black power had moved beyond the politics of pluralism in the United States to the revolutionary ideology of Pan Africanism. See his "Pan Africanism—Land and Power," *Black Scholar* 1 (November 1969): 36-54. And the following year H. "Rap" Brown, Carmichael's successor as SNCC chairman, called on blacks to arm themselves for the coming revolution.

[34] At this time the Black Panther party was moving from its initial reformist orientation toward an ideology of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism. See Gene Marine, *Black Panthers* (New York: New American Library, 1969).

[35] Gene Roberts, "A White Liberal Shift on Integration," *New York Times*, 17 December 1967.

[36] Fred Hechinger, "Ford Fund Pledges Drive against Racial Prejudice," *New York Times*, 18 February 1968.

[37] Earl Caldwell, "Young Embraces Black Power Idea," *New York Times*, 7 July 1968.

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Evidence of the polity's willingness to include blacks in the ongoing, competitive, pluralist interest-group structure include the appointment of blacks to highly visible positions in the national government, the election of black mayors in several large cities, the acceptance of a black power organization—the racially exclusive Congressional Black Caucus—in the Congress of the nation, the use of the Community Action and Model Cities agencies as mechanisms to organize the urban black poor, and in some instances the direct financing of black interest organizations by the federal government.[38] Taken together these acts represent the beginnings of the incorporation of blacks as constituent elements of the national polity.[39]

Conclusion

The most important consequence of the developments assayed in this article is the entrance of black interest organizations into the competitive, pluralist interest-group system characteristic of the "middle level" of power in the United States.[40] This is particularly evident at the federal level. As late as 1968, studies of the process of formulating federal policy found an absence of access by blacks.[41] Very few blacks were found among the policymaking elites, and blacks did not on the whole possess access to centers of decision making in the federal policy process. A principal reason for this lack of access was the relative absence of effective black interest organizations and elites at the federal level. Since the

[38] Of the poverty programs, Theodore Lowi observes: "To the interest group liberal poverty is becoming just another status around which power centers ought to organize. If a group hasn't organized then organize it. . . . This does not eliminate poverty but it helps legitimize the interest group liberal's preference for dealing only with organized claims" (*The End of Liberalism* [New York: W.W. Norton, 1969], pp. 83–84). Lowi's point is addressed to the problem of poverty but it can be extended without difficulty to black power as an ethnic variant of the interest-group liberal's philosophy. See David Greenstone and Paul Peterson, *Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Community Participation and the War on Poverty* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973), p. 7, and Frances Fox Piven, "The Great Society as Political Strategy," *Columbia Forum* 13 (Summer 1970): 271–77. Concerning the direct financing of black interest organizations, see Smith, "Black Elites and Black Groups," pp. 62–65.

[39] It should be clear that while there were elite efforts to facilitate the entry of black organizations into the competitive establishment, there were also as Gamson's model suggests efforts to undermine, discredit and harass certain black elites and organizations. Detailed evidence of this is available in the Senate's investigation of the FBI's COINTEL PRO program. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, *Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans*, Book III, *Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).

[40] C. Wright Mills, "The Structure of Power in American Society," in *Power, Politics and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills*, ed. Irving L. Horowitz (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), p. 30.

[41] Harold Wolman and Norman Thomas, "Black Interests, Black Groups, and Black Influence in the Federal Policy Process: The Cases of Housing and Education," *Journal of Politics* 32 (November 1970): 875–97. The Wolman and Thomas findings are in a strict sense limited to the education and housing policy areas; however, they imply the findings are valid across the range of policy areas at the federal level.

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late 1960s, however, blacks have made significant progress toward the development of a political voice of their own in Washington, that is, political organizations and leaders actively involved in the articulation of black interests.

Prior to this development there was, with the exception of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) and the Urban League and to a lesser degree the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and the National Council of Negro Women, little sustained organized black input in the federal policy process. Further, these organizations were engaged primarily in traditional civil-rights, antidiscrimination activities rather than in broad public-policy concerns. As Wolman and Thomas observe, "The policy goals blacks have pursued have been short-run, direct and highly visible; primarily to attack overt racial discrimination and promote integration." Thus, with the exception of civil rights, but on broader questions of public policy affecting blacks, black interests in the federal policy process were represented, to the extent they were, through what Wolman and Thomas call virtual and indirect representation.[42]

Today, there is evidence this is not the case.[43] The black power symbol, with its emphasis on racial solidarity and independent black organization, has operated over the years to stimulate the formation of black interest organizations and to increase the interest-articulation activities of the older, more established "Negro" organizations. Indeed, there has emerged a wide variety of black organizations active in the articulation of black interests in the federal policy process. These organizations cover a broad range of policy or issue areas and black community concerns ranging from general civil-rights organizations such as the NAACP to broad policy organizations such as the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, the National Association of Black Manufacturers, or until recently the National Welfare Rights Organization.[44] Further, there is evidence that black elites and organizations possess nominal access to major decision points in the federal policy process.[45]

[42] Ibid. By virtual representation Wolman and Thomas mean "certain units within the executive branch were institutionally structured and certain officials took it upon themselves to represent the interests of the black community—or at least some of the interests of some parts of the black community." By indirect representation it is argued that black interests are represented by such groups as the AFL-CIO and the National Council of Churches. Ibid., p. 881.

[43] Smith, "Black Elites and Black Groups," pp. 43–127.

[44] As a result of a cutback in government and foundation support, the militant National Welfare Rights Organization was forced to close its Washington office. This is indicative of a more general problem of the Washington black lobby—its dependence on external sources of financial support. Indeed, in my study, 50 percent of black interest organizations derived their major source of financial support from corporations, foundations, the federal government, or labor unions. Ibid., pp. 62–65. For an illuminating discussion of this as an aspect of the problem of clientage in black politics, see Holden, *The Politics of the Black "Nation,"* pp. 43–52.

[45] Smith, "Black Elites and Black Groups," pp. 73–78. The concept of nominal access indicates the extent to which a group has the ability to be heard in the strict sense by decision makers. It is contrasted with effective access which is the ability of groups not only to be heard but to get results. See Harold V. Savitch, "Powerlessness in an Urban Ghetto: The Case of Political Bias and Differential Access in New York City," *Polity* 5 (1972): 19–56.

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This development of black interest organization is a new and undoubtedly important departure in black political life. Studies on interest groups have shown that organization is highly advantageous in the successful advancement of a group's interest, particularly in the United States where competition from numerous organized groups to influence public policy is so great. As Wilson has written: "If the causes represented by . . . mass efforts are to continue to be espoused, they will continue through organizational efforts or not at all. Passions can be aroused and for the moment directed, they cannot be sustained. Organization provides continuity and predictability to social processes that would otherwise be episodic and uncertain."[46]

Although organization is perhaps indispensable in the articulation of a group's interests in the United States, it does involve certain costs. First, there is a marked tendency for middle- to upper-income persons to form and participate in organizations at a greater rate than poor or low-income persons. Second, as Theodore Lowi writes, "a permanent association is a distortion of its own interests, no matter how creative or effective the distortion."[47] These costs may weigh most heavily on blacks in the United States, given their high percentage of low-income persons and the relatively small stratum of those who are politically active. As a consequence, black organizations may, wittingly or not, distort or misrepresent black interests. Related to this problem, a substantial number of black organizations are dependent on whites for financial support and this may exert a subtle (and on occasion not so subtle) influence on the groups' articulation of black interests, and there is also the possibility that black organizational elites may in the course of the bargaining characteristic of the federal policy process become more willing to compromise black interests as the price of continued access and interaction in the system. Finally, a relatively resource-poor group (in terms of social status, economic power, and votes) such as American blacks finds it difficult to compete with the more privileged financial and ideological business and labor groups. Pinderhughes's research shows that "the subordinate, dependent status of the black population limits the capacity of black interests to create well funded and supported groups capable of the consistent monitoring required in administration and implementation of law. This same status multiplies the number of potential issue areas of importance to black constituencies, but their resource difficulties limit the number of issues they can address, and weaken their likelihood of being taken seriously within any of those areas."[48] Yet, in a polity in which interest groups exert enormous influence, all groups, small and weak, are generally accorded equal and indiscriminate legitimacy that, as Lowi argues, ends up in the system being representative of privileged and conservative interests.[49]

[46] James Q. Wilson, *Political Organization* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 7.

[47] Theodore Lowi, "Interest Groups and the Consent to Govern: Getting the People Out for What?" *The Annals* 413 (May 1974): 95.

[48] Dianne Pinderhughes, "Racial Interest Groups and Incremental Politics" (manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1980), p. 36.

[49] Lowi, *The End of Liberalism.*

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Nevertheless, these inchoate organizations constitute a developing national black lobby that, in spite of the calls of some black leaders for a return to the streets, is part of an irreversible process akin to the transformation from the agrarian crusade of the 1890s to the farm lobby of the 1920s or from the labor movement of the thirties to the labor lobby of today.[50] The question, then, is can the black lobby—representing the gradual incorporation of blacks at the middle level of power—fundamentally alter the terrible conditions of the black underclass. If not, we can be certain that black power will be succeeded by a more radical movement because the transformation from protest to politics will be but the precondition for a yet higher stage in the historic struggle of blacks for their liberation in the Americas.*

[50] This is not to say there will not be street protests in the future but rather that they will never again constitute a central mode of black politics as they did in the 1960s and in all probability will be subordinate to and manipulated by the black lobby. Nor do I discount future ghetto riots; on the contrary I believe they are inevitable and their shape and relationship to the black lobby unpredictable.

* A longer version of this article was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, 1-3 November 1979, Gatlinburg, Tennessee. I am grateful to Mack Jones, Dianne Pinderhughes, and Ronald Walters for comments on the earlier draft.

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

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Sino-Vietnamese Conflict and the Sino-American Rapprochement

JOHN W. GARVER

The collapse of the Saigon government in April 1975 and the subsequent unification of Vietnam under Hanoi's rule radically redefined the pattern of international relations in Southeast Asia. North Vietnam, exhilarated by its victory over the world's greatest power, began moving to establish the "special relation" between the countries of Indochina that Hanoi had long envisioned. These efforts, however, rapidly brought Hanoi into conflict with Peking, which had consistently sought to maintain the independence of Cambodia and Laos. Hanoi also more openly asserted its claims to the archipelagoes in the South China Sea. Peking had previously believed that Hanoi accepted China's claims to these islands.[1]

It is important to understand, however, that the Sino-Vietnamese conflict antedates the upheaval of 1975 and that its emergence was largely a function of the two countries' relations with the two superpowers. The purpose of this article is twofold. It seeks first of all to elucidate some of the more important historical antecedents of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in the period from the beginnings of the Sino-American rapprochement in late 1970 to the signing of the Vietnam Peace Accords in January 1973. During these years there was increasing divergence between the major foreign-policy objectives of both China and North Vietnam as Peking moved to improve its relations with the United States—a shift in policy that reflected the Chinese leadership's view that the Soviet Union constituted a greater threat to China than did the United States.

[1] "Hsiasha ch'üntao he nansha ch'üntao chengtuan de yulai" (The origin of the confrontation over the Paracel and Spratley Islands), *Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily)*, 15 May 1979, p. 5(hereafter *JMJP*).

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Hanoi's chief concern, however, lay in mobilizing maximum pressure against the United States.

The depth of the contradiction between Peking's and Hanoi's policies raises significant questions regarding Peking's own understanding of its rapprochement with the United States. During 1979 Hanoi began charging that Peking had reached an agreement with Washington during 1970–1972 which amounted to a "betrayal" of Vietnam. Under this agreement, Hanoi now charges, Peking abandoned its previous support for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam and for Vietnamese unification and instead began pressuring Hanoi to postpone indefinitely the liberation of the South and accept a continuing, residual U.S. presence there.

There are certainly precedents for such "betrayals" in the annals of twentieth-century history. Moreover, there is substantial evidence that Washington did indeed seek Chinese (and Soviet) assistance in achieving an "honorable peace" in Vietnam. The fact that Hanoi now quotes China's leaders to substantiate this charge also gives it a certain credibility.

The question of whether Hanoi was "betrayed" (as defined by Hanoi) by Peking can be used as a convenient starting point around which to organize an investigation of the linkages between Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-American relations at that critical juncture and of the nature of China's role in the 1973 Vietnam peace settlement. This is the second purpose of this article. Although this has been a question of interest for some time, the available evidence made possible only very tentative conclusions. During 1979, however, the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations led both Hanoi and Peking to release much new information in the form of polemics to discredit the policies of the other side. On the Chinese side, there were many revealing articles in *Jen Min Jih Pao (People's Daily)*.[2] Peking's propaganda was given a boost by the defection of an ex-member of the Vietnamese Worker's Party (VWP) Politburo, Hoang Van Hoan, in the fall of 1979.[3] For its part, Hanoi compiled its charges into several

[2] The more important Chinese articles are: Li Hsien-nien, "Ichiuch'ich'i nien liuyue shihjih Li Hsien-nien futs'ungli t'ung Fan Wen-t'ung ts'ungli t'anhua peiwanglu" (Memorandum of Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's discussions with Premier Pham Van Dong on 10 June 1977), *JMJP*, 23 March 1979, p. 1; Huang Mu, "Lishihde chiencheng, ichiuch'iliu nien ch'ingmingchieh Yüehnan saomuchi" (The witness of history, 1976 Ch'ingming grave sweeping ceremony in Vietnam), *JMJP*, 1 April 1979, p. 6, discussing China's wartime support for Hanoi; Commentator, "Yüehnan dangchü pach'üanchui lochi" (The hegemonist logic of the Vietnamese Authorities), *JMJP*, 5 May 1979, p. 1, presenting China's view of how Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorated; Chang Chia-hsiang and Liu Wo-min, "Huainien Hu Chih-ming chuhsi" (Recollections of Chairman Ho Chi Minh), *JMJP*, 4 September 1979, p. 6, documenting Ho's interactions with Chinese leaders. Vietnam's White Paper prompted a three part Chinese response: "Chishih kungchuang yushih ch'iuhsing" (Not only an affidavit, but also evil behavior), *JMJP*, 15 November 1979, p. 1; "Yüehnan kangfa, kangmei touchêng shihchi de Chungyüeh kuanhsi" (Sino-Vietnamese relations during the period of Vietnam's anti-French, anti-American struggles), *JMJP*, 21 November 1979, pp. 1, 4; "Weishenma Yüehnan tungyi hou Chengyüeh kuanhsi ohuale?" (Why did Sino-Vietnamese relations deteriorate after Vietnam's unification?), *JMJP*, 26 November 1979, pp. 1,4.

[3] Hoang Van Hoan's main contribution was, "Yüehchung chanchêng yui de shihshih pujung

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long pamphlets and a ninety-page White Paper.[4] The publication of Henry Kissinger's memoirs in 1979 also provided significant new information regarding the linkages between Sino-American and Sino-Vietnamese relations.[5] On the basis of this new information a much more conclusive reconstruction of these critical interrelationships is now possible.

China and the Vietnam War

Throughout its struggle against the United States and the South Vietnamese regime in Saigon, Hanoi sought maximum support from both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. During the 1950s and early 1960s, China was Hanoi's most enthusiastic backer. Conversely, as Khrushchev moved toward "peaceful coexistence" with the United States, Soviet support for Hanoi lessened. Thus, by 1963–1964 Hanoi was supporting the Chinese Communists in their polemical dispute with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The change in Soviet leadership in 1964 combined with the massive U.S. intervention of 1964–1965 to produce major changes in both Soviet and North Vietnamese policy. Moscow greatly increased its support for North Vietnam, while Hanoi adopted a strictly neutral line in the Sino-Soviet dispute. For the next ten years Hanoi walked a careful line, trying not to antagonize either Moscow or Peking while working to insure the support of both.[6]

Throughout this period Chinese aid to North Vietnam (or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV) was vital to the DRV's war effort. Although China extended economic and military aid, provided sanctuaries inside South China, and made available logistic lines running across China from the Soviet Union, China's most important contribution in support of Hanoi was a more amorphous one—its implicit threat to enter the war if U.S. escalation exceeded some unspecified level.[7] The deployment of large numbers of Chinese troops to the DRV during 1965–1968 underlined Peking's commitment to defend North Viet-

waich'ü," (It is impermissible to distort the facts of Vietnamese-Chinese friendship), *JMJP*, 27 November 1979, pp. 1,5.

[4] One of these pamphlets deals with the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979: *Chinese Aggression, Why and How It Failed* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979). The other presents a wider overview of Vietnam-China relations: *Chinese Aggression Against Vietnam: The Root of the Problem* (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1979). The White Paper was published in October 1979, *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations over the Last Thirty Years* (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1979).

[5] Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, and Co., 1979).

[6] See Brian Shaw, "China and North Vietnam: Two Revolutionary Paths," *Current Scene,* Part I, 7 November 1971, vol. ix, no. 11; Part II, 7 December 1979, vol. ix, no. 12; and Jay Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia: Peking's Relations with Revolutionary Movements* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976). *Current Scene* was published biweekly in Hong Kong by the United States Information Service to provide a survey and analysis of developments in the People's Republic of China.

[7] See Allen S. Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

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nam and placed serious constraints on the U.S. attack against the North.[8] Hanoi was well aware of this factor. As its 1979 White Paper pointed out, "With the Korean War, the U.S. imperialists learnt the lesson that they should not wage a war on the Asian contintent, especially in the countries adjacent to China, lest a direct military confrontation with China should take place."[9]

While support for Hanoi had long been, and was to remain, a central component of Peking's stridently anti-imperialist foreign policy, by 1968 new complexities in Sino-Vietnamese relations began to emerge. During the years 1968–1971 China's leadership was racked by an intense factional struggle over issues closely tied to foreign policy. The three major factions among the central leadership differed sharply in their views of the international order and about how China should respond to it. Although these factional disputes are very interesting, this analysis will focus only on the Chinese architects of the Sino-American rapprochement, that is, the group led by Chou En-lai (usually dubbed the "Moderates" by Western analysts) which was in control of China's foreign policy by late 1970. Chou's group believed that great changes were taking place in the international order with Soviet socialist imperialism presenting a great and increasing danger to China while U.S. imperialism was rapidly declining and posed little threat to China. Thus, they concluded, China should substantially improve its relations with the United States in order to help check and counter Soviet socialist imperialism and to prevent a possible joint Soviet-U.S. encirclement of China.[10]

Concerning their attitude toward the Vietnam War, the Moderates' approach led them to desire an end to the fighting on terms that would not lead to a rapid collapse of U.S. power in other areas of Asia and the world. The Moderates' thinking was elaborated in a series of documents used for political study within the Chinese army just after the signing of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring the Peace in Vietnam in January 1973. The peace accords were a great victory, these documents said, because they defeated Moscow's plan to keep the war going. By continuing the war, the Chinese noted, the Soviets had hoped not only to keep several hundred thousand U.S. troops on China's southern borders, thereby creating hostility between China and the United States and forging another link in Moscow's strategy to encircle China, but also to keep U.S. forces pinned down in Vietnam so that they could not oppose Soviet expansionism in other areas, most notably, Europe and the Middle East. Ending the fighting in Vietnam would reduce tension between China and the United States, the document said, while increasing tension between the United States

[8] China later revealed that between October 1965 and March 1968 a total of 320,000 Chinese troops served in North Vietnam with the annual maximum reaching 170,000. "Sino-Vietnamese relations during the period of Vietnam's anti-French, anti-American struggles," *JMJP*, 21 November 1979, p. 4.

[9] *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations,* p. 31.

[10] See Thomas Gottlieb, *Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1977); and John W. Garver, "China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968–1971" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1979).

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and the Soviet Union: "In this way the contradiction between them [the superpowers] will become more acute. This is an excellent development favorable to us and to the people of the world."[11]

It was their fear of a continued U.S. presence in South Vietnam and of superpower encirclement that led the Moderates to take umbrage at Hanoi's 1968 decision to begin negotiations with the United States. They feared that such negotiations would lead to a North Vietnamese "surrender" and the acceptance of a continued U.S. presence in South Vietnam. Thus Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, a member of Chou's Moderate group, told North Vietnamese officials in October 1968 that the agreement to negotiate was a mistake because it would leave South Vietnam under the domination of the United States and prevent its liberation.[12] Furthermore, if Hoang Van Hoan is to be believed, Hanoi made this move without consulting Peking:

> At that time [in the mid-1960s] Vietnamese-Chinese relations were quite intimate, whenever there was some big problem it would first be discussed, whenever there was an important decision they would first notify the other side. But when U.S. President Johnson expressed willingness on March 31, 1968 to negotiate with Vietnam, the Vietnamese government announced on April 3 that it was prepared anytime to send a representative to negotiate with the U.S., it had not exchanged opinions with China and had not notified China. At that time Chairman Ho was in Peking recovering from an illness. Premier Chou En-lai came to visit Chairman Ho. Chairman Ho also did not know about this. China felt that this abnormal deceiving of China by Le Duan was perhaps some sort of plot.[13]

Peking responded very negatively to Hanoi's decision to negotiate and issued numerous polemics decrying the move although not specifically denouncing Hanoi.[14] The amount of attention that the Chinese media paid to Vietnam generally declined steadily.[15] Chinese aid decreased and, according to Hanoi,

[11] Political Department, Kunming Military Region, "Reference Materials Concerning Education on Situation, No. 41, The Historical Current of the People's Revolution in the World is Irresistible," in *Chinese Communist Internal Politics and Foreign Policy* (Taipei: Institute for International Relations, 1974), pp. 120–25. This document was intended for use in the campaign within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1973 to criticize Lin Piao and rectify style of work. This particular document deals with the Vietnam peace accords and why these accords were a great victory. These documents have all the earmarks of authenticity and their credibility is supported by the fact that Chou En-lai urged these same arguments on Nixon and Kissinger during their February 1972 talks (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1073).

[12] *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations*, p. 37.

[13] Hoang Van Hoan, "It is impermissible to distort the facts of Vietnamese-Chinese friendship," p. 5.

[14] For example, "Soviet Revisionists Stop at Nothing to Salvage U.S. Imperialist Aggression against Vietnam," *Peking Review* 12, 22 March 1968, pp. 11–13; "U.S. Imperialist Chieftan Johnson Tries New Fraud—'Partially Stopping Bombing' to Induce 'Peace Talks'," *Peking Review* 15, 12 April 1968, pp. 14–15; "Murderous Intent Revealed Before the Scheme is Fully Unfolded," *JMJP* Commentator in *Peking Review* 16, 19 April 1968, p. 12.

[15] "Peking Reports Vietnam, 1965–1969," *China News Analysis* 780, 31 October 1969, pp. 1–7. *China News Analysis* is a highly respected independent newsletter covering Chinese affairs and

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Peking threatened to cut off aid altogether.[16] Moreover, in the spring of 1968 thousands of Chinese troops stationed in the DRV were withdrawn, and by mid-1970 all had returned to China.[17] Sino-Vietnamese relations warmed again in the aftermath of the U.S. "incursion" into Cambodia in the spring of 1970. Peking supported Hanoi's moves to counter that thrust and aborted its recently opened talks with the United States.

Peking's Handling of Contradictions

By late 1970 the Moderates were in control of China's foreign policy and were setting their course toward rapprochement with the United States. To carry out such a policy while Hanoi was engaged in a desperate total war against the United States could be highly risky to Sino-Vietnamese relations. Moreover, it might drive Hanoi into closer alignment with the Soviet Union—a development that would be contrary to the very purposes underlying China's opening to the United States. To handle such contradictions, Chinese leaders had to adopt measures strongly supportive of Hanoi's struggle. The VWP leadership had to be convinced that improved Sino-American relations would not be at the DRV's expense and that China's aid would continue, indeed, would increase. Thus, Chinese aid to the DRV, which had declined during 1968 and 1969, increased substantially during 1970 and rose to record levels by 1971–1972.[18] Hanoi later characterized this as an attempt by the Chinese leadership to "cover up their betrayal and to appease the Vietnamese people's indignation."[19]

Peking also moved into line behind Hanoi's and the Provisional Revolutionary Government's (PRG) negotiating efforts with the United States. The first tentative shift in Peking's strongly negative attitude toward Hanoi's negotiations had come late in 1968, only to be sharply reversed early in 1969.[20] This movement had coincided with Peking's first, abortive opening to Washington. Late in 1970 China's attitude toward the Paris peace talks again began to soften, just as the Moderates again began maneuvering to improve

published in Hong Kong. Among other things, it provides useful summaries and analysis of trends in Chinese propaganda. It also publishes occasional reviews of Vietnamese developments.

[16] Nayan Chanda, "Secrets of Former Friends," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 104, 15 June 1979, p. 39.

[17] "Regional Survey, China, Foreign Relations," *Asian Yearbook, 1969, Far Eastern Economic Review*, Hong Kong, p. 141 and, "Sino-Vietnamese relations during the period of Vietnam's anti-French, anti-American struggles," *JMJP*, 21 November 1979, p. 4.

[18] Leo Tansky, "Chinese Foreign Aid," in *People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment*, prepared for the U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 92d Cong., 1st sess., May 1972, p. 378.

[19] *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations*, p. 41.

[20] See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly* 37 (January-March 1969): 169. Also, Ishwer C. Ojha, *The Changing Pattern of China's Attitude Towards a Negotiated Settlement in Vietnam, 1964-1971*, Southern Illinois University, Asian Studies Occasional Paper Series, no. 2, (Carbondale, Ill., n.d.).

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ties—and begin talks—with the United States. On 13 December 1970 a Chinese government statement endorsed the peace plan proposed by the PRG.[21] A joint Sino-Vietnamese communique of 10 March 1971 contained a similar endorsement.

Peking also responsed to stepped-up U.S. military pressure against Hanoi during late 1970 and early 1971 by expressing its support of the North in stronger terms than had been used since 1964–1965. During November 1970, U.S. planes launched the heaviest bombing raids on the DRV since 1968. Equally significant was the U.S. commando raid against a prisoner of war camp twenty-three miles north of Hanoi. Launched one hour before the massive air strikes began, this raid was the first U.S. ground operation into the DRV. As such it carried an ominous hint.

Peking responded promptly with deterrent support for Hanoi. Two days after the U.S. warplanes struck, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement condemning the U.S. bombing. This statement set the tone for several Chinese warnings which followed over the next four months:

> The Chinese people are closely watching the development of the situation in Vietnam and Indochina. The Chinese government reaffirms: the struggle of the peoples of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries is our struggle. It is the bounden internationalist duty of the Chinese people to give all-out support and assistance to the peoples of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The 700 million Chinese people provide a powerful backing for the Vietnamese people. . . .China's vast expanse is their reliable rear area and the Chinese people are determined to stand forever with the fraternal peoples of Vietnam and other Indochinese countries and unite and fight together with them till complete victory.[22]

Late in 1970 U.S. and South Vietnamese military leaders began preparing the invasion of the southern panhandle of Laos which would follow early in 1971. While these preparations were going on, Peking issued a number of warnings to the United States, in terms similar to those of the earlier Foreign Ministry statement, that "new adventures" would be dangerous.[23] Once the Laos operation

[21] "Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review* 51, 18 December 1970; p. 3. For the 10 March 1971 statement see, "Joint Communique of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Worker's Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," *Peking Review* 11, 12 March 1971, p. 18.

[22] "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, November 24, 1970," *Peking Review* 48, 27 November 1970, p. 5.

[23] The Central Committee and government statement of 13 December 1970 cited in note 21, for example, warned that "Any U.S. imperialist military adventure . . . against the Vietnamese people or the other peoples of Indo-China are also provocations against the Chinese people . . . . We sternly warn U.S. imperialism: Don't misjudge the situation and miscalculate. The Vietnamese people are resolved to fight to the end, and the Chinese people, on their part, are determined to support them to the end." See also: "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, January 25, 1971," *Peking Review* 5, 29 January 1971, p. 5; "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, February 4, 1971, February 8, 1971," *Peking*

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was launched on 10 February 1971, Peking used very strong language to express its support for Hanoi and to warn the United States of the danger of Chinese intervention. On 10 February a *People's Daily* commentator warned Washington that it was "playing with fire" and that Laos was China's close neighbor.[24] On 12 February a government statement called developments in Indochina a "grave menace" to China.[25] The United States was "spreading the flames of war to the door of China," according to the statement, and China could not remain indifferent. On 20 February the *People's Daily* commentary "Don't Lose Your Head Nixon" carried the strongest warning of all.[26] The invasion of Laos was "highly dangerous" and "poses a grave threat to China" it said. Nixon was going down the same path taken by Truman in Korea, it continued. Laos was not in "Northwest Europe or South America," the commentary warned, but was China's close neighbor. In such circumstances the Chinese people "cannot be indifferent" and "will never let you run amuck in Indochina." This was strong language; the threat of Chinese military intervention was obvious. Elsewhere the Chinese press raised the possibility that Washington might employ tactical nuclear weapons in Indochina.[27]

From 5 to 8 March a Chinese delegation led by Chou En-lai visited Hanoi to demonstrate Peking's support during a very critical stage of the Laos operation. The communique issued at the conclusion of that visit said that the new U.S.

Review 7, 12 February 1971, pp. 5-6. Also *JMJP* Commentator, "Shameless Blackmail," in *Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP)*, CMP-SCMP-70-50, December 1970, pp. 27-28, and *JMJP* editorial "Resolutely Support Vietnamese People in Carrying War against U.S. Aggression and for National Salvation to Complete Victory," in the same issue of *SCMP*, pp. 163-64. Jay Taylor argues that Peking advised Hanoi against the massive counterattack that Hanoi launched against the U.S.-South Vietnamese thrust into Laos on the grounds that a serious defeat of the South Vietnamese army might lead the United States either to stop the withdrawal of its troops or to use tactical nuclear weapons (*China and Southeast Asia*, p. 170). Lin Piao did in fact urge Hanoi and the Pathet Lao on 21 December 1970 and 19 January 1971, respectively, to persist in waging a "people's war" to defeat U.S. imperialism ("Comrade Lin Piao's Message to Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap," *Peking Review* 52, 25 December 1970, p. 3; "Comrade Lin Piao Sends Message to Comrade Khamtay Siphandone," *Peking Review* 5, 29 January 1971, p. 3). *SCMP* is a daily survey of Chinese printed media published by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. In the early 1970s the name was changed to *Survey of the People's Republic of China Press.*

[24] "Action Long Premeditated," in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Daily Report, Communist China (FBIS-DR,PRC),* no. 28, vol. 1, 10 February 1971, p. A3. *FBIS* is a daily translation of significant foreign broadcasts monitored by the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

[25] "Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China," *Peking Review* 8, 19 February 1971, p. 6.

[26] *JMJP* Commentator, "Don't Lose Your Head, Nixon," in *Peking Review* 8, 19 February 1971, p. 6.

[27] For example, Ou Ping, "Steel tigers, or paper tigers, or bean curd tigers?" *FBIS-DR,PRC*, no. 16, vol. 1, 25 January 1971, pp. A6 and 7. This article noted that the United States had used all weapons in its arsenal in Southeast Asia except for nuclear weapons and used such euphemisms as "reckless new adventures" to refer to the possible use of atomic bombs. More explicit warnings followed the practice of citing foreign media reports, for example, "Swedish paper on U.S. using nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia," Peking radio, 30 January 1971, in *FBIS-DR,PRC*, no. 21, vol. 1, 1 February 1971, p. A15.

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moves were a "menace to the security of the People's Republic of China."[28] China thus would "take all necessary measures, not flinching even from the greatest national sacrifices to give all-out support and assistance" to the Indochinese peoples.

By April 1971 the groundwork for Sino-American rapprochement was in place. The Moderates' factional opponents within China had been outmaneuvered and were rapidly losing their power. Moreover, the United States had not resorted to retaliatory military actions in response to the catastrophic defeat of the Laos invasion and was continuing its withdrawal from South Vietnam—and Hanoi had been reassured of China's continuing support for its struggle against the United States. Thus, on 6 April Peking made its first *public* gesture to Washington by inviting the U.S. table tennis team to visit China.

It was during July that the contradictions between China's new orientation and Hanoi's strategies came into sharp focus. On 1 July the PRG issued its Seven Point Peace Plan.[29] This plan was to be the centerpiece of what the VWP Politburo intended to be a major peace campaign. Great publicity accompanied the announcement of the Seven Point Peace Plan. Hanoi announced that either Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy was ready to meet publicly or privately with Henry Kissinger to discuss the plan. Antiwar movements in the United States were asked to publicize the Seven Point Plan and to demand that the U.S. government accept it. Hanoi clearly hoped to mobilize political pressure on Nixon to accept some version of the peace plan.

China promptly endorsed the PRG's peace plan. On 4 July 1971 the *People's Daily* endorsed the Seven Point Plan in a statement containing Peking's first endorsement of a "peaceful settlement" of the Vietnam conflict since 1965.[30] On 15 July, however, Peking and Washington announced the recent trip of Henry Kissinger to Peking and the impending visit of President Nixon to China. The political commotion that followed this announcement is well known. There is no question that the impact of these events worked at cross purposes to Hanoi's political strategy. Nixon was facing reelection in 1972. He had been elected in 1968 promising to bring peace in Vietnam. Were he unable to deliver on this pledge, his election battle would be an uphill one. After 15 July, and more especially after Nixon's February 1972 visit to the PRC, even if Nixon could not campaign on the basis of having ended the war in Vietnam, he could still bank on having made peace with China. Even if Americans did not believe that peace in Vietnam could be achieved by Nixon's trip to Peking, and many believed that it could, at least it seemed that Nixon was breaking with the cold war policies of

[28] "Joint Communique of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Government of the People's Republic of China, and the Central Committee of the Viet Nam Worker's Party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," *Peking Review* 11, 12 March 1971, pp. 18–21.

[29] "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly* 48 (October-December 1971): 815.

[30] "A Just Stand, A Reasonable Stand," *Peking Review* 28, 9 July 1971, pp. 15–16.

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confrontation and containment in Asia. Washington never responded to the Seven Point Peace Plan.

In his memoirs Henry Kissinger waxes eloquent about the ways in which the dramatic visits by U.S. personnel to China in 1971 undercut Hanoi's political strategy.[31] Independent of any substantive results, Kissinger says, these visits would "massively demoralize Hanoi" by raising the specter of a Chinese sell-out. Moreover, the visits would reunite the American people and start moving the United States beyond the divisions of the Vietnam era. The hope created by the visits would, Kissinger says, undercut Hanoi's efforts to exhaust the United States psychologically and to undermine public support for the government.

Hanoi was very angry with Peking's disregard of its political strategy at this critical juncture. It might well have meant that Hanoi would face four more years of war. In 1973 a North Vietnamese official speaking to Japanese reporters characterized Peking's invitation to Nixon in 1971 as throwing a life preserver to someone who is about to drown.[32] The actions of large nations sometimes sacrifice small nations, the official said. In August 1972, *Nhan Dan* (*The People*), the VWP newspaper, used the same metaphor to characterize a policy of unprincipled reconciliation with imperialism based on "the narrow interests of one's country" and which violated "the common interests of the world revolution."[33] While condemning Peking's moves in such thinly veiled terms, Hanoi censored all actual news of the 15 July announcement. It was not until late in 1971 that the DRV's media finally informed its people of Nixon's impending visit to China.[34]

It should be noted that while developments following the 15 July announcement did frustrate many of Hanoi's efforts, they did not constitute a "betrayal" as defined by Hanoi. Nevertheless, Hanoi clearly feared that such a betrayal was in the offing. On 19 July *The People* expressed its belief that Nixon was trying to win Chinese, and/or Soviet, assistance in compelling Hanoi to submit to a settlement agreeable to the United States while compromising the VWP's basic objectives. *The People* characterized the "Nixon Doctrine" as

> dividing the socialist countries, winning over one section and pitting it against another in order to oppose the national liberation movement and carry out a counter-revolutionary peaceful evolution in socialist countries. Nixon's policy also consists of

[31] Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 735, 716, 757. In order to exacerbate Hanoi's fears it was decided that President Nixon's 15 July television speech announcing Kissinger's visit to China should *not* be billed as a matter "not related to Vietnam" as adviser Bob Haldeman had suggested in order to minimize any negative reaction (ibid., p. 758).

[32] This was among the Chinese grievances enumerated by Li Hsien-nien to the Vietnamese leaders in 1977 and made public in 1979. See Li Hsien-nien, "Memorandum of Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien's discussions with Premier Pham Van Dong on 10 June 1977," p. 5.

[33] "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly* 52 (October-December 1972), p. 792.

[34] P.J. Honey, "North Vietnam Quarterly Report No. 42, Nixon's Peking Visit and the Vietnam War," *China News Analysis* 855, 17 September 1971, pp. 1-7.

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trying to achieve a compromise between the big powers in an attempt to make smaller countries bow to their arrangement.[35]

That such publicly expressed fears were real was indicated by the issuance of a directive by National Liberation Front (NLF) headquarters to its ranks shortly after the 15 July announcement.[36] Fearing demoralizing rumors, the directive said that in the event China reached an agreement with the United States and ended the aid that it had previously given to Vietnam, the aim of the NLF would remain unchanged and the struggle would go on without China's assistance and would succeed just as surely.

Peking tried to persuade Hanoi that it had not made a deal with the United States regarding Vietnam. Shortly after Kissinger's July 1971 visit, Chou En-lai sent a message to Hanoi explaining the contents of the recent talks.[37] This was followed by a Chinese delegation to Hanoi to explain further what was discussed during the talks with Kissinger. North Vietnam's leaders made their fears clear to this Chinese delegation. When informed that the Chinese government planned to discuss the Vietnam question with President Nixon during his upcoming visit, the Vietnamese objected most strongly: China had no right to negotiate for Vietnam or to discuss questions regarding Vietnam with the United States. Peking also found a number of occasions during the latter part of 1971 to issue statements supporting Hanoi and condemning U.S. military actions.[38] China's efforts to reassure Hanoi seem to have been successful since Hanoi's veiled criticisms in the press of Nixon's forthcoming trip ceased in early September 1971.[39]

Moscow moved rapidly to exploit the new differences between Hanoi and Peking. Shortly after the 15 July announcement, it was disclosed that Soviet President Podgorny would visit Hanoi.[40] Podgorny arrived in Hanoi on 3 October 1971 with a large, high-level delegation. The Soviets were given a lavish

[35] Ibid., p. 2. For other DRV press commentary, see: "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly* 48 (October-December 1971): 816; and Taylor, *China and Southeast Asia*, p. 175.

[36] P.J. Honey, "North Vietnam Quarterly Report No. 42," p. 4. The document was issued by the NLF Central Office for South Vietnam and was obtained by South Vietnamese intelligence.

[37] Hoang Van Hoan, "It is impermissible to distort the facts of Vietnamese-Chinese friendship," p. 5.

[38] For example: "Greeting the 26th Anniversary of the Founding of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam," *Peking Review* 37, 10 September 1971, pp. 2-6; "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, September 24, 1971," *Peking Review* 40, 30 September 1971, p. 4; "Chairman Mao Meets D.R.V.N. Party and Government Delegation Led by Premier Pham Van Dong," *Peking Review* 48, 26 November 1971, p. 34; "Joint Communique of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Worker's Party and Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam," *Peking Review* 49, 3 December 1971, pp. 8-13.

[39] P.J. Honey, "North Vietnam Quarterly Report No. 43, President Podgorny's Visit," *China News Analysis* 865, 17 December 1971, pp. 1-7.

[40] Kenneth P. Landon, "The Impact of the Sino-American Détente on the Indochina Conflict," in *Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications,* ed. Gene Hsiao (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), p. 211.

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welcome by Hanoi and during the visit new, large economic and military aid agreements were signed. Shortly after Podgorny's departure, a high-level Soviet military mission arrived in Hanoi to stay until March 1972. Much of this Soviet activity was in preparation for the large-scale assault by North Vietnam's army across the 17th parallel in March 1972.

Peking, like Moscow, supported Hanoi's 1972 spring offensive—and its struggle in the aftermath of the United States's reaction to that thrust. As noted earlier, during 1971–1972 Chinese aid to the DRV reached peak levels. This assistance included 100 P-72 tanks.[41] During 1972 the number of Soviet trains allowed to cross China to the DRV increased.[42] Soviet and East European ships were allowed to off-load at ports in South China and their cargos moved overland through China to the DRV. A four-inch pipeline (sufficient to meet North Vietnam's petroleum needs) was built from South China to Hanoi. In the wake of the closure of the DRV's ports by the U.S. mining operations, this support was critical to Hanoi.

In spite of this Chinese support and assistance, it seems very likely that one reason the Nixon administration felt it could undertake the series of drastic military measures it did during 1972 was that its new relation with Peking lessened the likelihood that those long forbidden moves would provoke a strong Chinese response. By its very nature Sino-American rapprochement lessened the deterrent value of the DRV's ties to China.

It is possible that Peking intended its continued support for Hanoi and the PRG during 1970–1972 as a warning to Washington that U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, or at least continued progress in that direction, was the sine qua non of improved Sino-American relations. Peking may have been signaling Washington that it could not hope to maintain a presence in Vietnam through Chinese assistance and reminding it of the radical reversal of Chinese policy that followed the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in the spring of 1970.

China's public statements were in line with such a hypothesis. Speaking in Peking on 19 July 1971, Chou En-lai said that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina would necessarily take precedence over efforts to improve Sino-U.S. relations.[43] On 9 August Chou told James Reston of the *New York Times* that the questions of Vietnam and Indochina had to be solved first in order for Sino-American relations to advance. Peking's private communications to Hanoi also took this line. During a visit to Hanoi in 1972 Chou assured Vietnamese leaders that the Chinese had told Nixon during his visit that in order to bring about the normalization of relations between the United States and China and to

[41] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Arms Trade Registers: The Arms Trade with the Third World* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975), p. 28.

[42] "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly* 52 (October-December 1972): 790–91.

[43] Congressional Quarterly, *China and United States Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973), p. 21.

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moderate the situation in the Far East, "first of all the questions of Vietnam and Indochina must be solved."[44] The Taiwan question would be solved afterwards.

The hypothesis that China's actions in 1972 constituted a warning to the United States is only partially satisfactory; it does not square with the contents of the secret correspondence then being passed between Peking and Washington. In its secret, top-level correspondence with Washington, Peking indicated a willingness to go ahead with its opening to the United States while minimizing the importance of the Vietnam question. According to Henry Kissinger, on 8 December 1970 and 11 January 1971 Nixon received messages from Chou En-lai via Pakistan and Rumania respectively.[45] Neither note made any reference to Indochina and both stated that an emissary of the president would be welcome in Peking. Taiwan was specified as the "one outstanding issue" to be discussed between the two sides. These messages signaled to the United States, according to Kissinger, that Sino-American relations could improve in spite of the continuing war in Vietnam.

Chou's conflicting signals probably served several purposes. The public statements and private messages to Hanoi reassured the VWP leadership that China's opening to the United States would not be at their expense. Hanoi was, presumably, unaware of the content of the notes then being passed between Chou and Nixon conveying a somewhat different message (that is, that Taiwan, not Indochina, was the critical obstacle to better Sino-American relations). The public statements were probably designed not only to reassure Hanoi and to continue pressure on Washington to withdraw from Vietnam, but also as a solid "fallback position" should it become necessary, once again, to abort the move toward Washington whether because of factional opposition within China or because of some unacceptable U.S. re-escalation of the war in Indochina.

The Question of a Chinese Betrayal

Hanoi charges that Peking went much further than merely working at cross purposes to DRV political strategies during 1970–1973. Rather, it says, Peking truly "betrayed" North Vietnam. In exchange for pressuring Hanoi to give up its plans for liberating South Vietnam, Hanoi claims, China was to get American concessions on the Taiwan question, on PRC membership in the United Nations, and on U.S. containment policy in Asia. After the signing of the Shanghai Communique, Hanoi says, Peking tried to pressure DRV leaders into accepting the maintenance of the Thieu regime in Saigon "in exhange for American withdrawal from Taiwan."[46]

It is easy to speculate on why Peking might have decided in favor of a con-

[44] Hoang Van Hoan, "It is impermissible to distort the facts of Vietnamese-Chinese friendship," p. 5.

[45] Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 703–4.

[46] *Chinese Aggression against Vietnam*, p. 33.

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tinued division of Vietnam and the maintenance of a residual U.S. military presence in South Vietnam. During 1968 (and again in 1972) Hanoi ignored Chinese advice and followed policies that entailed greater reliance on Soviet material and political support. Coming as this did in the context of Moscow's stepped-up efforts to encircle China (especially following the 1969 border clashes), Hanoi's closer ties to the Soviet Union must have been very disturbing to Peking. Moreover, Peking's Moderate leadership hoped to use U.S. power to block Soviet moves in Asia and the Pacific. Given these developments, Peking might have concluded that a continued division of Vietnam and a U.S. presence in the South might be a desirable option. Given the chastisement of America in Vietnam and the emerging outlines of Washington's future Asian policy, such a U.S. presence would not constitute a threat to China. On the other hand, it would teach Hanoi a lesson by demonstrating the impotence of Moscow and the costs of ignoring China's wishes on questions of its vital interests, for example, the relations between China's neighbors and Moscow. Furthermore, if Hanoi continued to be an intractable and unreliable friend of China, it might be best not to have a united Vietnam. An American presence in South Vietnam could help manage a North Vietnam determined to follow Moscow's lead. It could also help prevent or resist a North Vietnamese attempt to control Laos and Cambodia. If, at some future time, Hanoi repented and turned to China for help, Peking might then be able to offer its good offices to intercede with the Americans on behalf of Hanoi. An arrangement might then be worked out, under Chinese auspices, providing for a U.S. exit from South Vietnam and national unification. The neutrality of such a united Vietnam might be guaranteed by international agreement.

This hypothesis is not substantiated by the evidence. Kissinger's memoirs make clear that the United States did indeed seek Chinese (and Soviet) assistance in persuading Hanoi to compromise—and also that Peking rejected such suggestions. During his discussion with Chou En-lai in July 1971, Kissinger intended to "seek some moderating influence on Indochina" and devoted a good deal of time to an explanation of the United States's policy toward Indochina.[47] When parting, Chou wished Kissinger well in the negotiations with Hanoi, but left him with the impression that Peking "could or would not do much to help us directly."[48] In October 1971 when Washington proposed the inclusion of David Bruce (the head of the U.S. negotiating team in Paris) in a U.S. delegation that was to visit China, Peking refused for "understandable reasons."[49] In January 1972 Alexander Haig discussed the Indochina situation with Chou. Again Chou reiterated China's support for Hanoi and urged a rapid settlement in order to reduce Soviet influence in Indochina.[50] Late in January 1972 the United States sent the Chinese a detailed report of Hanoi's rebuffs of the United States's

[47] Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 735, 749.
[48] Ibid., p. 757.
[49] Ibid., p. 769.
[50] Ibid., p. 1051.

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negotiating efforts. Chou replied with an "acerbic note" accusing the United States of trying to enmesh China in the Vietnam issue.[51] During his discussions with Nixon and Kissinger in February 1972, Chou affirmed China's sympathy and support for Hanoi and urged the United States to end the war quickly and withdraw its military forces from Vietnam. Chou also indicated, however, that China would not take sides in the continuing negotiations between Hanoi and the United States and implied that China would not intervene militarily in the conflict in Indochina.[52] Finally, Kissinger had a long discussion of Vietnam with Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua in February 1972 during which Ch'iao once again avowed China's moral and material support for Hanoi while dissociating China from North Vietnam's specific negotiating position.[53] This record makes clear Peking's refusal to play the role Washington hoped to assign it.

Peking did, however, offer its good offices to mediate between the United States and North Vietnam. According to Hanoi's White Paper, on 18 July 1971 Peking passed on to Hanoi a U.S. peace plan involving a withdrawal of U.S. troops and the release of U.S. prisoners of war within twelve months of a cease-fire.[54] In December 1972 Peking again passed on to Hanoi a U.S. message, this time a warning that unless the DRV made compromises on the peace agreement, the United States would be forced to take "necessary measures."

Moreover, Hanoi did compromise—and more important for our purposes, Peking did urge such compromises. In April 1972 the United States dropped its longtime demand for a mutual withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops from South Vietnam.[55] The United States now proposed, in essence, a cease-fire and a withdrawal of U.S. troops to be followed by measures to achieve a political settlement within South Vietnam. Hanoi rejected this approach and continued to demand the removal of Nguyen Van Thieu and the establishment of a coalition government in the South *prior* to a U.S. withdrawal. It was not until late in 1972 that Hanoi dropped this demand and accepted a version of the United States "two track" formula providing for separately implemented military and political settlements.

This critical North Vietnamese concession was made under intense U.S. military pressure and in the face of the possibility of four more years of war if an agreement was not reached before the U.S. presidential election. Peking was also advising Hanoi to compromise on this issue. According to Hanoi, late in 1971 Mao Tse-tung advised Pham Van Dong that Hanoi should postpone the liberation of the South, saying: "One can't sweep very far if the handle of the broom is too short. Taiwan is too far away for our broom to reach. Thieu in

[51] Ibid., p. 1052.
[52] Ibid., pp. 1073, 1087.
[53] Ibid., p. 1086.
[54] *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations*, p. 41.
[55] Tad Szulc, "Behind the Vietnam Cease Fire Agreement," *Foreign Policy* 15 (Summer 1974): 36.

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South Vietnam is also out of reach of your broom, comrades. We must resign ourselves to this situation."[56]

Pham Van Dong is reported to have replied that the Vietnamese broom had a very long handle. Mao also advised Dong that the United States "could not afford to forsake" its old friends such as Nguyen Van Thieu.[57] Hanoi also now claims that Peking advised it to accept the U.S. plan that it passed on to Hanoi in July 1971. Peking is also said to have urged Hanoi in November 1972 to make concessions regarding the "withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops and the question of North Viet Nam renouncing military aid, so that the agreement can be signed."[58]

While one must remain skeptical of the veracity of Hanoi's reporting, it should be noted that interpretations other than those provided by Hanoi can be put on the words, and actions, attributed to China's leaders. Rather than urging the abandonment of the "liberation" of the South, Peking could just as well have been urging Hanoi to grant the United States a face-saving withdrawal, for example, without a preliminary political settlement within South Vietnam, and to allow an interval of time to pass before the final liberation of the South was carried out. Mao himself confirmed that he thought Hanoi should be more flexible when he told French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann in July 1972 that he had advised PRG Foreign Minister Nguyen Thai Binh to stop demanding Thieu's removal as a precondition for a settlement with the United States.[59] Other evidence also indicates that Peking felt that Hanoi should compromise with the United States. Addressing a group of senior cadres on the international situation in March 1973, Chou En-lai spoke of the recently concluded peace agreements.

> We told the Vietnamese comrades: we must be practical and realistic. The U.S. herself knows that to continue fighting means to stall for time with no way of knowing how long she will procrastinate. Therefore, she will make a "glorious withdrawal" through negotiation. Besides, having fought for so many years, the Vietnamese people have suffered great losses. To continue fighting will not affect the outcome for a moment. But to compel the Americans to withdraw through negotiation will leave you yourselves a half to one year for rest and consolidation. You can reconsider the problem of liberating South Vietnam later. The Vietnamese comrades have accepted our suggestions.[60]

Elsewhere in the same speech Chou said that there had been disagreement between Peking and Hanoi over the provisions for a political settlement in South Vietnam after the United States's withdrawal. In the opinion of Chinese leaders,

[56] *Chinese Aggression against Vietnam*, p. 33.

[57] *The Truth about Vietnam-China Relations*, pp. 41–42.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Szulc, "Behind the Vietnam Cease Fire Agreement," p. 45.

[60] Chou En-lai, "Report on the International Situation," *Issues and Studies* 13 (January 1977): 122. *Issues and Studies* is published by the Institute for International Relations in Taipei, Taiwan. While the source of this document is reason to be skeptical of its authenticity, its substance fits with other evidence such as that in Hanoi's White Paper, Hoang Van Hoan's statement, and Mao's July 1972 statement to French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann.

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Chou said, the provision for democratic elections after the cease-fire under the supervision of the "three political powers" in South Vietnam was "empty talk" with no concrete measures for its implementation. Apparently Peking wanted such elections to be carried out, or at least favored that an attempt be made at their implementation, while Hanoi was not overly concerned that these provisions were mere eyewash. One surmises that Peking favored a longer period of political struggle in South Vietnam while Hanoi anticipated an earlier reliance on warfare to achieve victory.

Hoang Van Hoan provides further evidence that Peking urged Hanoi to be flexible. Hoan states that shortly after the peace agreements were signed Chou En-lai compared the situation in Vietnam with that in China just after World War II.[61] For almost two years the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) negotiated and retreated before launching a counterattack in the middle of 1947. Then in an instant the Chiang Kai-shek group was eliminated. Chou continued: "Vietnam must also win a period of time and prepare its strength. When the fighting begins it should completely eliminate the Nguyen Van Thieu regime in an instant because a short while after the cease fire the United States will not easily come back in."[62]

It is important to note that these statements indicate that Peking did indeed expect a Communist victory over Saigon. What was in question between Peking and Hanoi was a question of strategy, not objectives. Peking still wanted the U.S. out of Vietnam and still supported Hanoi's effort to "liberate" the South, but favored concessions allowing the United States to withdraw and to permit the passage of several years before a renewed effort was made to crush Saigon.

The fact that the Moderate leadership in Peking urged Hanoi to grant the United States certain face-saving compromises does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that pressure was actively applied to achieve this end. Again, this conclusion does not square with the available evidence. If Peking had been actively trying to pressure Hanoi, it could have done so very effectively by forgoing any of the concrete moves it took to support the DRV during 1971 and 1972; certainly it would not have increased its aid. Moreover, if Peking was pressuring Hanoi, why, in late 1971, did Hanoi cease its press criticism of the turnaround in Chinese foreign policy? If Peking had been pressuring Hanoi, it is likely that Hanoi would have responded by innuendo warning Peking that the PRC's behavior was endangering its revolutionary credentials and its future relations with Vietnam.

[61] Hoang Van Hoan, "It is impermissible to distort the facts of Vietnamese-Chinese friendship," p. 5. Hoang also quotes Mao early in 1973 to the effect that Nguyen Van Thieu still had several hundred thousand troops left, that the "final solution of the problem still depends on armed struggle," and that China would continue to supply aid during this period. PRC aid to the DRV after the signing of the peace agreements was said, by Peking, to have amounted to several billion U.S. dollars ("Sino-Vietnamese relations during the period of Vietnam's anti-French, anti-American struggles," p. 1).

[62] Hoang Van Hoan, "It is impermissible to distort the facts of Vietnamese-Chinese friendship," p. 5.

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Although Peking could not itself pressure Vietnam to compromise, it could, and did, allow the United States to do so. Peking wanted the war ended and believed that Hanoi should compromise to facilitate a U.S. withdrawal. If Hanoi was not willing to "be reasonable," then Peking was prepared to let Hanoi bear the burden of its obstinacy. In line with this, Chou told Nixon in February 1972 that China would no longer express its opinions on the negotiating positions of the two sides.[63] More importantly, Chou and Ch'iao Kuan-hua indirectly indicated to the visiting American leaders that China was no longer ready to intervene militarily in the Vietnam conflict.[64] While the subtle withdrawal of China's deterrent support at that stage of the conflict probably had little impact on American actions, it did indicate Peking's "understanding" of U.S. attempts to coerce Hanoi into accepting a compromise settlement of the Vietnam conflict. Peking's subdued response to the vigorous U.S. reaction (for example, mining Haiphong harbor and bombing of North Vietnam) to Hanoi's 1972 spring offensive was in line with this approach. Nor was the embryonic Sino-American rapprochement adversely affected by the United States's "Christmas bombing" of North Vietnam at the end of 1972.[65]

The evidence indicates that while disagreeing with aspects of Hanoi's strategy for expelling the United States from Indochina and for liberating South Vietnam, Peking continued very substantial support for Hanoi's war effort through January 1973. Peking apparently distinguished between urging Hanoi to compromise with the United States and actively applying pressure to achieve this. While such a distinction might seem sophistic, it can also be seen as an attempt to synchronize the contradictory objectives of minimizing the influence of *both* superpowers in Indochina while creating optimal conditions for using U.S. power to check Soviet moves elsewhere in the world. By being tolerant of Washington's efforts to force Hanoi to compromise while continuing to provide Hanoi with "firm support" and assistance, China let the United States do the dirty work, China's future relations with Vietnam were protected, and Hanoi was kept from embracing the Soviet Union too closely.

If betrayal is defined as Chinese pressure on Hanoi to accede to a compromise settlement with the United States that would have prevented the "liberation" of South Vietnam, the charge must be rejected on two counts. First, while Peking did advise Hanoi to compromise, it did not actively pressure Hanoi to accomplish this. Rather, Peking stood aside and let Washington apply the necessary pressure. Secondly, there is no evidence that Peking did not expect a Communist unification of Vietnam after the U.S. withdrawal. The evidence indicates the opposite. What was at issue were questions of strategy, not goals.

[63] Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1073.

[64] Ibid., pp. 1069, 1073, 1086.

[65] "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation," *China Quarterly* 51 (July-September 1972): 598-99.

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Conclusion

As Peking concluded that the United States was no longer its major opponent and reoriented its policies accordingly, the national objectives of the PRC and the DRV increasingly diverged. All the relevant national actors were aware of these growing contradictions. Washington and Moscow attempted, with some success, to exploit them. Peking tried to paper them over by pacifying Hanoi with generous aid and by refusing to actively pressure Hanoi on behalf of the United States. Although not betraying Hanoi, Peking's desire for improved relations with the United States did conflict with its "solidarity" with Hanoi. The "secondary contradiction" between North Vietnam and the United States had to be subordinated to the primary contradiction involving Soviet socialist imperialism. This had to be done in such a way, however, as not to undermine the primary objective—countering and limiting Soviet influence in Asia and the Pacific.[66]

Regarding the general pattern of interaction between national foreign policies, this case provides an interesting example of overlapping and conflicting "triangular" strategies. Hanoi played on the rivalries between Peking and Moscow in order to compel both of them to support its struggle against the United States. Peking relied on the United States to twist Hanoi's arm when this became appropriate in order to create conditions favorable for using U.S. power to oppose Soviet advances throughout Asia. Washington hoped to manipulate Sino-Soviet rivalry to induce one or the other, or both, of them to persuade Hanoi to make critical compromises on a Vietnam peace settlement. Moscow attempted to exploit the tensions between Hanoi and Peking to increase its own leverage in Hanoi.

Hanoi, Peking, and Washington all enjoyed a fair amount of success in the short run. Hanoi's manipulation of Sino-Soviet rivalries did insure continued Chinese support and helped prevent a Chinese betrayal. Peking's handling of contradictions was, for its part, successful. Sino-Vietnamese relations did not suffer irreparably as a result of the contradictions between Hanoi's and Peking's policies during 1970–1973. Washington's policy of "linkage" did help persuade Hanoi to agree to a "two track" formula. It is ironic that this new U.S. policy helped accomplish a major objective underlying the United States's original intervention in South Vietnam—the containment of Chinese influence—even while abandoning the original strategy through which that objective was to be accomplished. Rather than attempting to contain "Chinese" influence at the

[66] According to Mao's theory of the united front, during each historical era a single chief reactionary enemy was to be identified and targeted as the primary enemy. All other, less evil reactionaries were to be "united with" during this era and won over to opposition to the primary enemy. Contradictions would still exist between these lesser enemies and the truly progressive elements of the united front, but during that particular stage of historical development those conflicts were "secondary" and had to be handled in such a way as to not detract from the common struggle against the primary enemy.

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17th parallel by "teaching Hanoi a lesson" (to use the idiom of a later era), now the differences between Vietnam and China were to be exploited. Of course, by that time "containing" China was no longer a U.S. priority.

It is interesting that over the longer run, however, these particular policies of linkage or handling of contradictions helped produce bitter fruit. Hanoi's success in manipulating Chinese fears of the Soviet Union prior to 1973 may have contributed to Hanoi's miscalculation during the post-1975 period of the restraints that these fears placed on Peking. Peking's attempt to manipulate Soviet-American rivalries at the expense of Hanoi's anti-U.S. efforts undoubtedly convinced Hanoi of Peking's insensitivity to Vietnam's vital needs (as perceived by the VWP Politburo). After 1975 Hanoi was psychologically ready to pursue objectives that risked alienating China.[67]

It is of course impossible to say whether or not Hanoi would have been more solicitous of Peking's sensitivities during the post-1975 period if Peking had been more respectful of Vietnamese objectives during the 1970–1973 period, that is, if Peking had postponed its rapprochement with the United States until after the conclusion of a Vietnam settlement. What can be said with more certainty is that Peking's policies during the earlier period embittered the North Vietnamese leadership. If we assume that human emotions influenced Hanoi's foreign-policy decisions, then we can conclude that the 1970–1973 experience, while not amounting to a Chinese betrayal, did make Hanoi more willing to implement policies after 1975 that were likely to antagonize China.*

[67] In 1979 Peking bitterly quoted a Vietnamese official as saying in 1976: "During the war, making China and the Soviet Union go all out to help North Vietnam was very important. Now, Vietnam doesn't need to follow this policy as much" ("Ping tahsiao pach'uanchuiche de niuo piaoyen" [A review of the evil performances of big and small hegemonists], *Hung Ch'i [Red Flag]* 4 (1979): 12–15).

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Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955

BENNETT C. RUSHKOFF

Dwight D. Eisenhower has often been portrayed as a president who did not personally direct the activities of his administration but merely presided over them. According to this view, Eisenhower's role in making foreign policy consisted mainly of accepting the recommendations of his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. In recent years, however, scholars have drawn upon materials from the newly opened Ann Whitman File, which is deposited in the Eisenhower Library, to cast doubt on the validity of this interpretation.[1] Richard Immerman, for example, has suggested that the relationship between Eisenhower and Dulles may actually have been characterized by "the type of give and take which indicates a mutual respect and confidence." Fred Greenstein, moreover, has concluded that Eisenhower influenced policy to a far greater extent than was previously believed and that he was well aware of Dulles's shortcomings.[2]

[1] Among the items in the Whitman File are records of high-level meetings, summaries of telephone conversations, and much of the president's correspondence. These papers provide scholars with a day-to-day account of Eisenhower's conduct of the presidency. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Papers as President of the United States, 1953–1961 (Ann Whitman File), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. In this article, citations are made to various series of the Whitman File: the Ann Whitman Diary Series (hereafter Whitman Diary), the Eisenhower Diary Series (hereafter Eisenhower Diary), and the Legislative Meetings Series. In addition to the Whitman File, this article draws on an even more recently available collection consisting of summaries of Dulles's telephone conversations, most of which were prepared by his secretary Phyllis Bernau.

[2] Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" *Political Psychology* 1 (Autumn 1979):21–38; and Fred I. Greenstein, "Eisenhower as an Activist President: A

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Unlike the Greenstein and Immerman articles, which cite a variety of documents dating from different periods of the Eisenhower presidency, this article will deal only with the administration's handling of the first Quemoy-Matsu crisis. The formulation of U.S. policy toward the Chinese offshore islands in 1954–1955 will serve as a case study of the relative impact Eisenhower had on foreign policy.

The crisis centered on the Quemoy, Matsu, and Tachen island groups, which, five years after Chiang Kai-shek had been driven from the mainland, were still being held by Chiang's Nationalist troops. All of the islands lay within a few miles of the Chinese mainland, and the largest group, the Quemoys, covered a total of just sixty square miles. On 3 September 1954, Chinese Communist artillery opened fire on Quemoy Island.[3] For the next eight months, a full-scale Chinese Communist attack on these offshore positions, to be followed by an invasion of Taiwan (commonly called Formosa at that time in the Western Press) seemed imminent. The long-awaited assaults on Quemoy and Matsu fortunately never materialized. By May, the tension in the Formosa Straits had subsided, and it would remain at a relatively low level until mid-1958.

The Eisenhower administration's response to the crisis consisted of concluding a mutual-defense treaty with the Nationalist government, getting Congress to pass a resolution authorizing the president to use military force to defend Taiwan, and helping the Nationalists to evacuate their forces from the Tachens. This article focuses primarily on Eisenhower's decisions concerning the deployment of Nationalist troops in the Formosa Straits and the use of force against the Chinese Communists. On more than one occasion, the president rejected steps advocated by the military that he believed were likely to lead to war. The evidence available in this crisis supports the view that Eisenhower did not delegate responsibility for major foreign-policy decisions to his secretary of state.

A Policy of Restraint

On the evening of 3 September 1954, Eisenhower received word that earlier in the day, guns on the Chinese mainland had opened fire on Quemoy Island. Neither Eisenhower nor Dulles were in Washington at the time; the president was at the Summer White House in Denver; the secretary was on his way to Manila to participate in negotiations on the creation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).[4] Early the next morning, the president telephoned Acting Secretary of Defense Robert Anderson to find out the latest status on the

Look at New Evidence," *Political Science Quarterly* 94 (Winter 1979–80):575–99.

[3] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 461–63.

[4] Ibid., p. 459; also Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown and Co., 1973), p. 265.

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Quemoy crisis. Anderson reported that the situation was unchanged, and the two men discussed the Seventh Fleet's orders to deploy in a manner suitable for reconnaissance while not being provocative. The president reportedly sounded relieved, saying "We are not at war now."[5] From the outset, then, Eisenhower saw the shelling of Quemoy, not as a small incident, but as a full-fledged crisis requiring his personal attention.

Three days later, the president was considering whether the United States should intervene militarily in the event of a Chinese Communist assault on Quemoy. A summary of Eisenhower's telephone conversation on September 6 with General Bedell Smith, who was performing the regular duties of the secretary of state in Dulles's absence, mentions that Admiral Arthur Radford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed that Quemoy could be defended, while General Matthew Ridgway, the Army Chief of Staff, disagreed.[6] The summary also reveals that Eisenhower was aware of Quemoy's vulnerability to Chinese Communist artillery and of the impossibility of U.S. naval ships maneuvering between the island and the Mainland. In addition, it records the president's request that the Joint Chiefs send him a "ground estimate," presumably of land forces in the area. Thus, Eisenhower took it upon himself to consider personally the relevant military factors instead of relying upon the conflicting assertions of the Chiefs of Staff.

While Eisenhower and Smith also expressed concern over the possible loss of an estimated forty-thousand nationalist troops on Quemoy, they did not limit their discussion to only military considerations. In particular, they agreed that the United States would be putting its prestige on the line by becoming directly involved in the defense of Quemoy. As a result, they concluded that U.S. forces "should not go in unless we can defend it." Eisenhower even questioned the advisability of the United States evacuating Nationalist troops from Quemoy in the face of a major onslaught, because he felt that "once we get tied up in any one of these things our prestige is so completely involved."[7]

During their conversation on September 6, Eisenhower and Smith discussed whether or not Dulles should accept the Nationalists' invitation to stop over in Taiwan. They agreed that as long as the situation remained the same, the secretary ought to make the trip.[8] Dulles's five-hour stay in Taiwan on September 9 gave him a chance to discuss the crisis with Ambassador Karl Rankin and the head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan, Major General William Chase. As the secretary's visit drew to an end, Rankin and Chase accompanied him in the car on the way to the airport. While Chase suggested to Dulles that the United States "announce its intention to help the Nationalists defend the offshore islands," Rankin disagreed. The ambassador believed that since not all of the offshore islands were defensible, the

[5] "Telephone Calls, September 4, 1954," Eisenhower Diary.
[6] Smith's role in Dulles's absence is discussed in Hoopes, *Devil and Dulles,* p. 265.
[7] "Telephone Call, To General Smith, 9/6/54," Eisenhower Diary.
[8] Ibid.

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United States would be better off not making a commitment to them. He advised, instead, "that it would be best simply to keep the communists guessing." Perhaps more significantly, Rankin recommended that U.S. carrier-based planes carry out air strikes in support of the Nationalist forces.[9]

Meanwhile, the opinion of the Joint Chiefs was split. Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney, and General Twining argued that the United States had to prevent a Communist takeover of the offshore islands, since the loss of the islands would seriously hurt the Nationalists' morale. They favored allowing Nationalist planes to bomb inland China in retaliation for the Quemoy shelling and advised that if the Communists responded by trying to occupy Quemoy, the United States should send its own planes into the fray. General Ridgway opposed the aggressive strategy advocated by the majority and maintained that the Chiefs, as military leaders, should be weighing only military factors, not psychological ones. All of the Chiefs, though, did agree that the United States would be able to defend Taiwan even if the offshore islands were lost.[10]

On September 12, with Dulles back from the Far East, the president held a National Security Council (NSC) meeting in Denver at which his advisers debated the Joint Chiefs' proposal. Radford stressed the military significance of the offshore islands and, along with Carney and Twining, "urged that the United States commit itself to defend the islands and help the Chinese Nationalists bomb the mainland."[11] Eisenhower did not react favorably to the Chiefs' plan: "We're not talking now about a limited, brush-fire war. We're talking about going to the threshold of World War III. If we attack China, we're not going to impose limits on our military actions, as in Korea."[12] Clearly, the president realized that the course of action advocated by the Chiefs would bring America to the "threshold" of an unlimited war with Communist China and, for that reason, he rejected their plan.

When Dulles's turn came to speak, he argued that while the United States had to resist Chinese Communist pressure, it should not draw a line between the offshore islands and the mainland. A commitment to Quemoy and Matsu, he stated, could cause American allies to abandon the United States, thereby forcing it to fight Communist China alone. Instead, the secretary recommended that the problem be brought before the United Nations Security Council in order to obtain a resolution calling for a cease-fire in the area. According to Eisenhower, Dulles said, "Whether Russia vetoes or accepts such a plan, the United States will gain." The secretary's proposal was accepted by the president.[13] In this case, Eisenhower appears to have taken the initiative in turning down the idea of an aggressive strategy, while Dulles was the one who suggested a suitable alternative.

[9] Karl L. Rankin, *China Assignment* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), pp. 206–7.
[10] Hoopes, *Devil and Dulles,* p. 265; also Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* p. 463.
[11] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* p. 464.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.

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Meeting in London with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden and the New Zealand High Commissioner on September 29, Dulles proposed that New Zealand raise the issue of the offshore islands in the Security Council.[14] On October 7 Dulles informed the president that Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson would be going to Taipei to convince the Nationalists of the merits of the plan to appeal to the United Nations for a cease-fire. Eisenhower suggested that Robertson tell the Chinese that countries sympathetic to the United States were about to introduce the resolution, and that the assistant secretary was sent to discuss the matter with them. Dulles then told Eisenhower of evidence that Eden might not back the plan even though the foreign minister had originally supported it. The president replied that Eden should not be allowed to continue wavering on the issue, and Dulles responded that he was insisting that Eden agree upon a common plan before the maneuvers in the United Nations began.[15] Hence, the record suggests that the relationship between Eisenhower and Dulles was *not* characterized by a one-way flow of advice from the secretary to the president.

The Decision to Evacuate the Tachens

The tension in the Taiwan area reached a higher plateau on 18 January 1955 when a Communist force of four thousand captured the island of Ichiang, which had been defended by a thousand Nationalist troops.[16] Ichiang lay only a few miles north of the Tachen Islands, where a Nationalist infantry division was stationed.[17] On the morning of the attack, Dulles told his brother Allen that he expected to minimize the significance of the Tachens at his press conference that day.[18] Later that morning, the president informed Dulles that although the secretary should find out more from Radford, he should tell the press that the fighting was nothing more than a "skirmish." Eisenhower also advised Dulles not to go into very much detail.[19] Immediately after talking with the president, Dulles called Radford, who confirmed that Ichiang really was unimportant, although he did add that its loss would bring the Tachens within artillery range of Chinese Communist forces.[20]

At the press conference, Dulles stated that the Tachens were not "in any sense essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, which we do regard as vital to us." Although he did characterize the fighting on Ichiang as "rather severe," the Secretary pointed out that "the island . . . is without any particular

[14] Ibid.

[15] "Thursday, October 7, 1954, Called Secy. Dulles," Eisenhower Diary; also "Call from the President," 7 October 1954, John Foster Dulles—Telephone Conversations Memoranda, Mudd Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. (hereafter referred to as JFD Telephone).

[16] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 466.

[17] Rankin, *China Assignment*, pp. 218–19.

[18] "Telephone Call to Mr. Allen Dulles," 18 January 1955, JFD Telephone.

[19] "Call from the President," 18 January 1955, JFD Telephone.

[20] "Telephone Call to Adm. Radford," 18 January 1955, JFD Telephone.

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importance."[21] Earlier that day, Dulles had received a memorandum informing him that most of the other islands in Ichiang's island group had passed into the Communists' hands during the previous spring.[22] Dulles told the press about the earlier island seizures and added: "The loss didn't attract any particular attention at that time. Since then public opinion has been focussed more on these little off-shore islands than was the case last May."[23] Thus, the secretary portrayed the assault on Ichiang as a media event rather than as a serious act of aggression.

At his own news conference the following day, Eisenhower repeated that the Tachens were not essential to the defense of Taiwan and added that both Ichiang and a second island that was under attack had been held entirely by Nationalist guerillas, not by Chiang's regular troops—a distinction that served to further minimize the significance of the setback.[24] Both Dulles and Eisenhower's statements may have resulted in part from the president's concern, which he expressed to the secretary on January 18, that by making commitments, the United States might actually bring on additional attacks.[25] Presumably, Eisenhower believed that public opinion, if aroused, might force the United States to make commitments that the Communists would feel compelled to test. In any case, the administration's portrayal of the attack on Ichiang seems to have been determined by both the secretary and the president.

Not surprisingly, with the sudden increase in Communist Chinese pressure against the Tachen group, American officials began considering the option of a Nationalist withdrawal from the islands. At a meeting on the morning of January 20, Dulles told the president that the Nationalists might not be able to hold "any of the offshore islands" by themselves. He recommended that the United States initiate efforts to transfer the Nationalist forces on the Tachens to other positions. The secretary believed that the United States should concurrently promise to help defend Quemoy and perhaps Matsu until the Communist regime stopped threatening to invade Taiwan. Eisenhower gave his approval to the policy advocated by Dulles.[26]

At a meeting in the president's office on the afternoon of January 21, which was attended by most of Eisenhower's top military advisers as well as by Dulles, the Joint Chiefs expressed their opposition to the planned withdrawal of Nationalist troops from the Tachens. What prompted the discussion was Eisenhower's proposed message to Congress which would request a resolution authorizing the president to use U.S. military forces to help redeploy some of

[21] State Department press release, no. 32, 18 January 1955, The John Foster Dulles Papers, Box 90, Firestone Library, Princeton University (hereafter referred to as Dulles Papers).

[22] "Telephone Call to Mr. McConaughy," 18 January 1955, JFD Telephone.

[23] State Department press release, no. 32, 18 January 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

[24] President's news conference of 19 January 1955, in *Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1955* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959).

[25] "Call from the President," 18 January 1955, JFD Telephone.

[26] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* pp. 466-67.

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the Nationalist troops then stationed on the offshore islands. Speaking for the other Chiefs, Admiral Carney argued that defending or reinforcing the Tachens would be easier than evacuating them. At the same time, the Chiefs maintained that the Nationalists could not alone successfully defend the islands. Presumably, the military men felt that the Nationalists would be better off trying to defend the islands and failing than trying to retreat and failing at that. One factor favoring the evacuation idea, however, was the CIA's assessment that the Communists would not try to oppose an attempted withdrawal. The gloomy reports of the commander of the Nationalist forces on the Tachens, reports which had been brought to the president's attention, may have also made the evacuation option look more attractive. Dulles's view was that the United States had to choose between allowing the Tachen defenders to capitulate and attempting to rescue them.[27] At the conclusion of the meeting, Eisenhower still wanted to go ahead with the evacuation strategy.[28]

One advantage of Eisenhower's professional background was that he did not have to accept the statements of his military advisers unquestioningly. In fact, at the meeting of January 21, he probed beyond the Chiefs' general assertions and expanded the scope of the discussion to include some of the more basic military considerations that were relevant to his decision. For example, when the Chiefs reported that the Nationalists could not hold the Tachens, the president noted that the Tachen defenders were far more likely to succeed in thwarting an attempted landing than in stopping the Communists once they were firmly ashore. Thus, Eisenhower was the one to raise the issue of whether or not the Nationalists could keep the Communists from successfully landing. On the matter of reinforcing the islands, the president observed that while supplying the troops and civilians with food would not be a problem, supplying sufficient amounts of ammunition could be difficult. Finally, in response to Carney's argument that a sunken vessel at the mouth of the Tachen harbor would hamper the evacuation of equipment, Eisenhower pointed out that the presence of this particular problem meant that a serious mistake had been made.[29]

This critical observation probably served to remind the Chiefs that the president was no ordinary civilian authority. He was a military man, and his military judgments were as valid as those of the Chiefs. Thus, not only could Eisenhower reject the advice of the Chiefs on political grounds, he could also reject it on military grounds. Since the primary political consideration affecting the Tachen decision—namely, the impact of the island group's loss on America's Asian allies—could only have supported an argument against the evacuation of the islands, the president's final approval of a withdrawal depended upon his willingness to reject the assessment of his military advisers. A president without a military background may well have accepted the assertion that reinforcing the islands was easier than evacuating them.

[27] "Meeting in the President's Office," 21 January 1955, Whitman Diary.
[28] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 467.
[29] "Meeting in the President's Office," 21 January 1955, Whitman Diary.

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On January 27, Press Secretary James Hagerty announced that the president had met with his military advisers that day to discuss "the deployment of United States air and naval forces in the Formosa area."[30] The following day, Eisenhower and Radford went over the set of instructions to be sent to Admiral Felix Stump, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, concerning the role to be played by U.S. forces in the evacuation of the Tachens. The instructions that they decided on authorized Stump to bomb airfields on the mainland if such action was necessary to protect the operation.[31] During the first week of February, the evacuation got under way. Altogether, with the help of U.S. Navy transports, some thirty thousand troops and civilians were taken off the Tachens and two neighboring islands. An intimidating array of ships from the Seventh Fleet, including aircraft carriers, were on hand to keep the Communists from interfering. The evacuation ran smoothly and was completed in about a week.[32]

Stepping Back from the Brink

Between the evacuation of the Tachens and the convening of the Bandung Conference in April 1955, which marked the end of the crisis, the administration's views on the value of holding the offshore positions changed dramatically.

In his letter of February 1 to General Alfred Gruenther, the supreme commander of the allied forces in Europe, the president discussed the offshore-island situation at some length. He distinguished between the offshore islands and Taiwan on political and military grounds. In the first place, he noted that the islands had traditionally belonged to the Chinese mainland, while historically, Taiwan had changed hands a number of times. The president further noted that, considering the situation from a purely military perspective, he and Gruenther would conclude that although the United States should prevent the Communists from seizing more than the offshore islands, it should not become involved in fighting over the islands themselves. Eisenhower mentioned, however, that since the islands kept alive the Nationalists' aspirations of eventually returning to the mainland, an American policy of nonintervention with respect to the islands "would infuriate the Chinese Nationalists." He also stressed that the combat fitness of Chiang's troops depended to a great extent on their morale. Thus, in Eisenhower's view, the loss of Quemoy and Matsu could end up making Taiwan easier for the Communists to capture. At the same time, Eisenhower recognized that the United States would have trouble defending indefinitely a group "of islands that are almost within wading distance of the mainland." Another consideration was that America's European allies would not react favorably to a commitment to the offshore groups, viewing it as

[30] "Statement by James C. Hagerty, Press Secretary to the President," 27 January 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

[31] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* p. 469.

[32] Ibid. p. 470; also Rankin, *China Assignment,* p. 221.

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another example of "recklessness, impulsiveness and immaturity" in U.S. foreign policy.[33]

Eisenhower's solution was to adopt a policy that lay somewhere between committing his country to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu and disavowing any intention of coming to the islands' aid. He told Gruenther that America should not ignore the problem of Nationalist morale. Nevertheless, the president believed that the United States should not be as obligated to defend the offshore islands as it would be obligated, once the Senate ratified the mutual-defense treaty, to defend Taiwan. He concluded that "we must make a distinction—(this is a difficult one)—between an attack that has *only* as its objective the capture of an offshore island and one that is *primarily a preliminary movement to an all-out attack on Formosa.*" Because Eisenhower also stated that the U.S. should "move promptly against" Chinese Communist units that were clearly readying themselves for an invasion of Taiwan, one can infer that if a Communist assault on Quemoy and Matsu seemed to be the first stage of an attempt to conquer Taiwan, he would favor the U.S. sending military forces to help defend the islands.[34] Parts of the letter to Gruenther were repeated almost verbatim in a letter that the president sent to Prime Minister Winston Churchill less than two weeks later. In particular, Eisenhower repeated word-for-word the section about distinguishing between two kinds of attacks on the offshore islands. In the message to Churchill, however, the president stated explicitly that because it "would destroy the reason for the existence of the Nationalist forces on Formosa," the capture of Quemoy and Matsu by the Communists would bring about the surrender of Taiwan soon afterwards.[35] While he may have purposely exaggerated the importance of these islands in order to gain Churchill's support for what many British thought to be an aggressive American policy, Eisenhower clearly believed that the security of Taiwan would be seriously threatened by the loss of the offshore positions.

Dulles and Eisenhower also feared that conceding the islands to the Chinese Communists might make an attack on Taiwan more likely than before. In a speech delivered to the Foreign Policy Association on February 16, Dulles reminded his audience that Peking had proclaimed its intention to use force to capture Taiwan. He said that one could hardly expect that "Red China" would be less willing to attempt a full-scale assault after gaining control of islands that would facilitate such an undertaking.[36] In a letter of February 19, written in response to a communication from Churchill protesting the American policy toward the offshore groups, Eisenhower said that conciliatory moves by the United States during the previous few months, such as the withdrawal from the Tachen Islands, had "apparently been interpreted by the Chinese Communists

[33] Eisenhower to Gruenther, 1 February 1955, Eisenhower Diary.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* pp. 470–71.

[36] Text of Dulles's address before Foreign Policy Association, New York, N.Y., 16 February 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

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merely as a sign of weakness." The president pointed out that Peking had stepped up its efforts against Quemoy and Matsu to remind the world of the Communist regime's intention to invade Taiwan. He warned that the United States might already have made so many concessions that further concessions would serve only to make the Communists more aggressive.[37]

In late February, Dulles and Eden met in Bangkok, where they had gone to attend a SEATO conference, and discussed the confrontation with the Chinese Communists. The typed notes that Dulles brought to the meeting echoed Eisenhower's comments to Churchill: "In the face of this temperate action by the US, the Chinese Communists have become more intemperate. They have made increasingly official and formal their determination to use force to take Formosa. . . ."[38] Clearly, Dulles did not believe that giving up Quemoy and Matsu would make Peking less "intemperate." "As matters now stand," continued Dulles in his notes, "we are compelled to conclude that the Chinese Communists intend . . . to probe our intention to the point of finding out whether the US is prepared to fight."[39] Thus, Dulles had come to believe that Communist China would continue its aggressive behavior in the Taiwan Strait area until it met American military forces head-on.

The last four pages (the first sixteen are missing) of an unidentified document from the Dulles collection at Princeton University provide a great deal of insight into Dulles's perceptions of Communist China in early 1955. The document recounts U.S. policy toward China from the beginning of the Quemoy-Matsu crisis up to the point where Peking turned down an invitation to appear before the U.N. Security Council (the invitation followed New Zealand's introduction of a cease-fire resolution on January 28). Written in the first person singular, the author of the paper states that he "had a talk about this business with Sir Anthony Eden at Bangkok."[40] Clearly, the "talk" referred to was the one between Dulles and Eden on 24 February 1955.[41] Nevertheless, the document may not have been prepared by the secretary himself. William Macomber, who was a special assistant to the secretary, says that the writing style is not like Dulles's. Macomber's wife Phyllis, who was one of Dulles's secretaries, does not recall there having been in the office a typewriter of the kind that was used to type the document.[42] Moreover, John Hanes, who also was a special assistant to the secretary, notes that "I would not rule out the fact that [Dulles] might have drafted it—but it just doesn't ring true to me solely on stylistic ground." According to Hanes, however, the document *does* "accurately reflect" Dulles's views, and in some spots even uses the secretary's "methods of expression." Hanes sug-

[37] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* pp. 472–73.

[38] Notes Dulles used in conversation with Eden, 24 February 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Unidentified document, Dulles Papers, Box 92 (1955), Folder: Re Formosa and "Formosa Doctrine."

[41] Date of meeting was provided by Eisenhower Library in letter to Richard Immerman (Princeton University), 26 March 1980.

[42] Macomber to Richard Immerman, 21 February 1980.

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gests that it might have been written by an associate who had a very clear understanding of Dulles's views on the matter.[43] Robert Bowie, who was assistant secretary of state under Dulles, has a different opinion—the wording of the piece does not lead him to think that Dulles did not write it.[44] In any case, the opinions expressed in the paper are almost certainly in line with what Dulles was thinking. Since the author states that "about four weeks ago" he had advised Eisenhower to request a resolution from Congress, one can assume that the document was written in late February or early March.

The unidentified document seems to show that the secretary believed in the near inevitability of a confrontation between the United States and Communist China in the Formosa Strait, as is indicated in the following excerpt.

> I do not believe that this expansionist movement of the Chinese Communists will be checked until at some point we are prepared to check it with force. . . . Are we better off to confront them after we have given up important positions, after we have greatly impaired [the] morale of the Nationalists, after we have further shaken the confidence of the non-Communist peoples of the Western Pacific in our determination?

The author goes on to compare the policy of making concessions to the Chinese Communists to the policy of appeasing Hitler: giving up Czechoslovakia did not avert war but only caused it to begin later in Poland; giving up Quemoy and Matsu, therefore, would merely result in the war beginning with an attack on Taiwan. The author also states that if Britain had demonstrated its "willingness to fight," World War II might never have occurred. How one can indicate a "willingness to fight" without actually having to fight was not explained.[45] Apparently, Dulles believed that the value of demonstrating resolve was worth the risk of getting into a major war over the offshore islands, perhaps because demonstrating resolve offered the only chance of averting war in the long run.

The secretary's visit to Taiwan after he left Bangkok undoubtedly influenced his perceptions of the Communists' plans. Upon his return to Washington in early March, he reported to the president that he was more concerned than before about Peking's intentions. Dulles was convinced that Communist China would continue its quest to take over Taiwan even if the Nationalists abandoned Quemoy and Matsu. According to Eisenhower, Dulles believed that there was at least "an even chance" that the United States would have to go to war.[46]

At the beginning of his news conference of March 15, the secretary declared that, perhaps, only "superior resistance" would motivate the Communist regime to give up its aggressive behavior.[47] During the question and answer period, he said that the United States would participate in the defense of the offshore

[43] Hanes to Richard Immerman, 22 February 1980.

[44] Author's telephone interview with Bowie (Cambridge, Mass.), 17 March 1980.

[45] Unidentified document, Dulles Papers, Box 92 (1955), Folder: Re Formosa and "Formosa Doctrine."

[46] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* pp. 476–77; see also "Memorandum for Files," 11 March 1955, Eisenhower Diary.

[47] State Department press release, no. 146, 15 March 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

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islands if the president determined that the assault was the first stage of an attempt to conquer Taiwan. Dulles added that by their own admission, the Chinese Communists valued the recently acquired Tachen Islands because the islands would facilitate an invasion of Taiwan. He said that Peking's statements seemed to show that the Communists' activities in the Taiwan Strait were ultimately directed at Taiwan and the Pescadores. In response to a question about how the United States would react to an attack on the various groups of offshore islands if the Communists announced simultaneously that they did not intend to invade Taiwan, Dulles pointed out "that the Communists' protestations are not necessarily to be taken at face value."[48] Thus, Dulles seems to have expected that a full-scale attack on Quemoy and Matsu would be met by U.S. armed intervention.

While Dulles's increasingly pessimistic perceptions of Chinese Communist intentions led him to embrace a relatively hard-line position, a change in Eisenhower's outlook on the problem of Nationalist morale led the president to favor a withdrawal from the offshore islands. In his message to Churchill of February 19, the president had said that the evacuation of the islands, and the pressure brought to bear by the United States to effect the withdrawal, would probably result in a severe loss of morale for the Nationalist troops on Taiwan.[49] Two-and-a-half weeks later, in a letter to Lewis Douglas, a former ambassador to Britain, Eisenhower defended his policy toward Quemoy and Matsu, maintaining that the morale of Chiang's army would be shattered if the Nationalists were "compelled to desert" the islands.[50] This time, however, the wording of the argument left open the possibility that a voluntary evacuation might be much less psychologically damaging than a forced evacuation.

On March 22, Eisenhower stated in a letter to Churchill that if the Nationalists continued to believe that their morale would be threatened by a withdrawal from the offshore groups, then the United States should not press Chiang too hard to make such a move.[51] In this case, the president seems to have been less concerned about the impact of an evacuation on the morale of Nationalist troops than he was about what certain Nationalists *expected* that impact to be. In another letter to the British prime minister, sent on March 29, the president wrote that he "would personally be very happy" if Chiang decided on his own that an evacuation was desirable. At the same time, Eisenhower warned that if faced with strong pressure to withdraw, Chiang "might give up the entire struggle in utter discouragement."[52] The president also pointed out in his letters of March 22 and 29 that since the Nationalist army was essential for the defense of Taiwan, Chiang's willingness to keep on resisting communism could not be jeopardized.[53] Clearly, Eisenhower saw the possibility of seriously damaging

[48] State Department press release, no. 147, 15 March 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.
[49] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* pp. 473–74.
[50] Eisenhower to Douglas, 9 March 1955, Eisenhower Diary.
[51] Eisenhower to Churchill, 22 March 1955, Eisenhower Diary.
[52] Eisenhower to Churchill, 29 March 1955, Eisenhower Diary.
[53] Ibid.; also Eisenhower to Churchill, 22 March 1955, Eisenhower Diary.

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the Nationalist leader's morale as the only major obstacle to the withdrawal of forces from the offshore positions.

By the end of March, Dulles's statements began to reflect the shift that had occurred in Eisenhower's thinking on the Quemoy-Matsu problem. The unidentified document that was written soon after the Eden meeting had emphasized the direct effect that an evacuation of the offshore islands would have "upon the morale and loyalty of the forces on Taiwan."[54] At a congressional luncheon meeting on March 30, though, Dulles told thirteen members of the House that, as long as Chiang himself favored one, an evacuation would not hurt the morale of the Nationalists very much. Apparently, Dulles believed that the United States should avoid exerting pressure on Chiang, not because of the effect that such pressure would have on the generalissimo's morale, which was what Eisenhower stressed to Churchill, but because of the effect that it would have on the morale of Nationalist troops.[55] Nevertheless, Dulles was now advancing the president's idea that a withdrawal would be all right if Chiang went along. In his press conference of April 5, Dulles said that unless American intervention were "vital for the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores," the United States would not become involved in fighting over Quemoy and Matsu.[56] Just three weeks before, the secretary had implied that a Communist attack on the offshore islands would probably be considered the first stage of an attack on Taiwan, meaning that America would assist the Nationalists.[57] Despite the shift, on April 5, Dulles gave the impression that the administration's policy had remained the same: "I have said many times, and I am glad to have a chance to say again, something which I can repeat by heart: the only commitment of the United States in that area is based exclusively on Formosa and the Pescadores."[58] Thus, by explaining the American position with respect to Quemoy and Matsu in terms of the rather abstract notion of responding only to threats to Taiwan, Dulles allowed the administration to change significantly its offshore-island policy without having to change its public statements of that policy.

The available evidence supports the conclusion that it was the president who in fact initiated the changes in attitude that came about in late March and early April regarding the desirability of a Nationalist withdrawal from the offshore islands and the probability of American involvement in their defense. The notes that Dulles brought to the meeting with Eden, the unidentified document describing his outlook after the meeting, the secretary's report to the president upon his return to Washington, and his public statements of March 15 all seem to show that the secretary was primarily concerned about the intentions of the Chinese Communists. Since a Nationalist withdrawal from the offshore islands

[54] Unidentified document, Dulles Papers, Box 92 (1955), Folder: Re Formosa and "Formosa Doctrine."

[55] "Bipartisan Congressional Luncheon Meeting, March 30, 1955," Legislative Meetings Series.

[56] State Department press release, no. 190, 5 April 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

[57] State Department press release, no. 147, 15 March 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

[58] State Department press release, no. 190, 5 April 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 90.

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might have made a Communist attack on Taiwan more likely than before, Dulles's preoccupation with the enemy's intentions probably made him more receptive than he otherwise would have been to the idea of holding on to the islands.

Eisenhower's correspondence, on the other hand, indicates that in February and March, the president was mainly interested in the state of Nationalist morale. Close examination of the president's letters to Churchill of February 19, March 22, and March 29 and his letter to Douglas of March 9 shows that his perceptions of the morale factor were changing steadily over time. While in February he had believed that the evacuation of the islands would directly hurt the morale of the Nationalist troops, by late March, he seems to have cared only about the effect of a withdrawal on Chiang's morale. By the end of March, Dulles, too, was saying that an evacuation would not be harmful to morale on Taiwan as long as Chiang supported the move. The secretary's new statements, however, represented a complete break from his outlook at the time of his return from the Far East. Thus, instead of determining the direction of U.S. policy himself, in this case, Dulles seems to have been backing the offshore-island policy chosen by the president.

On April 5, Eisenhower sent a memorandum to Dulles outlining a plan for persuading Chiang to transform the offshore islands into outposts. The memorandum stated that the world should be made aware that "neither Chiang nor ourselves is committed to *full-out* defense of Quemoy and Matsu." It went on to recommend that the islands "be garrisoned in accordance with the requirements of outpost positions," and that all unnecessary manpower be withdrawn from the islands, including civilians who were willing to leave. These changes were to be carried out by Chiang himself in order to protect his prestige and "the morale of his forces."[59] Two considerations seem to have been responsible for the decision to approach Chiang with this idea. The first consideration, as Dulles told a group of senators at a March 31 luncheon, was that anti-Communist forces might not be able to hold the offshore groups without the help of tactical nuclear weapons.[60] The second was that the Nationalists had staked a great deal of their prestige on the islands.[61] Eisenhower's aim was presumably to minimize the psychological aftershocks that would accompany the loss of the islands, as well as to give the islands a reasonable chance of holding out.

In late April, Radford and Robertson went to Taiwan to convince Chiang of the merits of the outpost idea. Unfortunately, they failed to win over the generalissimo, who did not want to reduce the number of troops on the offshore positions.[62]

According to Bowie, Radford and Robertson were chosen to go because they were thought to be influential with Chiang. Bowie has speculated that while the

[59] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* p. 611.
[60] "Bipartisan Congressional Luncheon Meeting, March 31, 1955," Legislative Meetings Series.
[61] Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change,* p. 481.
[62] Ibid.

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American emissaries' sympathy for the Nationalist position may have made them popular with the generalissimo, it may also have made them reluctant to argue forcefully for reducing troop levels on the islands.[63]

The Quemoy-Matsu crisis ended almost as abruptly as it began. At a conference of Asian and African states held in Bandung (Indonesia) in late April, Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai proclaimed that his country was willing to open negotiations with the United States, so that the two nations could settle their differences without war. In May, Chou stated that the "Chinese people are willing to strive for the liberation of Formosa by peaceful means as far as this is possible." By the end of the month, an unofficial cease-fire had taken hold in the Formosa Strait.[64]

Conclusion

The evidence on Eisenhower's role in the making of U.S. policy toward the offshore islands during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis casts doubt on the view that the president was content to let Dulles handle all matters of foreign policy. In the first place, Eisenhower seems to have had a good grasp of the military and political factors that were relevant to the decisions that had to be made. Soon after the crisis began, he began to personally evaluate the military situation in the Quemoy area rather than passively accept the assessments of the Joint Chiefs concerning the defensibility of the island. Second, Eisenhower contributed significantly to each of the two major policy debates on the offshore islands. At the NSC meeting in Denver, the president responded to the Chiefs' hard-line proposal by alerting the group of the danger of getting into a full-scale war with Communist China. During the discussion of the Tachen situation with his top military and foreign-policy advisers on January 21, Eisenhower interjected a number of observations of a military nature pertaining to the options under consideration.

Records of telephone conversations between Eisenhower and Dulles dealing with the offshore-island crisis provide significant insights into the nature of their relationship. That Eisenhower was the one to advise Dulles on how to handle the negotiations with Chiang and Eden and on what to say to the press after the assault on Ichiang indicates that, at least some of the time, the secretary followed the course laid down by the president. More important than the summaries of individual conversations is the evidence that points to the president as the one responsible for the policy shift away from a U.S. commitment to the offshore islands. Since this article focuses on decisions of a military nature, one cannot conclude from it that Eisenhower dominated all aspects of foreign policy. Nevertheless, a close look at high-level decision making during the Quemoy-Matsu crisis reveals a president who wrestled with complex political

[63] Author's telephone interview with Bowie, 17 March 1980.

[64] Quoted in Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, pp. 480, 482.

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and military questions and whose thinking largely determined America's approach to the confrontation with Communist China.*

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Book Reviews

Science at the White House: A Political Liability *by Edward J. Burger, Jr. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 180 pp. $14.95.*

This is a thoughtful, temperate, concise, and useful addition to the growing body of literature on the advising of presidents on science and technology. The author, a middle-aged academic with an M.D. degree, has served on faculties at Harvard and Georgetown. The basis of the book is his several years of service on the staff of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) between 1969 and 1976. Thus his viewpoint is from the working level in Washington—from the depression that precedes the foothills of Olympus. Consequently he sees the same elephant through a different prism than do past science advisers who have published book-length memoirs (for example, Killian, Kistiakowsky, Wiesner), or other science advisers, PSAC members, and participants whose essays of recollection and prescription were published in an extensive collection last year. And his observations of a portion of the evolutionary history of the apparatus serve as a significant supplement to Detlev Bronk's prospective view in his essay "Science Advice at the White House."

Berger's thesis is that the liaison between science (and scientists) and the public-policy machinery is inherently difficult and tenuous. He emphasizes the forces of rejection, and he narrates examples, mostly in the health-related fields in which he specialized. But the forces of rejection, like the force of gravitation, are omnipresent. They must be dealt with: deflected, resisted (but rarely head-on), or accommodated to—not acceded to. Adapt or perish is nature's law. Berger is better at diagnosis and pathology than at prescription. Perhaps his case studies, typically of frustration, wasted effort, and defeat, will constructively challenge more resourceful public servants.

The book includes lucid presentations, from the author's experience, on population and family planning, including the work and 1972 report of the Commission on Population Growth and the American Future; on the 1970 PSAC Panel on Chemicals and Health (John Tukey, chairman); on the PSAC Panel on Biological and Medical Science (Ivan Bennett, chairman), whose 1972 final report, unpalatable to the president and his

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staff, was never issued; on the elaborately prepared but ultimately unpublished 1970–1971 "First Annual Report" of the science adviser; on English and Canadian experiences with science policy; on national health policy and on environmental and health-related issues; along with retrospective observations on the Ruina Report of 1966 (Management of National Institutes of Health Research Contracts and Grants), and chiaroscuro comments on the Sunshine Laws.

All this is accomplished in 129 pages of text plus a three-page foreword by Don Price, a useful index, and unusually informative notes. To this is added 35 pages of specialized, low-calorie documentary stuffing of very limited interest.

Berger's subtitle, "A Political Liability," is an unfortunate catchpenny misnomer which is sustained neither by his text nor by the facts. It is challenged by Don Price in his foreword and by this reviewer. Considerations of science and technology are indispensable for policy formulation by the executive branch, for legislation by the Congress, and for rulings by the judiciary on a wide range of domestic and international issues, including those of peace, of war, and of arms limitation. The question is not whether, but how: how information and judgment will be introduced to the president and members of the executive branch. The confidence and receptivity of the president is essential. Winning and holding this confidence and receptivity has been—and will again be when they are reappointed, as they should be—a challenge and an opportunity for the science adviser and for the President's Science Advisory Committee. Constant awareness that they are immersed in a political environment and that they are there to serve the president and the country—not the scientific and technical community—is a requisite to successful performance and survival.

Berger's little book will be useful for students in schools of government and in political science courses at undergraduate and graduate levels. It is recommended as a practical, though somewhat defeatist, manual—a sensitizer to the mine fields—for those contemplating or entering government service at any level, especially, but not limited to, those in the executive branch.

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Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions *edited by Craufurd D. Goodwin. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 798 pp. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $14.95.*

This volume of eleven essays by six members of the staff of the Brookings Institution's Economic Studies Program attempts the formidable task of surveying U.S. energy policy from the Truman administration through 1979 and reflects the authors' shared conviction that "knowledge of where the United States has been in energy policy is essential to determining where it should go" (p. xviii). Perhaps the two most useful chapters are those by Joseph Yager, who cogently summarizes the economic, political, and environmental tradeoffs and competing values underlying energy policy decisions in "Energy in America's Future: The Difficult Transition," and editor Craufurd Goodwin's concluding chapter, soberly entitled "The Lessons of History."

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Goodwin, arguing from the same economic perspective taken by most of his fellow contributors, contends that despite much rhetoric in praise of "free enterprise" and the "free market," many government officials, consumer groups, and energy producers themselves frequently ignored such values if their own economic or political self-interest appeared threatened. The close relationship between the oil industry and the government, which actually predates the period covered in this book, provides a case in point. Such "special interests," Goodwin writes, "often became by default the dominant intellectual force in energy policy formation" (p. 677).

In addition to government-industry alliances and lobbying by particular interest groups, the book also identifies a number of other obstacles to energy policymaking in the American political system—including fragmented political institutions; public apathy and disbelief in the reality of the energy "crisis"; excessive faith in scientific and technological "quick-fix" solutions; bureaucratic rivalry and infighting among executive branch agencies; governmental dependence on industry data; ideological and structural barriers to comprehensive planning in the absence of an obvious emergency situation; and uncertainty resulting from lack of adequate information on energy problems.

While much of this massive volume provides a solid historical analysis of energy policymaking (or lack thereof) during the past four decades, the discussion of the issues, participants, and official documents involved occasionally becomes a bit too detailed (the second of Goodwin's two chapters on the Truman administration, for example, seems much too long and could seemingly have been shortened and incorporated into the preceding chapter). William J. Barber's chapter on the Eisenhower years curiously omits any mention of the stimulative role played by the 1957 Price-Anderson Act in the development of a civilian nuclear power industry. Some readers may question whether the authors convincingly demonstrate their general presumption that "free enterprise" and energy price increases (the inequitable impacts of the latter on the rich and the poor are never fully acknowledged or addressed), rather than new forms of government intervention, would really provide an optimal solution to the problems of energy production and allocation. Others may fault Goodwin and his colleagues for devoting too much attention to describing the mistakes of the past and too little to spelling out alternative solutions for the present and future, other than ritualistic paeans to "free market" economics and Goodwin's vague call for "fundamental government reorganization" to deal with energy issues (p. 681).

Goodwin himself admits, however, that the book "does not answer any of the structural questions definitely, nor does it attempt to provide prescriptions for systemic change" (p. 684). This book may not be the definitive analysis and critique of U.S. energy policy from Truman to Carter, but it does offer some instructive examples in how *not* to formulate a comprehensive, long-range energy policy. Whether present and future energy policymakers will learn from the mistakes of their predecessors and whether the American political system can really cope with the necessary transition to new energy sources, however, remain in doubt.

JAMES R. TEMPLES
Bradley University

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Politics and the Oval Office: Towards Presidential Governance *edited by Arnold J. Meltsner. San Francisco, Calif., Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1981. 332 pp. $7.95.*

This collection of original essays deals with the politics and organization of the modern presidential office. It complements two prior studies published last year by the Institute for Contemporary Studies, on national security and economic policies. This collection, edited by Arnold J. Meltsner, a professor at Berkeley's Graduate School of Public Policy, features essays by political scientists, together with an occasional economist, lawyer, or journalist.

Some articles assess recent trends in the president's relations with party, media, Congress, bureaucracy, and the courts. Others suggest how Reagan might organize his office and spend his time. The last section provides a policy context involving analysis of defense, energy, and economic decision making.

The collection begins with a "Memorandum" from Meltsner to Reagan entitled "Advice on Politics and Governance." He does not tell Reagan to duck or wear a bullet proof vest, but aside from those omissions, he just about covers the common ground of recommendations made by political scientists for the last decade.

Many of the articles should prove quite useful for advanced undergraduate or graduate students. Jack Citrin, in "The Changing American Electorate," provides an excellent description and assessment of trends involving voter turnout, attitudes toward government outputs, partisanship, and follows with recommendations to restore public confidence in the presidency. It did seem a bit presumptuous, however, to address recommendations on "style" to the winner of the last election. In "Political Parties and Governance" Everett C. Ladd, Jr., has some sensible suggestions concerning the incremental rebuilding of the parties organizationally. I wish he had also addressed an alternative method of promoting party responsibility involving ideological polarization of mass politics, which then influences the behavior of presidential nominees and congressional parties.

The other articles will be useful in the classroom. Eric Davis provides an interesting summary of changes in Congress, including competitiveness in elections, turnover, and dispersal of power to subcommittees. Frances Rourke offers an interesting discussion of the reasons why career officials in the future have less ability or inclination to challenge a presidential program than in the past, news which will be welcome to the Reaganites.

Two other articles are worth the price of the book and make it a must for professionals. In "The Presidency and the Federal Courts" Martin Shapiro offers the notion that "a new iron triangle" has appeared, consisting of agency, court, and interest group (p. 142). And the president, Shapiro adds, "now faces an increasing number of statutory rights which arm the courts to obligate even more commitments and to mandate that the executive branch pursue implementation policies that run counter to those it favors" (p. 142). Shapiro goes on to suggest ways in which the president can deal with his rivals in agenda setting, though he does not recommend the most obvious of all, one that Shakespeare knew when he had King Henry declaim, "We'll kill all the lawyers." Reagan, by recommending the abolition of the Legal Services Corporation, has taken a first step toward breaking the triangle of poverty lawyer, bureaucrat, and clientele agency.

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Hugh Heclo, in "The Changing Presidential Office," provides a sample of the analysis he has prepared for the research project on the presidency supported by the National Academy of Administration. Impossible to summarize, one can better do the article justice by characterizing it as an assessment of the management problems of the president that resembles in insight and lucidity the analysis of presidential power developed by Neustadt.

In sum, this book is an excellent presidential sampler, with insights for students of any facet of the field. The research agenda for the 1980s can be developed from it, and if institutional analysis from the academy is at all useful to the Reaganites, they ought to begin here.

RICHARD M. PIOUS
Barnard College, Columbia University

Congress and Money: Budgeting, Taxing and Spending *by Allen Schick. Washington, D.C., The Urban Institute, 1980. 604 pp. $27.50.*

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 established a complex set of procedures to govern congressional budgeting. Allen Schick, a senior specialist at the Congressional Research Service who participated in drafting the 1974 law, has attempted to answer two central questions about its subsequent implementation: how has it affected congressional decision-making processes, and what impact, if any, has it had on substantive spending and tax policies? His account of the first five years of the "reformed" budget process (1975–1979) is comprehensive and detailed, providing a great deal of useful information about emerging relationships among the new budget committees of the House and Senate and the authorizing, appropriations, and tax committees in each chamber.

Schick points out that the 1974 budget act was a response not only to congressional disputes with the executive branch over impoundments and spending control but also to sharpening conflicts among congressional committees having jurisdiction over various pieces of the budget. The complexities associated with resolving the latter, together with the lack of consensus regarding congressional budget policy, resulted in a policy-neutral reform that "transformed the concept of [fiscal] responsibility from a substantive to a procedural test" (p. 77). In effect, the budget act required Congress to make explicit budget choices and to make those choices at specified times, but it did not prescribe certain choices.

Since partisan and ideological lineups in Congress remained fairly stable between 1975 and 1979, it is not surprising that congressional spending policy changed very little. Schick finds that the House and Senate budget committees, despite differences in style and procedure, settled quickly into a pattern of accommodation with most committees. Distributive rather than redistributive decision rules governed functional spending allocations in budget resolutions. Budget targets and ceilings never seriously constrained the appropriations process. Congress was able to pass "just about all the legislation it . . . wanted, though not always in the preferred form" (p. 412). On the revenue side, where

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the procedural restraints of the budget process were weaker, the budget committees had even less impact.

Schick concludes that the major accomplishments of budget reform were essentially procedural. The budget process was institutionalized, budgetary and other legislative interests were balanced, and budgetary conflict was successfully managed. The budget process did not seriously restrain spending or change budget priorities, but Schick argues that these substantive tests are quite irrelevant and reflect misconceptions about what the 1974 budget act could or should do. Indeed, Schick argues that only a truly neutral budget process will allow Congress its proper full and free power of the purse. Regardless of actual spending, Schick claims that the budget process does, in fact, matter, so long as Congress exercises discretionary spending authority in accordance with its budget resolutions.

This rather restrictive view of the purposes and accomplishments of congressional budget reform is not necessarily invalid. Congress has recently managed, for example, to make some major spending reductions in the fiscal 1982 budget with only minor modifications in the budget process that Schick describes. It has done so, however, only with massive intervention by the Reagan administration. And this demonstrates one of the shortcomings with Schick's analysis. If Congress wishes to preserve its discretion over the federal purse, it inevitably must demonstrate substantive as well as procedural fiscal responsibility. Unless it is able to do so, it risks losing budgetary control to the president. That has occurred in the past, and it appears to be happening once again. Neutral reform may have an appeal to defenders of congressional prerogatives, but at least in the case of spending control, it simply encourages perceptions that Congress remains incapable of fiscal discipline.

DENNIS S. IPPOLITO
Emory University

Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy *by Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980. 234 pp. $6.95.*

This timely book dramatizes the change that has overtaken executive-legislative relations in foreign affairs since the Vietnam War. It focuses on the recent assertiveness of congressional authority in a constitutionally ambiguous relationship generally marked by presidential leadership. While the authors aim at a balanced evaluation of the current phase of the unending struggle between the president and Congress in foreign policy, in the end they tilt toward the president's side in that political and constitutional competition.

The book is a collaboration between a scholar (Crabb), who is a student of American foreign-policy making, and a practitioner (Holt), who served the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for many years in a staff capacity. Crabb gives us the outside of the sandwich, so to speak—two initial chapters on the roles of the executive branch and the Congress in foreign affairs, and a concluding chapter reviewing the impact of congressional assertiveness on American foreign policy. Holt has stuffed the sandwich with five "specific case studies or policy areas" selected to "illustrate Congress' changing percep-

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tions of its role in foreign policymaking and how the executive branch and public opinion shape these perceptions" (p. 63). Actually, only one of the five is a case study: the Panama Canal Treaties; the other four are policy or issue areas: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the armed forces, the intelligence community, and human rights.

Invitation to Struggle does not pretend to be an innovative contribution to scholarship; it was written, according to the authors, primarily with students and general readers in mind. Yet its weaknesses as a text seem to me to follow directly from its reluctance to take a scholarly approach to the subject. There is a great deal in this book for the general student: traditional aspects of and approaches to the congressional role in foreign affairs are well presented and well integrated with examples and discussions of "the new congressional assertiveness," its contributions, its problems, and its implications. Had the authors been more rigorous and demanding in the way they conceived of their task, however, there would be even more here for the general student—and for the teacher too. My criticisms revolve around the absence of theory and theorizing, with a consequent loss of focus and of intellectual discipline.

First, there is no apparent theoretical basis for the selection of the five issues or issue areas that make up the heart of the book. In the preface, the authors state that each deals with a "noteworthy development or issue" and "illustrates . . . important aspects of presidential and congressional authority" (pp. x–xi). In fact, their usefulness is difficult to judge, since the four "policy areas" include many specific issues or cases that are presented with so little detail that it is not clear what they illustrate—or suggest. Furthermore, the case-study material is treated with so little attention to explicit theory that there are no operative principles of inclusion or exclusion. Holt thus moves loosely from discussions of policy process to discussions of policy substance, and even, in the context of the armed forces as a policy area, to generalizations about "consultation" which are more extensive (pp. 132–33) than Crabb's conclusions on the same subject (pp. 209–10).

Moreover, in his overall conclusions on the new congressional role, Crabb elects to treat interesting and novel propositions briefly and casually—for example, sources of change in lobbying activity (p. 195), the impact on Congress of disunity within the executive branch (pp. 198–99), and the differences in the foreign-policy roles of legislatures as between the American democracy and other Western democracies (p. 209). He thereby misses the opportunity to engage the student in the process of discovery. That is a pity, because he does come close to some important new insights on an old subject.

BERNARD C. COHEN
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Clean Coal, Dirty Air: Or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It *by Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. Hassler. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1981. 193 pp. Cloth, $20.00; paper, $5.95.*

The story is simple enough. Congress passed an *agency-forcing* statute in 1970 requiring the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set quantitative clean air targets. For existing electric plants, states were to establish State Implementation Plans. For new plants

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a New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) required all plants of the same type to meet the same emission ceiling. The book details how EPA implemented this last mandate, particularly how the agency failed to consider alternatives: by 1977 the solution consisted in clamping a NSPS requirement that all new plants install expensive scrubbers.

How was this decision arrived at? Ackerman and Hassler highlight the mutual interests of high-sulfur coal producers in the east and of environmentalists. As long as the problem is to reduce SO_2 emissions, coal-burning thermoelectric plants may find it more economical to burn coal that contains less sulfur. Therefore, eastern coal interests wanted a ceiling their coal could meet by scrubbing and wanted scrubbing to be mandatory. Environmentalists desired to push maximum emission reduction. Scrubbing low-sulfur western coal in areas where pollution was not yet a problem was that much more gained for air quality. Thus, a multibillion dollar solution was imposed when other less costly alternatives were available.

This short and important book explains why regulatory bodies are not able to deal with the broader issues they are mandated to attend to. They respond to the political pressures of their environment. The book calls for reforms. First, the authors suggest that the courts do more than focus on agency procedures. A judicial concern with "full policy airing" (p. 104), with interpreting "textual priorities of the legislation" (p. 108), and with applying "principles of coordination" (p. 110) could lead to more agency planning. Second, they suggest that Congress should better define goals and the means to reach those goals. For example, Congress could stipulate that the clean air goal may be "to save 25,000 more life years by 1991 subject to constraints that polluters spend no more than 25 billion dollars in control costs" (p. 126).

Thus, with prods from the courts and tighter congressional mandates, the authors hope that agencies may consider more alternatives, coordinate efforts, in short, engage in more planning.

I see little in American legal tradition and practice to suggest that the courts can substitute for, or even encourage, agency planning. The focus has to be elsewhere. Planning is both an executive and legislative process. It requires continued involvement of both sides in the formulation of objectives, the appropriation of resources, and the definition of means. If we think of planning as ping-pong, then current practice, or even the authors' suggestions, consists in Congress serving and the executive keeping the ball in its hand most of the time. Ping-pong means that the ball goes back and forth. Congress could set a first goal to save 25,000 lives, have EPA provide a set of alternatives, have Congress pass on these, have EPA provide modifications, have Congress appropriate some resources, have EPA adjust targets, and so forth.

Ping-pong means the relevant political environment is broadened because the relevant actors are not only the regulators—also involved are their oversight committees and the current pressure groups. Appropriations force broader participation and that, in the final analysis, is the only way to alter the existing political configuration.

In short, this is an excellent book that goes a long way to spell out relevant issues. It begins to suggest that asking the right question means a need for planning. The question is, how does planning fit our federal system?

GUY BENVENISTE
University of California, Berkeley

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Portraying the President: The White House and the News Media *by Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 358 pp. Cloth, $26.50; paper, $9.95.*

In the preface to this comprehensive account of White House-media relations, the authors point out that most other works on this subject are personal memoirs that are often insightful but are topical rather than analytic in nature. This academic approach to the subject is certainly organized around analytic frameworks, but the reader will still confront largely topical and descriptive material, much of which is already familiar. Perhaps this cannot be avoided given the subject matter but, in my opinion, the book would be much more useful if it were 100 pages shorter in length. The authors do bring together in a well-integrated and updated fashion, however, all the accumulated knowledge we have about the institutional history of the presidential press operation and the manipulative techniques the two parties use on one another. In addition, *Portraying the President* does have a major theme concerning the state of presidential-media relations, one that will be familiar to those who have read the authors' articles on the subject. In contrast to those who assert that the relationship has been permanently and fundamentally altered by the American involvement in Vietnam, Watergate, and the growing sophistication of reporters, Grossman and Kumar argue that mutual dependencies and organizational constraints are so great that the number of favorable news items and descriptive articles about the president still outnumber the negative pieces and analytic articles by a significant extent.

Regardless of the angry comments occasionally voiced by newspersons at the White House press conferences, the authors find that few reporters or editors are dissatisified with the existing structure in which the White House sets the news agenda and that a "body watch" of the president is the main focus of attention. To the extent that struggles between the White House and reporters do occur, Grossman and Kumar state that they are usually rooted in the conflicts between the organizational demands and routines of the two parties rather than in differences in political ideology. Yet the authors limit their descriptions of the backgrounds and operating styles of the presidential reporters to nine case studies, so they provide no comprehensive data on how this crowd differs from the average citizenry in terms of social and educational background or political views.

In the one chapter that presents quantitative data about the degree of favorable news coverage of the president, the authors use content analysis by two coders to categorize items as positive, neutral or negative toward the president. Their survey covers a sample of stories appearing every fifteen days in the *New York Times* and *Time* magazine between 1953 and 1978 and on the "CBS Evening News" between 1968 (when Vanderbilt University established the archives) and 1978. The findings confirm that presidents *normally* receive more attention during their first year in office and that early coverage tends to be more positive in tone. An analysis of published photographs and television footage of the president indicates that pictorial representations were overwhelmingly positive even when stories were negative. Stories about the president's daily activity or personal life tend to be more positive than items about his relations with the other branches of government. The authors concluded that the three types of media "pay attention to the same general kinds of stories and give their articles a similar tone" (p. 272).

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Grossman and Kumar believe that a cycle does exist in the tone of coverage of each presidency beginning with "alliance" (honeymoon period) shifting to "competition" (disillusionment), and ending with "detachment" (routinized relations). Since the authors provide no in-depth case studies of how reality differs from the positive or negative images of presidential actions presented in the press, however, it is impossible for them to explain what independent roles the various media have in structuring the news.

Portraying the President is a good descriptive account of the current players and techniques in the presidential-press "game," but it does not seriously address the issue of what role the media play in affecting our perceptions of the president.

PAUL HALPERN
United States Environmental Protection Agency

Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power *by Eugene Lewis. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980. 274 pp. $22.50.*

When thinking about politics Americans usually have in mind the activities of elected officials, especially presidents, who have been at center stage in national politics since the birth of the Republic. Of course, there were occasions in the past when nonelected officials did play a major supporting role in American political life. Alexander Hamilton as secretary of the treasury and Amos Kendall as postmaster general were notable cases in point. Generally, however, it was from elections that our political leaders traditionally derived the power to govern.

In *Public Entrepreneurship: Toward a Theory of Bureaucratic Political Power,* Eugene Lewis paints a quite different picture of the situation today. Nonelected officials are frequently major figures on the contemporary political scene, and elected officials not uncommonly court their favor and seek their support. Certainly this was true of the three bureaucratic entrepreneurs whose careers Lewis examines: Hyman Rickover, J. Edgar Hoover, and Robert Moses. Each was far more powerful than most of the elected politicians with whom he dealt, and each was a person elected officials dared to cross only at great peril to their own political safety.

Perhaps the most striking characteristic these bureaucrats shared was a genius for publicity. Not for them any covert role in the shadows of power—making the decisions that elected officials announce—Rickover, Hoover, and Moses were extraordinarily adept at publicizing themselves and their agencies' programs. Each became a highly visible figure in American public life.

Why were these entrepreneurs able to arouse so much public interest in what they did? Primarily because they alone seemed to command the expertise necessary to deal with problems the public regarded as important, complex, or threatening. It is striking how much more confidence the public had in these bureaucrats than it did in elected officials, and how often it looked to them for leadership in defining and coping with major issues of public policy.

In addition to their expertise in specialized policy areas, these entrepreneurs were also

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highly adept at the use of managerial strategies necessary either to advance their interests or to fend off adversaries within the national bureaucracy. None could have functioned as successfully as he did on the basis of policy expertise alone. In each case, such expertise was supplemented by a sure instinct for picking out advantageous and defensible organizational terrain and avoiding assignments that might jeapardize either their public standing or organizational autonomy.

This book is in some sense a sequel to an earlier volume by the author, *American Politics in a Bureaucratic Age,* and it uses in its analytical framework many of the concepts introduced in the earlier book. What both of these books demonstrate is that Lewis has one of the most interesting and original minds now involved in the study of administrative institutions. He does not simply recycle old materials, he creates something new.

But, sadly, it must also be said that this book is far from a total success. Standing by themselves, the case histories are extremely valuable. They are clearly organized, crisply written, and have a well-balanced mix of information and analysis. Of course, it is possible to question the entrepreneurs he chooses for analysis. All are modern figures, and we might have learned more about the evolution of entrepreneurship in American bureaucracy if they had come from different historical periods. And why not choose other figures—Henry Kissinger, for example, the entrepreneur without peer in modern American bureaucracy?

But these are essentially quibbles. What is really disappointing is the cumbersome theoretical apparatus it is necessary to climb through to get into and out of the book. Lewis creates this apparatus largely out of the work of a variety of other social and organization theorists. Better he had let his case histories speak for themselves about the implications of bureaucratic entrepreneurship for American democracy. On this particular topic the theorists he relies upon suffocate rather than stimulate our understanding.

FRANCIS E. ROURKE
Johns Hopkins University

Roll Call: One Year in the United States Senate *by William S. Cohen. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1981. 344 pp. $14.95.*

William S. Cohen, a Republican senator from Maine, served in the House of Representatives for six years (1973–1978) before he defeated incumbent Democratic Senator William D. Hathaway in 1978. This book chronicles his first year in the Senate from his swearing-in ceremony in mid-January 1979 until a final roll-call vote in the early morning hours of 22 December 1979. Its purpose is to "serve as a lens, clouded as it is with prejudice and passion, that will allow the viewer to see the flowing metamorphosis of power, people and events" (p. 14). There are also some interesting flashbacks to the 1978 senatorial campaign and his earlier experiences in the House, including his participation as a liberal Republican member on the Judiciary Committee during the impeachment hearings against President Nixon.

Cohen is at his best in his intimate portraits of key colleagues such as John Stennis

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(D.-Miss.) and John Tower (R.-Tex.), the chairman and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee, one of Cohen's principal committee assignments in the Senate. The sometimes partisan, often constituency-oriented interactions with Edmund Muskie, the senior senator from Maine, are especially revealing. There are also personal glimpses of Cohen's relationships with his wife Diane and their two teenage sons. These serve to remind us that senators, despite their lofty status, assertive egos, and numerous perquisites, are still human beings, open to self-doubts and frailities.

Senator Cohen demonstrates a keen sense for differences between the House and the Senate. House members, according to Cohen, "see themselves as legislative craftsmen, laboring diligently and productively—albeit anonymously—for the public good." Senators, on the other hand, "cherish an image of themselves as the molders of large ideas and shapers of global policy" (p. 245). The House deliberates in orderly, if sometimes raucous, fashion; the Senate, by contrast, is much more informal and unstructured. Some of the best anecdotes in the book come from Cohen's prior experiences in the House, such as the time he learned his first lesson about the importance of seniority in, of all places, the House gym.

Senator Cohen is to be congratulated for accomplishing in large part what he set out to do, an insightful description of behind-the-scenes activities in one session of the Ninety-sixth Congress. As he himself notes, it "is not *the* true version of what life is really like in the United States Senate" (p. 326). But it is an imaginative and lively attempt. The book will be useful to political scientists interested in the workings of the contemporary Senate and to historians who wish to understand the political issues and personalities of the 1970s.

ROBERT L. PEABODY
Johns Hopkins University

The American Establishment *by Leonard Silk and Mark Silk. New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1980. 351 pp. $13.95.*

This ambitious book distinguishes from business and government a "third sector," the *establishment*, examining in separate chapters five major institutions: Harvard University; the *New York Times*; the Ford Foundation; the Brookings Institution; and the Council on Foreign Relations. Several other organizations are covered in two additional chapters.

To the extent that the book has an argument, it is that there *is* an establishment, but one that experiences internal conflicts and is ultimately quite adaptable to changing times. And in fact, the book recounts various episodes, in some cases quite engrossing, of influence, conflict, and change. Unfortunately, the book offers virtually no framework within which to evaluate these assertions. How did the authors choose the institutions they did, whom did they interview, and what did they ask? By what measure are these five institutions influential in American society? How significant were the internal debates highlighted in the book? Were they crucial, or rather side issues or aberrations (such as Harvard's "Battle of Memorial Church")? Moreover, some elements of consensus within

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these institutions may be so firmly held that the very idea of changing them may qualify as a nonissue.

The book makes no use of decades of research on the question of power and elites. For example, C. Wright Mills examined interlocking relationships of elites, and yet the authors do not closely track the relations the five institutions have with each other or with business and government. Similarly, the pluralist literature that challenged Mills suggests a more competitive relationship among elites and recommends more exacting methods to measure influence. In contrast, the book freely attributes the defeat of hospital cost regulation and public funding of congressional campaigns entirely to lobbying by the Business Roundtable (pp. 256–57). The authors do not explain how they came to this sweeping conclusion.

Surprising from these estimable writers and publisher is that the book needs rewriting and editing. Parts are rambling and repetitive (for example, on the Council on Foreign Relations), and some chapters are confusing, weak, and inconclusive (for example, on the Ford Foundation). Contradiction or overlap between chapters is handled by a lame footnote rather than seized as an occasion for additional analysis (compare pages 64 and 181). The authors criticize Henry Ford II (p. 148) and the Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences (p. 61) without dealing adequately with their respective objections to the Ford Foundation and the Kennedy School of Government.

The book is at its best when it explores a particular incident in depth, as in the account of an internal debate on *New York Times* editorial policy toward business. The rest of the book would have been more penetrating if it had been organized around case studies of similar issues. All too often, as in the chapters on the Ford Foundation and the Brookings Institution, the early historical detail leaves little room for contemporary cases or analysis. By examining fewer cases in an intensive and comparative manner, a more definite and documented argument can be made about how social decisions are actually made.

The authors had unrivaled access to some of the nation's leading bankers, editors, intellectuals, and public servants. Thus it is a special pity that they did not base their book on more systematic research and documentation. Even so, one tantalizing contribution of the book is to underline the importance of personalities within organizations, such as the conflict between John Oakes and A.O. Sulzberger at the *New York Times*, or that between Henry Kissinger and the Bundy brothers at the Council on Foreign Relations. Social scientists often overlook such personal factors, and this book represents an invitation to more systematic research on the subject.

CHRISTOPHER K. LEMAN
Brandeis University
University Consortium for Research on North America

Friendly Fascism: The New Face of Power in America *by Bertram Gross. New York, M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1980. 387 pp. $15.00.*

It is always disappointing when a respected scholar abandons the scholar's basic "tools of the trade"—the careful use of words and concepts. In this book, Bertram Gross attends

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to a set of developments involving American government and corporate business. Some of his analysis is widely accepted by informed observers; large parts, however, reflect a narrow, close-minded, passionate, and intensely polemical perspective. When Gross argues that political and economic developments have brought the United States to the brink of fascism—albeit "fascism with a smile"—he displays the polemicist's willingness to bend words and ideas in whatever way serves his purpose.

That Bertram Gross's intellectual carelessness may well have been prompted by a form of caring is evident. The author tells his readers repeatedly how deeply concerned he is with the elaboration of governmental and economic power in the United States. He recalls his rude shock of recognition when a brilliant student thus confronted him: "Aren't you a friendly fascist yourself, Professor Gross" (p. 4)? After a series of such exchanges, he was haunted by a dream. In it "I saw myself searching for 'friendly fascists' through a huge, rambling house. . . . At last I came to a half-lit room with many doors. . . . I flung open one of the doors—and there sitting at a typewriter and smiling right back at me, I saw MYSELF" (p. 4).

One does not know whether to laugh or cry. Gross is obviously sincere; his distress is real. But for him to plead guilty to the charge that he has encouraged fascism is absurd. It may well be, as he thinks, that in earlier writings he had been too encouraging of more governmental power and too confident that such power would always be used with wisdom and benevolence. Many social scientists seem to have reached similar conclusions. But this perception is not strengthened by equating all encouragement of governmental or private economic power with support for a "friendly fascism."

Bertram Gross is Distinguished Professor of Public Policy and Planning at Hunter College and professor of political science at City University of New York. He has written widely on public administration and public affairs. Among his books are *The Legislative Struggle* and *The Managing of Organizations.*

Much of Gross's analysis in his new volume will not appear surprising to those familiar with the writings of such "power elite" theorists as C. Wright Mills and C. William Domhoff. With them he now concludes that the United States is governed by a narrow elite spawned by the intersection of big business and big government. Pursuing its interests in the face of growing challenges at home and abroad, this elite ruthlessly manipulates the public. It narcotizes dissent through the medium of television (pp. 256–58). It catches the people up in a consuming pursuit of goods whose obsolescence is either built in or psychologically induced (pp. 225–28). It encourages "conflict among the 'slobs' " through which, for example, have-not whites and blacks take out their frustrations on each other rather than on the proper target, the establishment itself (pp. 307–9). And so the critique proceeds, case after case. In Gross's present judgment, the ascendant groups in American social and political leadership are, quite simply, evil.

The reader who starts from a perspective similar to that of Bertram Gross's may well find *Friendly Fascism* bold and imaginative. Most readers, unfortunately, will find the book an unbroken and unproductive polemic.

EVERETT CARLL LADD
University of Connecticut, Storrs

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The International Economy and the National Interest *by Irvin Millman Grossack. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1980. 253 pp. $17.95.*

The nation-state—that ideal-type construction in which the administrative structure of a state is coextensive with a community of shared social and cultural values—is, perhaps, the West's most singular contribution to political theory and the dominant form of political organization in the world today. The nation-state idea has never been entirely at ease with the notion of an open international economy. The latter, which is sometimes offered up as an alternative form of international organization—in the extreme, a political system in its own right—vests sovereignty in a free marketplace rather than in a territorially limited government. The two notions, to be sure, are less distinct in practice than in theory. Most Western states voluntarily submit themselves to a code of liberal international conduct, expressed through institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and undergirded by a theory that postulates that states maximize their real income by taking part in an unimpeded international economy. Periods of economic stress, of course, tend to lay bare the distance between their underlying premises.

In the view of Grossack, what a nation-state really gains, in an economic sense, from the world economy may be less (or more) than is customarily believed, both because of a deficiency of theory and because of inadequate accounting that may measure one flow and distort another, while ignoring a third kind altogether.

The main problem with prevailing theory, Grossack argues, is that it is too beholdened to its origins. Its assumptions remain rooted in a simpler era when trade between countries dominated international commerce. Indeed, current trade theory (the author uses the durable Heckscher-Ohlin thesis to stand for the whole) still assumes first that all factors of production are internationally immobile and second that free trade in any event equalizes returns to factors of production internationally. In short, attempts to build a theory of foreign investment upon a "trade theory that both first assumes and then deduces that foreign investment does not and cannot come about will surely be a futile exercise" (p. 6).

While economic theory and measurement remain transterritorial, economic reality has become transnational. Stated another way, the citizens of a nation-state and their economic endeavors no longer stay home, but migrate and generate wealth throughout the world. The impact of these various migrations upon the balance of payments of a single country can be substantial, but is imperfectly captured by traditional transterritorial accounting methods. Traditional accounting would show trade and investment transactions between country A and country B, but would not reflect the activities of country A nationals within country B, or between countries other than the home state. Thus, to cite one among numerous possible examples, trade between country B and country C conducted by country A nationals would increase country A national revenues if the earnings were repatriated. But that activity might equally well lower country A exports. Since such third-country transactions will not necessarily be translated back to the country of national origin, they are ultimately unquantifiable and must be recorded as contingencies in the accounts of country A. But quantifiable or not, the magnitude of the

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flows they represent is immense, and an accounting system that calls attention to them is of high importance.

No national government will rush to change from a transterritorial to a transnational accounting basis, nor does Grossack advise it. In a currency crisis, there is little comfort to be had from counting the liquid assets of U.S. companies in Nassau, London, or Luxembourg. Notwithstanding the importance of offshore havens and third-country flows, a state's balance of payments, not least for reasons of national security, must continue to be territorial in nature.

It is implied throughout, if not actually specified, that the transnational economy, despite its obvious prominence, does *not* presage a new political order. As a class, international economists seem peculiarly susceptible to utopian "one-world" political schemes. Grossack is a refreshing exception. Style, organization, and clarity of expression are weak points in an otherwise good and important book.

BENJAMIN M. ROWLAND
New York City

Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks *by Gerard Smith. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1980. 556 pp. $17.95.*

Ambassador Gerard Smith was the chief negotiator in SALT I. *Doubletalk* is primarily a narrative history cum memoir of the talks leading to the treaty, from the viewpoint of the official U.S. delegation. The secondary thread in the book is an attack on Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon's secretive and personalized style of diplomacy.

The book succeeds in both respects, though it is not thrilling reading. Laymen may find the book confusing in its technical detail and boring in its description of events. Specialists will appreciate the book as the most extensive account by a prime participant. Strategists may be disappointed, however, by the ploddingly descriptive quality of the book and the lack of analysis or theoretical argument. There are, in fact, only about two pages (pp. 85 and 86) that discuss the conceptually desired politico-military outputs (for example, "crisis stability") from the negotiators' long labor over technical inputs such as antiballistic missile systems, submarine launchers, and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Smith does not engage the debates that have dominated U.S. policy since the mid-1970s—debates over the logic of strategy based on "assured destruction," the import of equivalence in counterforce capabilities, or the criteria for defining nuclear parity. As a chronicle of the bargaining a decade ago between the U.S. and Soviet delegations in Vienna and Helsinki, however, *Doubletalk* is first-rate and unmatched.

Smith makes scant attempt to record the other half of SALT I—the evolution of policy in Washington—although he does include some interesting references to the instances in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff supported his position against civilians in the Defense Department. The only lapses from his bland and gentlemanly tone occur when he discusses Kissinger's parallel "back channel" negotiations with Soviet leaders. The most interesting chapter in this respect is the one entitled "Bullshit" (a direct quotation of Nixon's reaction to one of Smith's recommendations). Kissinger is faulted for recklessness,

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disruptive confusion of the bargaining process by adding a second track (hence the title of the book), poor grasp of the negotiating issues due to absorption in other problems, sloppy analytic support from the National Security Council staff, and unconscionable trusting reliance on Soviet interpreters: "a presidential aide" blithely matching himself "against the resources of the Soviet leadership" (p. 225). Kissinger and Nixon, in fact, are portrayed as overanxious and "soft" on the Russians. For example, Kissinger was originally nonchalant about requiring Moscow to include submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the interim freeze agreement. This is an ironic twist, since it was the delegation and Smith's own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency that took the fall in a post-treaty purge to propitiate Senator Henry Jackson.

An example that also brings to light a curious and shocking incident concerns the summit negotiations in Moscow just prior to the signing of the treaty. Kissinger almost stumbled into an inadvertent ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV), through a formula inconsistent with the U.S. Minuteman III program as well as prospective modernization of Soviet heavy missiles, and was saved only by Smith's last-minute intervention by telephone. Given now prevalent nostalgia for missed opportunities for a MIRV ban, Smith writes, "Some people may say we should have kept quiet at Helsinki!" (p. 417).

Though flawed, John Newhouse's *Cold Dawn* remains a more comprehensive (focusing on the bureaucratic politics in Washington), interesting, and engagingly written account of Salt I. Thomas Wolfe's *The SALT Experience* is the most balanced and up-to-date study, though quite dry in presentation. And Kissinger's *White House Years* offers the viewpoint of Smith's *bête noir*. For diplomatic history of one-half of the enterprise, however, *Doubletalk* is the best and only source available.

RICHARD K. BETTS
The Brookings Institution

Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment *by Stephen E. Ambrose. Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1981. 368 pp. $14.95.*

Eisenhower revisionism continues apace. This book adds to the increasing volume of literature that would alter earlier stereotypes of Ike as the amiable "political general" of modest intellectual talent who later presided reluctantly over an ineffective American government for eight years. The new Eisenhower is presented here as a statesman of political cunning and skill who led the United States to victory in Europe in World War II and whose presidency was a time of peace and prosperity, in part the consequence of his understanding and nurturing of clandestine operations.

This volume centers on Eisenhower's relationship to the policy, organization, and operations of what is vaguely termed the "espionage establishment." It is a breezy historical analysis, launched in some conceptual confusion, of the United States intelligence and secret operations experience under Eisenhower's influence from 1942 to the Bay of Pigs in 1961. A number of important questions might have informed a study so ambitious in scope. What were Eisenhower's strengths and weaknesses as a strategic deci-

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sion maker? What role did intelligence and secret operations play in World War II? In the cold war that followed, how effectively did intelligence systems perform in their various functions of informing decision makers, of espionage operations, of counterintelligence, and of covert action?

Attempts to answer these questions, or to write about the secret world of espionage and covert action, present a historiographical challenge. Much of the activity of the world's "second oldest profession" is designed for deception. The paper trail is unreliable. Often the pivotal archives—if they exist—are premanently padlocked. And yet the world of secret intelligence can hide the key to historical understanding.

Stephen E. Ambrose, professor of history at Louisiana State University at New Orleans, with the assistance of Richard H. Immerman, has written an episodic analysis of Eisenhower's most active years, including: the Normandy invasion in 1944; the battles that followed in the Allied sweep into Germany; the early postwar years of the Central Intelligence Agency; CIA-sponsored covert actions in Guatemala and Iran; events in Hungary, Vietnam, and Indonesia; the U-2 incident in 1960; Eisenhower's role in various CIA assassination plots; and the embarrassing Bay of Pigs invasion in early 1961. This book adds appreciably to our knowledge of some of these events, particularly about covert actions in Guatemala and Iran and the U-2 incident in May 1960. Much of the analysis is based upon well-known secondary sources, but a substantial amount of new information has been gleaned from unpublished papers, interviews, and correspondence.

The book, however, fails to delineate the manifold activities described under the label of "spies" or "espionage." By its title one would expect the book to deal primarily with espionage. But in an all too brief introduction the reader is given little help in distinguishing among such terms as intelligence, counterintelligence, espionage, cryptography, covert action, deception, and psychological warfare. Ignoring the definitional and theoretical problems, the author offers an inadequate framework for assessing the significance of the events described, or to answer the questions posed above. This leaves us with little more than episodic descriptions.

The thrust of the book glorifies secret intelligence as well as Eisenhower's leadership. One must wonder if such adulation is justified. The author can be faulted on a number of points of fact and evaluation. Hyperbole abounds: "the Dulles brothers came to know the world and its commerce as well as any men living" (p. 172); Ike "knew the United States Government, perhaps as well as any man living" (p. 156); Ray S. Cline, who spent his career as an intelligence official, is described as "a scholar's scholar" (p. 252). As for errors, we are told that Cline became "Deputy Director of the CIA" (p. 236). The President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities is erroneously described as "composed of retired senior government officials" (p. 242). The reader is given the impression that President Kennedy fired Allen Dulles as CIA director shortly after the Bay of Pigs (p. 318); in fact, Dulles stayed on for more than six months.

On matters of judgment and fact there is much to quarrel with here. Nonetheless, revisionism is the constant task of the historian; stereotypes of the past tend to be all too firmly embedded in historical images. One cannot fault this work for its revisionist approach. Main disappointments are the book's uncritical approach to its principal actors, and to some of its sources, and its weak conceptual and theoretical underpinning with

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reference to the nature and functions of clandestine operations. Yet when a definitive history of American intelligence, 1942–1961, comes to be written, Ambrose's engaging volume will not be ignored.

HARRY HOWE RANSOM
Vanderbilt University

First Line of Defense: The U.S. Navy Since 1945 *by Paul B. Ryan. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1981. 224 pp. $14.95.*

This volume is neither a descriptive history nor an objective analysis of the United States Navy's development since 1945. Instead, it is both apologia and polemic, defending the navy's long-standing infatuation with costly, large multipurpose warships and advocating their continued acquisition throughout the 1980s.

Written in the style of a "Washington Insider" column, *First Line of Defense* is prone to hyperbole and unsupported assertions, driven by a navy-centric view of national security affairs since 1945. The reader must endure trite phrases such as "paralysis by analysis" (p. 180); assertions based on "rumors in Pentagon corridors" (p. 162); and speculation such as "This smashing propaganda triumph [Carter's neutron-bomb decision] encouraged the Kremlin to launch similar attacks on the ubiquitous U.S. fleet" (p. 152). The book is laced with favorable characterizations of supporters of navy programs—"low-keyed, salty" Admiral Pride (p. 20); "judicious," "perceptive" Defense Secretary Thomas Gates (p. 23); "down-to-earth" Admiral Stockdale (p. 54); and unflattering descriptions of less sympathetic officials—"irascible" Defense Secretary Louis Johnson (p. 14); "irresolute" Lyndon Johnson (p. 49).

Finally, and more annoying, perhaps, are the inaccuracies with which the book abounds and which undermine its credibility. Some examples: Malaysia did not exist when Truman was in office (p. 7); the Soviets do not operate a vertical and short takeoff and landing plane (p. 73), it can only take off vertically; Backfire is a bomber, not a reconnaissance aircraft (p. 96); British forces were never positioned in Malagasy (p. 155), the republic formerly known as the French territory of Madagascar.

Unfortunately, both the book's tone and its technical sloppiness undermine a case that is not without merit. The acquisition of large and capable warships, notably those comprising aircraft carrier battle groups, would enable the navy to seek the destruction of the Soviet fleet worldwide during the early stages of a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact forces. Navy spokesmen have put the case for such a strategy for well over a decade, as have articulate civilians such as John Lehman, currently secretary of the navy. The issue now, as in the past, concerns budgetary constraints: Can a large, offensive, multipurpose Navy be funded in peacetime given competing demands on budget dollars?

The budgetary tradeoff is not so much one between the navy per se and social benefit programs, as Captain Ryan alleges on several occasions (pp. 134, 170, 183). It is equally one of resource allocation within the Department of Defense itself. Resources must be divided among the various military services, often to support missions that cross service lines. Thus, for example, implementing an offensive maritime strategy involves the choice

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among the employment solely of carrier task forces, the use of ship and/or air-launched cruise missiles, or a combination of these approaches to achieve the desired destruction of the Soviet fleet.

Most naval observers would agree that all alternate approaches to the conduct of similar missions need not be fully funded independently of one another. To do so, given any budget constraint, would be highly inefficient and to the detriment of other, underfunded missions. But *First Line of Defense* provides the reader with no appreciation of possible tradeoffs between service capabilities or between the demands of different missions. Such tradeoffs are, of course, the essence of analysis. And analysis, Captain Ryan alleges, has not served the navy's—and the nation's—interests (pp. 106–11, 122–23, 180–81).

Indeed, Captain Ryan's critique of analysis raises a fundamental question regarding the qualifications of those who should be charged with the task of determining the nature of military modernization. Ryan contends that the "operator" is the best qualified to judge what systems need be acquired. Operating particular systems does not, however, necessarily provide the basis for determining political and military strategies, for organizing modernization programs, for choosing between the competing demands of military services, and for allocating budgetary resources.

One cannot blindly favor the sailor's judgment over that of the soldier, or indeed, the airman, scientist, economist, or systems analyst. All must contribute their expertise to the complex problems of force development. That Captain Ryan fails to realize this fact is reason enough for the interested reader to look elsewhere for a more objective history of the navy's struggles for a larger fleet in the postwar, but pre-Reagan, era.

Dov S. Zakheim
Congressional Budget Office

From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford *edited by Stephen Jurika, Jr. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 476 pp. $15.00.*

Admiral Radford retired from the navy in 1957 after serving four years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). In the late sixties he began to write the memoirs from which Jurika has edited this volume which is being published posthumously. Radford was a naval aviator who participated in or witnessed almost everything important that happened to the navy from Pearl Harbor until his retirement and much that involved all three services after 1946.

This volume adds little to what is already known about events before 1953, when he became chairman of the JCS. The coverage after 1953, which ends about 1955, is more detailed and more rewarding, seemingly because it is based on better records.

The problem with Radford's account of his career prior to 1953 is in part the evidently modest goals of his writing and in part Jurika's editing. Lacking personal records, Radford might have commented on the many published accounts of events he witnessed firsthand. In fact, his few references to published accounts usually serve only to relieve him of

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the burden of further description. Jurika, in turn, provides only cursory substantive editing. The result is a laconic and discreet narrative that gets better when Radford tells about his years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Radford was surely a successful military leader is his time. He strode unscathed through the minefields of unification politics and interservice rivalries during the three years before the Korean War when it looked like the future belonged to the air force. During that period, some naval officers of lesser rank and composure became rebellious. A chief of naval operations (CNO), Louis Denfield, was forced to resign. Radford's own straight-arrow conduct helped force Denfield out. At least in part because of the way Radford handled himself in those dark days for the navy, President Eisenhower chose him as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for two terms, the only chairman who has not first served as the chairman's service chief.

Radford's background as an aviator enabled him to become in the Eisenhower administration an advocate of an integrated defense program based on air power. In 1949, when he was Pacific fleet commander, he tells us that he withheld his congratulations to Forrest Sherman for his appointment as CNO until he could be sure that Sherman had made no commitments that would encumber his advocacy of navy interests. Four years later, now chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Radford expected the army chief, General Ridgway, to go along with major changes in the defense program that substantially reduced the army's budget. He was now pitted against service chief advocacy.

How much did Radford understand the political world in which he operated? How self-conscious was he about the relationship of professional conduct to political dealing in the late forties during the navy-air force row, or later when he worked with President Eisenhower to impose the "New Look" in the armed services? No attempt is made in this memoir to answer these questions.

To reconcile Radford as the untarnished representative of navy interests in 1949 and Radford as advocate of an integrated military strategy and budget after 1953 in the face of service opposition is not easy. Other evidence is substantial that Radford played his role as a military statesman remarkably well. The book only suggests why.

In practice, Radford's behavior defined a fairly consistent and predictable but rather complicated professional military leadership role. Like other men of affairs—business, politicians, bureaucrats—there may be no correlation between the demonstrated capacity of a military leader to perform and the inclination or ability to discuss the performance. Radford's memoir suggest that he was much better at performance than discussion. This judgment is supported by my own experience interviewing Radford shortly after his retirement.

Radford's success as a military leader is presumptive evidence that he was highly skillful at the discreet exercise of bureaucratic political power. For political science, which is predisposed to deal in explicit politicking, the difficulty in explaining Radford's career as a military leader, and to some extent Eisenhower's as a political leader, reflects on the discipline's awkwardness in dealing with restrained partisanship. This memoir helps show us the problem, but not the solution.

PAUL Y. HAMMOND
University of Pittsburgh

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The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, 1933–1947 *by Hugh DeSantis. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 270 pp. $23.00.*

The fall 1979 issue of *Political Science Quarterly* carried an excellent article by DeSantis in which he contrasted the perceptions of the Soviet Union held by American diplomats sent to the Balkans after the Nazis had been driven out with the views held by the officials who remained in Washington. There had been no major and systematic differences in the beliefs of the members of these two groups before the former went out to the field, but the firsthand experience of dealing with the Soviet consolidation of power in East Europe led them to become disillusioned with the Soviets much more quickly than those who stayed at home. *The Diplomacy of Silence* (a misleading title) looks at the attitudes of the members of the U.S. foreign service toward the Soviet Union over a longer period of time, from 1933 to 1947. Unfortunately, however, the best argument remains that which the author made in his earlier article.

The book lacks a clear focus, combining as it does quick histories of diplomatic events with a record of American diplomats' commentaries on these events. Although many of the quotations from unpublished documents are illuminating, the final result is disappointing. First, the author never fully engages the books by others, such as Robert Schulzinger, Lynn Davis, and Daniel Yergin, which present views that differ somewhat from his. Second, except for the excellent distinction between diplomats who went to the field at the end of World War II and those who remained in Washington, the author makes the foreign-service officers (with the obvious exception of George Kennan) appear to be of one mind. It might have been more fruitful to have probed for the existence of systematic differences of opinion. Third, assertions about causality are made very casually. One diplomat's "thinking was further influenced by his personality" (p. 52); because foreign-service officers "embraced a favorable cultural and social image of Western Europe, they tended to tolerate the Fascist governments of Italy and Germany" (p. 79); and "on account of [the British] historical rivalry with Russia, [their diplomats] had tended all along to be more circumspect than the Americans in their approach to Moscow" (p. 116). These propositions are plausible, but need to be developed and explored systematically, rather than asserted without evidence.

DeSantis argues that foreign-service officers formed a relatively closed and self-contained circle, especially when they were abroad. But what I find striking is that many of their views also characterized the wider public. They were, according to DeSantis, ethnocentric, Eurocentric, idealistic, and strongly—if briefly—influenced by wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union. Although they were bitterly anti-Communist before the war, by 1943 their image of the Soviet Union had changed, and they had great expectations for postwar collaboration. It took a while for this optimism to fade, and when it did the old image of the Soviet Union returned in strengthened form, thus inhibiting a firm but balanced policy that might have permitted the sort of "realistic cooperation" that Kennan—whose views about the Soviet Union remained relatively constant throughout this period—espoused. But this describes the American public as well as the diplomatic

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corps. For the author's purposes, then, concentrating on the latter may be inappropriate. The most important factors at work in molding attitudes may lie in a broader sphere.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964–1968 *by Wallace J. Thies. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980. 446 pp. $20.00.*

In this provocative and useful study the author argues that coercion of North Vietnam by the Johnson administration proved very difficult for six reasons. First, American decision makers falsely assumed that the government in Hanoi was a unitary actor that would rank and rerank its values in a rational fashion, when in reality the Hanoi regime was a collection of revolutionaries, many of whose careers were tied to achieving an early victory in the war and who therefore discounted American threats due to "premature cognitive closure" (p. 264). Moreover, between 1963 and 1965 Johnson failed to break through the perceptual barriers in Hanoi by signaling clearly that North Vietnam would suffer heavy bombing and massive American intervention in the war in the South if they chose to escalate. Third, during the more promising periods for negotiations, incremental decision making in the White House and uncoordinated implementation by military and diplomatic bureaucracies resulted in escalations that accidentally coincided with diplomatic initiatives, thereby disrupting the start of talks. And when he needed to deescalate the bombing in 1967, Johnson was unable to do so, for fear of the reaction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the hawks in the Senate. Thies's fifth reason focuses on the leaders in Hanoi, who falsely believed that Johnson was consciously timing the bombing raids to indicate his underlying intentions. Finally, according to the author, when the most promising moment for talks came in 1966–1967, Johnson offered little but a "demand for unconditional surrender" (p. 282).

Thies portrays the interactions between Washington and Hanoi as streams of decisions from superiors to subordinates that were often implemented haphazardly and frequently misinterpreted by the target government, rather than as simple actions and reactions in which words and deeds conveyed clear meanings. Thies concludes that the resulting errors and misunderstandings made a difficult problem "virtually insoluble" (p. 374). He argues that such confusion is the rule when states collide, and he warns that theorists who believe that force and diplomacy can be orchestrated successfully in a limited war are wrong. He then offers a few lessons for would-be coercers. Before acting, decision makers should assess carefully how committed their opposite numbers are to a course of action and how likely it is that their opponents can be so discredited that they will be replaced within the opposing government. When engaged in coercion, coercers should try to coordinate their words and deeds very closely, and they should try to maintain one diplomatic channel through which consistently authoritative and truthful messages can be sent.

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Thies has written a sophisticated treatment of the negotiations as viewed from both capitals—his treatment is more satisfying in its detail than the work of Goodman and Porter for the Johnson years, and his prescriptions are sensible. His choice of the Johnson years as his case, however, is questionable, since Johnson was seeking surrender from the men who had previously taken the southern countryside from the French in 1954 and then from Diem and who were holding it successfully against the American regulars. On the basis of this case one may conclude that the primary requisite for successful coercion is a correct definition of the situation and a realistic appraisal of means and goals, rather than proper signaling. Thies also assumes that Johnson's extremely chaotic style of decision making and of implementation was typical of most governments, rather than a result of Kennedy's replacement of Eisenhower's National Security Council and its Operations Control Board with McGeorge Bundy's free-wheeling White House staff and Johnson's Tuesday lunch meetings. The author also underestimates the extent to which Johnson's character, his concern with domestic critics from both the left and the right, and his fear of a collapse in Saigon prevented him either from sending early and forceful signals or from negotiating a compromise settlement in the South that would have allowed an American withdrawal. Consequently, Thies overemphasizes the bureaucratic and psychological factors that contributed to the failure of coercion. These criticisms aside, Thies has written a convincing cautionary tale for American leaders who hope to orchestrate military attacks and diplomatic initiatives, for he shows how difficult coercive diplomacy really is.

STEPHEN PELZ
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Oil, War, and American Security: The Search for a National Policy on Foreign Oil, 1941–1947 *by Michael B. Stoff. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1980. 249 pp. $15.00.*

"A review of the diplomatic history of the past thirty-five years," a State Department oil economist observed in 1945,"will show that petroleum has historically played a larger role in the external relations of the United States than any other commodity." Nowhere has this fact been more clearly demonstrated than in United States involvement in the Middle East during World War II and the immediate postwar period. During these years the search to secure the enormous reserves of the Persian Gulf challenged the United States to play a more active role in Middle East affairs. They also raised important questions regarding government's proper role in the formation of domestic and foreign oil policy.

Michael Stoff's *Oil, War, and American Security* provides a thoroughly researched and readable account of that wartime oil diplomacy. Drawing on a wide variety of government and private sources, Stoff chronicles Washington's frustrating search for a national oil policy—a goal that still eludes the United States to this day.

Although, as Stoff points out, the goal of formulating a coordinated and consistent approach toward foreign oil was never realized, the search for that policy left an important legacy that still shapes the official and private view of the Middle East and its oil.

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Abroad, particularly in Saudi Arabia, State Department and military officials set out, in heavy-handed fashion, to convince Ibn Saud and Great Britain that Arabian oil was primarily an American preserve. The need to preserve access to the king's oil and to maintain his goodwill laid the basis of what was to become the United States's special and complicated relationship with Saudi Arabia.

Stoff's story, however, does not lie in the shifting sands of Arabia but in the maze of bureaucratic rivalries of wartime Washington. Here bureaucrats from at least half a dozen agencies wrestled with the issues of security and order in the international petroleum trade. Whatever their differences, these men came to believe—at least during the war years—that alone the oil companies could not secure the nation's stake in Middle East oil. Only official involvement at home and abroad could protect the national interest: from the Petroleum Reserves Corporation to the pipeline to the abortive Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement. This view was challenged and ultimately defeated by domestic oilmen who were determined to keep Middle East oil out of the United States and government out of the oil industry.

While Stoff has presented a fascinating account of bureaucratic wrangling in Washington, particularly over the Anglo-American petroleum, he often neglects the regional and global considerations that influenced oil policy. This is clearly evident from his treatment of the years 1945 to 1947—the period in which the United States began to reassess its views of its friends, enemies, and security needs. There is little or no mention of oil or the Middle East within the context of an emerging cold war. How did American perceptions of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East affect oil policy? What was Washington's view of the strategic and economic pros and cons of Persian Gulf oil in the postwar years? These and other questions are not addressed. In short, the reader is frequently left with the impression that policymakers—American and British alike—had little appreciation of events outside of Washington and London.

Nor is adequate attention devoted to the impact of regional events on the formation of postwar policy. Events such as the Iranian crisis of 1946 or the situation in Palestine that deeply affected official attitudes and policies toward oil are not treated at all.

These shortcomings, however, should not obscure the significance of Stoff's work. He has written an important book that adds greatly to our understanding of U.S. policy toward Middle East oil.

AARON DAVID MILLER
Department of State

Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States, vol. 3, The Political Background of the Federal Convention *by William Winslow Crosskey and William Jeffrey, Jr. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1981. 592 pp. $27.00.*

William W. Crosskey's first two volumes, published in 1953, produced skepticism and controversy. His exhumed Constitution gave Congress general rather than enumerated legislative power, and its Commerce Clause covered practically all economically gainful

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activity, "interstate" or not. Although Crosskey extensively analyzed the document in light of eighteenth-century word usage and rules of legal interpretation and explored the history of its post-1788 misinterpretation, he postponed close consideration of the political and constitutional controversies of the 1770s and 1780s. Now a third volume, completed after Crosskey's death by William Jeffrey, Jr., examines the years 1774–1787, but leaves the Philadelphia Convention to a promised fourth volume.

Throughout the period, the authors find that New England and usually the Middle States advocated full central authority over "commerce" in its expansive eighteenth-century sense. Frequent reservations in favor of colonial or state control of "internal police" meant little, given that term's then-restricted meaning (roughly, preservation of local order through criminal and tort law, and control of the law of estates and personal status, but *not* local economic regulation). To be sure, the nationalists lost an early round: during secret sessions of the undemocratic, postindependence Continental Congress, an unrepresentative "revolutionary party" succeeded in weakening the Articles of Confederation, which undemocratic state legislatures then ratified. After the war, the South resisted commercial reform because of a stubborn commitment to slave-based agriculture. By 1785–1786, however, leading Virginians and especially James Madison feared that continued regional hostility would drive the North to separatism. About the same time, northerners recognized the slave South's sense of military vulnerability in the absence of outside protection and cunningly affected talk of disunion; yet they themselves feared eventual southern dominance in a national government based on representation by population. Statesmanship consequently vied with con artistry during the sectionally charged Jay-Gardoqui negotiations, the Annapolis gathering, Shays's Rebellion, and the final maneuverings to call the Philadelphia Convention.

Even Congress's resolution limiting the Philadelphia Convention to "the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation" turns out to have had a true nationalist intent. The authors discount arguably contrary evidence in Madison's notes on Congress for 21 February 1787 as "the first clear instance of Madisonian falsification" (p. 388). The falsification occurred, they imply, sometime after 1791, when Madison sought to hide his earlier nationalist interlude. The modern, well-annotated edition of Madison's papers (which the authors do not cite) not only indicates nothing sufficient to support the charge, but also contains correspondence tending to corroborate the challenged account. One wonders.

The authors provide repeated and persuasive evidence to support Crosskey's claim in 1953 about the very meaning that eighteenth-century Americans attached to "commerce." Although they also make a strong case for the existence of nationalist sentiment, they are less successful in showing that it was deeply felt by all but southerners and a few other perversely localistic rascals. The hard problem involves the sentiment's extent and depth, not its existence, but the book gives inadequate attention to structures and channels of opinion formation, within the political and social orders of the period, to allow firm generalizing. Other studies from the last three decades have provided useful insight, but the authors almost studiously ignore them, as well as most other twentieth-century accounts. At minimum, tapping the extensive secondary literature could have helped relate debates over commerce and centralism to the wider-ranging political and constitutional ferment

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of the 1770s and 1780s, when shifts occurred in the very terms and premises of American political discourse.

As an intellectual artifact, the book has value, too, and probably more value than if Jeffrey, in preparing Crosskey's manuscript for publication, had departed from the original design by incorporating recent scholarship. Not least, this volume whets the appetite for the final installment.

CHARLES A. LOFGREN
Claremont Men's College

Party Politics in the South *edited by Robert P. Steed, Laurence W. Moreland, and Tod A. Baker. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980. 239 pp. $23.50.*

The conversion of symposium papers into an integrated book is notoriously difficult, and this volume is no exception to that rule. Based on the Citadel's first (1978) Symposium on Southern Politics, it offers basically a collection of ten research papers of varying scope and quality, loosely linked by the fact that they deal with some facet of electoral politics in the South, or in one or more of its states. It is an instance of the whole being less than the sum of its parts; specialists will find value in particular papers, but the book is not designed for and is unlikely to attract general readers.

Of the four chapters dealing with intraparty politics, the most useful is Bradley Canon's examination of V.O. Key's two alternative explanations for the structure of Southern Democratic factionalism (though I find inexplicable Canon's inclusion of Texas and Florida as part of the "deep South"). Equally interesting but less rigorous in approach is Malcolm Jewell's effort to measure the impact of Republican primaries on total primary turnout and on the types of candidates nominated, though I remain skeptical of his conclusion that increased participation in Republican primaries probably has not had much impact on conflicts in the Democratic party between liberals and conservatives. Each of the other two analyses of intraparty politics focuses on a single state. Dale Krane and Tip Allen, Jr., use aggregate data to demonstrate the durability of factional alignments in Mississippi. Alan Abramowitz, John McGlennon, and Ronald Rapoport rely on a three-wave panel survey of voters in three adjacent localities to explain the 1977 gubernatorial primary and election in Virginia.

Another three chapters are devoted to consideration of interparty competition. Using Social Research Council (SRC) data, Charles Prysby examines the demographic makeup and issue orientation of Republican voters in the South. Charles Hadley and Susan Howell, also using SRC data, explore split-ticket voting among white southerners. Both chapters contribute substantially to our understanding of southern voters and voting, even though the ratio of tables to text is sometimes too high for my taste. The third chapter dealing with interparty competition, Margaret Aiesi and Walter Rosenbaum's study of class and partisanship in Greenville, South Carolina, and Richmond, Virginia, is rendered worthless by the failure to distinguish—sometimes in the same table—between the independent city of Richmond and the vastly different surrounding suburban counties.

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The third part of this volume considers blacks and women as part of the South's changing party environment. James Carlson uses data from the Comparative State Elections project to explore the impact of five contextual variables on black and white voting participation in 1968. His concern with "political climate" is useful even if its operationalization falls short; it would be interesting to see what the passage of time has done to his correlates. Richard Engstrom, in the only nonquantitative chapter, reviews the history of litigation under Section Five of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. His account, though sometimes appearing to be uncritical, sheds a good bit of light on efforts to combat the dilution of black voting strength. The role of women in party politics in two populous counties in the Atlanta area is explored by Diane Fowlkes, Jerry Perkins, and Sue Tolleson Rinehart. Their research is well done, their findings consistent with similar studies.

The contributions of the three editors—all located at the Citadel—lie mostly in the planning and execution of the symposium and in the readying of materials for this volume; their introductions to each of the three major parts of the book and their postscript do not do enough to integrate and to illuminate, perhaps because William Havard's thoughtful introduction does some of that work for them.

CLIFTON MCCLESKEY
University of Virginia

Cities by Contract: The Politics of Municipal Incorporation *by Gary J. Miller. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1981. 224 pp. $19.95.*

This short volume focuses on the Lakewood Plan in Los Angeles County under which newly incorporated cities initially contracted for all or nearly all of their services with the county. The plan has received considerable publicity in terms of the relatively efficient provision of services within a fragmented metropolitan governance system, and it is cited as an example of the public choice theory in practice.

Miller concludes his study with the interesting thesis that the Lakewood Plan was a precursor of the Proposition 13 movement in California, although he fails to document this conclusion with convincing evidence. Thus, his conclusion remains a hypothesis in need of further testing and empirical verification.

Miller launches a strong attack against public choice theory and argues that Tiebout's "demand articulation" analysis of the origin of the Lakewood Plan "is of secondary importance, and that the primary motivation . . . has followed from the way in which local services are funded" (p. 36). This statement obviously does not apply to the city of Lakewood incorporated two years prior to the Bradley-Burns Sales Tax Law of 1956 which gave an incentive to unincorporated areas to incorporate. As Miller points out, Lakewood involved defensive incorporation; that is, prevention of annexation by the city of Long Beach which had a "strong revenue base" (p. 18).

Somewhat surprisingly, Miller announces that "the argument will be that, because of the redistributional effect of governmental expenditures, different kinds of people prefer different scales of local governmental activity" (p. 64). This statement is a truism and essentially incorporates the public choice argument. He makes a similar statement that

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taxpayers by incorporating contract cities "could escape from the redistributional patterns of old-line cities" (p. 77), but fails to explain what else the incorporationists may have been fleeing. One is suspicious of the attribution of the motivation of incorporation to a single objective: escape from high property taxation. One suspects that the motivations involved several goals, and Miller's analysis supports this suspicion. Since property taxes are deductible under the Internal Revenue Code, the property tax may or may not be a major concern to middle- and upper-income groups residing in the contract cities.

The principal weaknesses of the book are methodological. While Miller is interested in the historical origin of several Lakewood Plan cities, he neglects to examine the long history of cities contracting with Los Angeles County and only mentions in passing that the contract cities have the options of contracting with private firms and other municipalities for service. The major weakness of Miller's analysis is the drawing of sweeping conclusions about the motivations of citizens who voted to incorporate cities. He admits in the preface that his field work was limited to forty-six residents of Los Angeles County who "talked to me so freely about their *memories* of incorporations" (p. viii, emphasis added). He fails to indicate either how representative or knowledgeable these individuals are or the questions asked.

Although Miller makes unqualified statements in advancing his "conclusion" in the preface and in several places in the text, he offers a qualifier rather than evidence by writing in his concluding chapter "there are theoretical and empirical reasons to *suspect* that the people of low-income, low-resources communities . . . have been made worse off by the . . . Lakewood Plan" (p. 187, emphasis added). His suspicion is difficult to disagree with since any incorporation occurring in affluent suburban areas naturally weakens older central cities housing a large lower-income group and desiring to annex the areas to broaden the cities' tax bases, regardless of whether the new cities function as Lakewood Plan, semi-Lakewood Plan, or non-Lakewood Plan cities.

Other failures of analysis include the lack of explanation for Los Angeles County in 1954 changing its half-century position of opposition to incorporations and the reasons why the amount of territory annexed from 1954 to 1974 exceeded the amount incorporated.

Miller concludes by quoting Robert Warren, a public choice theorist, relative to what the Lakewood Plan cannot accomplish and indicating agreement with the statement (p. 197).

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN
State University of New York at Albany

Taxation of American Railroads: A Policy Analysis *by Dennis L Thompson with the assistance of John Barth, Raymond Garthner, and Steven Sours. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981. 186 pp. $29.95.*

This short volume warrants its title, but whether it deserves its subtitle is questionable. Although the book contains some useful information on the practices of various jurisdictions in taxation of the railroads, there is little in it that can be called analytical by the standards of either economics or political science.

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The book opens with a chapter on contemporary railroads in their historical context. Although the earlier portions have some archaic judgments that antedate the historical scholarship of Gabriel Kolko and Robert Fogel, the treatment of the industry's current situation is well done. This is followed by a chapter on federal taxation of the railroads, in which the authors note that the separate systems of unemployment and retirement benefits in the industry are somewhat more onerous than the Social Security system. The rest of the book is devoted to state and local taxation of the railroads. Thompson arrives at the usual judgment that railroads are more heavily taxed than commercial or industrial enterprises and concludes that this is discriminatory against them. He is generally favorable to the approach embodied in the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 of limiting assessments of railroads to the levels of commercial and industrial property in the taxing jurisdiction.

Oddly, since the author is a political scientist, his consideration is almost entirely of the railroads and hardly at all of the governments: "Nevertheless, tax policies should be geared to strengthening the economic viability of railroads that the massive public investments of the past may continue to provide for new and more critical needs of the future" (p. 125). When he addresses the behavior of the governments involved, his analysis is quite meager, based only on administrative or procedural considerations, rather than on the basic motivations involved. Consider his treatment of the most basic question in his book: "Why is railroad property consistently assessed at higher levels than other property? Railroad (and utility) property that is assessed by a central assessing authority in states using unit valuation procedures is systematically revalued and equalized at the required level of assessment each year. Other taxable properties, which are all assessed locally, cannot possibly be individually reassessed each year because of the enormity of such a task" (p. 95).

Actually, railroads are taxed more heavily than other enterprises because they are less able to flee. Their capital is largely irretrievably committed to a fixed right-of-way. The extraordinary rapacity in railroad taxation of New Jersey—which is little treated in this book—is the consequence of the vital importance to the railroads of passing through the state to reach New York harbor, compared with the relative ease of industry or residents transferring to New York or Pennsylvania. This sort of thinking has been available to scholars since Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Indeed, the theory of taxation was developed to approximately modern levels earlier than any other, except possibly the theory of income differentials, but the author makes little use of this body of knowledge. As a consequence, the book gives one the impression of being short—there are only 125 pages of text, followed by appendices of doubtful usefulness—and indecisive. This is the sort of subject on which the Brookings Institution might commission either an economist or political scientist to produce a volume. If this were the manuscript he brought forth, there seems little prospect that it would be considered acceptable.

GEORGE W. HILTON
University of California, Los Angeles

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The Politics of Displacement: Racial and Ethnic Transition in Three American Cities *by Peter K. Eisinger. New York, Academic Press, 1980. 223 pp. $18.00.*

While much has been written about the character of a traditionally subordinate group's adjustment to its new political dominance, much less is known about a traditionally dominant group's adjustment to its new subordinate status and the effects of that adjustment upon a previously subordinate group's capacity to govern. Peter Eisinger addresses these latter issues, exploring ethnic and racial political transitions in three American cities: the election of black mayors in Detroit and Atlanta in the early 1970s, and the earlier Irish overthrow of Brahmin rule in Boston. Carefully describing the psychological and political reactions of displaced Brahmin and white elites, Eisinger argues that cooperation was the dominant form of elite adjustment, a function more of political perceptions and values than of economic interests.

Economic interests coupled with the political vulnerability of the newcomers, however, provide as convincing an explanation for the acquiescence of displaced elites, as Eisinger's own evidence suggests. Dependent upon the resources still controlled by the *ancienne noblesse*, Irish and black politicians purchased cooperation with favorable economic policies. The term of office of Hugh O'Brien, Boston's first Irish mayor, had all the trappings of a Yankee reform administration, complete with calls for municipal taxation and debt limitations (pp. 36–37). In subsequent years a low tax rate became a universally important symbol of Irish rule (p. 51). More recently, Coleman Young of Detroit and Maynard Jackson of Atlanta have worked equally hard in their economic development policies to reassure the white business community (p. 89). Given the *mutual* dependence of old and new elites, it is more difficult than the author suggests to distinguish analytically the determinants of the previously dominant group's adjustment from those of the previously subordinate group.

More than nationality, however, religion or race separated the newcomers from the old guard, and both Irish and blacks were predominantly lower class. Did the increases in formal political power achieved by Irish and black elites lead to economic gains for the masses? While distributional issues are barely touched on in this book (Eisinger is now studying the impact of employment policies in Detroit and Atlanta), the efficacy of *local* political strategies for reducing poverty is open to more serious question than the author implies. There was remarkably little "trickle down" under Irish or black rule, although blacks have been more successful than have the Irish in using governmental channels of social mobility. For the Irish, urban machine politics never served as a route of group social mobility owing to the limited scale of the public sector. In 1900, only 6 percent of the urban Irish worked for government, mostly in poorly paying blue-collar jobs. While Eisinger concludes that "there is no evidence to suggest that the Irish were the pawns . . . of Brahmin wirepullers" (p. 54), more explanation is needed for the limited group economic rewards derived from pulling the wires themselves.

As for blacks, by the mid-1970s over one-half of the new middle class was directly employed by government, mostly in educational and social-welfare agencies. This pattern developed more through job opportunities generated by federal social programs, however, than through the subsidies holding business and black political coalitions together.

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One hopes that the author's next book will highlight the complex interdependencies between new and old elites, as well as further explore the reasons for the limits of the local political arena as a redistributional device.

STEVEN P. ERIE
State University of New York at Albany

The Practice of Urban Economics *by Alfred J. Watkins. Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage Publications, 1980. 248 pp. Cloth, $18.00; paper, $8.95.*

The title of this book is misleading. Alfred Watkins has written not a compendious how-to-do-it volume for urban economists but instead a rather short book on the subject of urban growth and decline. Since the growth and decline of U.S. cities and regions is one of the major policy issues of the 1980s, the subject, if not the title, is well chosen.

In an introductory chapter Watkins rejects the view that U.S. cities and regions, under pressure of factor mobility and other market forces, are gradually converging toward some long-run equilibrium. Instead, he suggests that the dynamics of urban growth (and decline) are best described as a process of "uneven development" marked by spurts of cumulative causation that successively propel discrete groups of cities into a growth leadership. The details of this argument, however, are reserved for chapters 6 and 7. In chapters 2, 3, and 4, Watkins takes the reader on a tour of classical location theory, central-place theory and economic base analysis to see what these standard constructs contribute to an explanation of urban growth and decline. In chapter 5 he reveiws several dynamic models of urban growth, providing a bridge between the comparative statics of the earlier chapters and his own "model of urban dynamics" presented in chapters 6 and 7.

Watkins's theory is solidly grounded in U.S. economic history and so draws especially on the works of Pred and Lampard, which he extends in two ways: first, he attempts to explain decay as well as growth; second, he deals specifically with the most recent historic period, the post-World War II era, characterized by the rise of the Sunbelt cities.

In Watkins's schema, the U.S. economy has passed through two evolutionary stages, the "mercantile" (1790 to 1870) and the "industrial" (1870 to 1940) and is now in the "Sunbelt" stage. In each stage a set of cities can be identified that benefits most from the development of the types of economic activity in the ascendancy during that period. In the Sunbelt era the pace-setting activities are said to be agribusiness, defense, advanced technology, oil and natural gas production, real estate and construction, and tourism and leisure.

The cities that succeed in achieving rapid growth in each period, however, are not simply "chosen" by the national economy on the basis of possessing locational factors favorable to the ascendant activities of that epoch. Though locational factors play a part, Watkins also leaves much scope to the political and entrepreneurial energy and the business foresight of capitalists in particular places, and especially to their success in erecting barriers to the prosperity of rival cities. Watkins points out that cities that are growth leaders in one period are unlikely to be so in the next, and he attempts to account

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for this fact by arguing that entrepreneurs who succeed in one epoch have difficulty shaking off its mental and institutional "shackles" in order to take advantage of opportunities for capital accumulation in the succeeding era. The mantle of leadership passes to a new set of cities where businessmen are not similarly constrained.

Watkins's emphasis on the importance of local entrepreneurial behavior emerges in statements such as the following description of the transition between the industrial and Sunbelt eras: "As the fate of various regions hung precariously in the balance, a struggle ensued over which region and set of cities would seize the opportunity" (p. 223). This is heady stuff and may, indeed, begin to raise questions in the reader's mind. Given Watkins's own definition of the leading sectors in the Sunbelt era, could not one account for the emergence of the Sunbelt by reference to standard factors such as presence of raw materials (in this case energy), relative costs (low wages and taxes), favorable climate, heavy defense spending, and so on, without resort to metaphors of struggle, strategy, and contest that seem to require each city (or region?) to be controlled by an economically independent and self-conscious committee of capitalists?

That question is more easily asked than answered. The facts of "uneven development" of cities and regions lie around us. Accounting for their full historic and economic complexity, however, is an enormous task that few economists have the stamina or competence to attempt. A persuasive account would have immediate policy relevance, as we debate the question (raised explicitly by the McGill Commission) of whether it is preferable to facilitate migration toward growing areas or to invest in reviving those in decline. Watkins makes no claim to have produced a definitive study of urban growth and decline, but it is to be hoped that he and others will persist in trying to do so.

JAMES HEILBRUN
Fordham University

Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union *by Seweryn Bialer. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1980. 312 pp. $19.95.*

It is a commonplace among students of Soviet politics that the absence of constitutional provisions regulating the succession for the top leader is one of the system's weaknesses; and ever since Stalin approached the age where his demise appeared imminent, American policymakers have sought to predict the likely outcome of a succession crisis they considered inevitable.

In the series of closely related essays being reviewed here, Seweryn Bialer makes clear, among other things, that in fact the Soviet system has handled succession crises rather successfully. While the death or ouster of each top leader was followed by a period of uncertainty, political conflict, and adjustment, the system has avoided the convulsions that some observers had predicted; and compared to right-wing dictatorships like Spain and Portugal, pre-Castro Cuba and Nicaragua, the Soviet regime since Stalin has weathered succession crises with its ruling oligarchy remarkably undisturbed.

Bialer argues, however, that the coming succession crisis is likely to be more profound,

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for a number of reasons. First, the death or retirement of Leonid Brezhnev will coincide with the wholesale departure of virtually the entire top elite in Soviet politics; Bialer's demographic statistics make this a very convincing point. Second, this coming generational succession will coincide with a profound systemic crisis related to the slowing of economic growth which comes at a particularly awkward time, when rising needs in industrial investment, military spending, and consumer satisfaction must be met. The economic slowdown, he argues, can be stemmed only by costly long-term investments and a tremendously risky restructuring of the entire pattern of economic management, planning, and incentives. The resulting painful dilemmas are further complicated by the reemergence of the nationalities problem, which goes on ticking as a potential time bomb.

Bialer's account convincingly suggests that the grave crisis facing the coming generation of Soviet leaders should be seen as resulting from the remarkable successes of the post-Stalin leadership, and especially the Brezhnev regime—successes such as that of weathering the transition from one-man rule to oligarchy; providing almost two decades of remarkable stability; raising living standards; providing social mobility; allowing wide popular participation in public affairs; and shaping the regime to conform with traditional Russian political culture. Bialer credits the Soviet oligarchy with having acquired considerable legitimacy and having held the ship of state on a steady and successful course. The very successes, however, and the sources of strength ultimately turn into weaknesses; and stability is on the point of turning into stagnation, at the very moment when a generational succession is in the offing.

Marxists would have described the resulting problems as the dialectic of base and superstructure or of productive forces and production relations. Bialer prefers the equally cumbersome jargon of political sociology and organization theory, which at times obscures rather than clarifies his meaning; I, for one, would have spent less space on explaining the elusive concept of stability.

But my minor questions concerning his vocabulary and style do not detract from my overall positive evaluation of this book. His appraisal of the achievements made and problems about to be faced by the Soviet system appears to be sober and well balanced. His shrewd judgments are based on detailed knowledge both of the leadership and of the society that leadership is governing. This is a thoughtful appraisal by a learned man.

I have one ridiculous little nit to pick: What, pray, is the source of the trivial bit of misinformation related in note 2, page 29?

ALFRED G. MEYER
University of Michigan

The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–1941 *edited by James William Morley. New York, Columbia University Press, 1980. 366 pp. $25.00.*

This collection of essays explores the developing components of Japan's momentous decision in mid-1941 to move southward against European colonies and thereby implicitly

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against the United States rather than to join its ally Germany in a concerted attack on the Soviet Union. Had Japan moved northward instead, the result might well have been fatal to the Soviet Union and the West.

This is the second of a projected five-volume series presenting in English selected essays and portions of essays from the authoritative, cooperative Japanese history of the origins of the Pacific War, published in 1962. It includes essays by two of Japan's most distinguished scholars of diplomacy, Hosoya Chihiro and Tsunoda Jun, with translations and introductions by Peter Berton and Robert Scalapino.

Hosoya skillfully traces the zigzag path of Soviet-Japanese relations from enmity and quasi-war toward entente in 1940 and back again to the modest neutrality treaty of 1941. Rapprochement with the Soviet Union gathered steam from such diverse sources as the Army General Staff, seeking to cut off Soviet aid to China, the pro-Axis faction in the Foreign Ministry and the navy, anxious for security in the north in order to pursue the southward advance. To block rapprochement, western-oriented diplomats aligned with rabidly anti-Communist generals. The Soviets proved stubborn and truly Machiavellian, involving themselves with the Japanese far enough to sow concern in Washington but not so deeply as to ruin chances of ultimate American support. After the German attack in June 1941, Japan did not abruptly turn southward but instead made preparations in both directions and moved into southern Indochina only when opportunities to the north fell short of expectations.

Equally lacking in coherence was the southward advance itself, as Hata Ikuhiko and Tsunoda demonstrate. Leaders of the South China Army, according to Hata, abetted by the Operations Section of the Army General Staff, determined on occupation of northern Indochina rather than mere transit and inspection rights and sought to precipitate the event by unauthorized attacks in typical rule-from-below fashion.

Tsunoda highlights equally influential middle-echelon officers in the navy. Dazzled by the opportunities opened by the German victory in the West, they accelerated plans and fleet readiness for southward advance and war. The alternative, attack on the Soviet Union, offered no benefit to the navy. They developed a fatal circular reasoning: advance against Indochina would provoke a stiffer American embargo that would force Japan to seize the Dutch East Indies that in turn would bring full-scale embargo and war with the United States. With the reassignment of moderate admirals in 1940, naval leadership lapsed into opportunism and fatalism of this sort.

Two essays by Nagaoka Shinjirō examine further diplomatic aspects of the southward advance. The resource-rich Dutch East Indies were the principal attraction in the region and the Japanese exerted powerful pressure to secure a larger share for themselves. They were largely frustrated by the Dutch, who, closely coordinating their moves with London and Washington, spun out the talks, limited the contracts, and avoided political conditions. Japan was more successful in its mediation of border disputes between Thailand and French Indochina, extending its influence over both parties in the process.

This book, which is indispensable for the origins of the Pacific War, shows a Japan moving into the maelstrom of world politics without a compass. It was pulled this way and that by swiftly changing international circumstances and the caprice of bureaucratic

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and factional interest. It indulged in wishful thinking and ignored the basic question of whether it could win the war it increasingly risked with the United States.

WALDO HEINRICHS
Temple University

Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan *edited by Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss, and Scott C. Flanagan. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 486 pp. Cloth, $30.00; paper, $9.95.*

When an area specialist reviews a book in his area the key question is whether he can recommend it to his colleagues in comparative politics. Most specialists of Japanese politics will read this book whatever its reviews. Fortunately, I can also recommend it to people in comparative politics, especially those studying Western Europe, and anyone studying intergovernmental relations in a comparative context.

In the 1960s and early 1970s local governments in Japan seemed to wake up and play an active role in national politics for the first time in modern history. Left-wing mayors and governors were elected and pursued innovative policies, often in confrontation with the central government and under pressure from a new type of social organization, the citizens' movement. The book has two main purposes: "to describe and analyze the spectacular developments in Japanese local politics over the last decade and a half and to contribute to theory building in a relatively new subfield of comparative politics, namely comparative local politics" (p. 3). It accomplishes the former goal much more effectively than the latter. Little explicit comparison can be found. Nevertheless, the analysis of Japanese local politics should prove an important contribution to the development of this new subfield. The overall impression on specialists of Western Europe should be wonder at the similarities with Japan.

The book is remarkably coherent for an edited volume. The book is organized into three parts besides the introduction and conclusion: electoral trends, citizens' movements, and progressive local adminstrations. The section on electoral trends sets the pattern for the volume. After an introduction, three articles examine focus on similar questions concerning different types of data. The focus on the key concept of "politicization" is maintained and explored in big-city elections by Terry MacDougall, in two suburban cities by Gary Allinson, and more generally using both survey and aggregate data by Scott Flanagan.

The section on citizens' movements is probably the most important from a comparative perspective, and all three articles are of very high quality. A comparativist interested in citizens' movements could get no better introduction to the Japanese case and would be well advised to read this section for its theoretical insights as well.

The third section on progressive local administrations lacks the coherence of the earlier sections, in part because the concept of local autonomy is not clear, here or elsewhere, and in part because the links between partisanship and policy outputs has proven difficult to demonstrate, here and elsewhere. The authors have not been more successful in dealing with these problems than the rest of us. Nevertheless, Kurt Steiner's introduction provides

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the specialist in comparative politics with a good entry into the Japanese case, and Ellis Krauss's study of Kyoto, the great leftist stronghold in Japan, provides excellent material for comparison with Western Europe. Ronald Aqua's study of expenditures in medium-sized cities uses some innovative statistical techniques, but contains one section that I find misleading.

Aqua implies that there was a period in postwar Japanese history when the central government really did punish local governments for electing a progressive chief executive. His examples are suggestive but incomplete. In particular, I find it highly misleading to describe a tiff between the central government and Oita Prefecture's progressive governor over the designation of "New Industrial Cities," during which "the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] warned of harsh retaliatory action" (p. 356), without informing the reader that Oita received the disputed designation. I also believe the Chiba example to be misleading.

Overall, I would rate this the best recent book on Japanese politics and one of the handful of works that proves helpful in thinking about comparative intergovernmental relations.

STEVEN R. REED
University of Alabama

China under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy *by Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 336 pp. $22.95.*

During the 1950s and 1960s, analysts of Chinese foreign policy stressed Peking's aggressive, warlike ways. Ideology was the driving force behind all Chinese actions. Crises resulted from the willingness of Chinese leaders to risk full-scale conflict. Confrontations were engineered by the Chinese to unify the dicontented masses behind a constant stream of campaigns and fierce political struggles.

A decade ago, paralleling the breakthrough in Sino-American relations, pioneering works appeared that provided a welcomed corrective. These studies jettisoned rhetoric to emphasize the rational elements in China's foreign policy and to demonstrate the cautious manner in which China approached crisis situations. The Middle Kingdom was portrayed as a modern state like any other; defending what it perceived to be its national interest with all the tools at its command including the threat or actual use of force.

Gurtov and Hwang extend the logic of the latter group of studies, but with significant modifications that mar the importance of their findings. They correctly link China's foreign-policy process with domestic political events, economic imperatives, and what could be called the "operational code" of the leadership—the shared views about the world that influence particular decisions. In case studies of five crises—the Korean War, the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis, the border war with India in 1962, the Vietnam War in 1965, and the Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1969—the authors skillfully weave a comprehensive theory to explain the nature of Chinese activity in the international arena. Their probing examination of the causes of Chinese intervention is a valuable compilation of little used primary sources as well as of the standard secondary works.

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Despite the barrage of evidence presented, the reader is left unconvinced of the authors' central thesis. Gurtov and Hwang assert that China has followed a "decidedly defensive orientation" in its foreign policy. Military clashes have occurred only when "imperialism, revisionism, capitalism, and other counterrevolutionary forces" pose palpable threats to the Chinese political system and essential values (p. 17). To the authors, it is obvious that China's poverty, military weakness, and political instability have severely constrained Peking's ambitions on the global and regional stages and consequently reduced, if not eliminated, any desire to wield its potential power. In their view, the Chinese government has been repeatedly provoked to defend its basic rights and territorial integrity by expansionist, but incompetent, superpowers or by proud, but miscalculating, neighbors.

The actions of the Chinese elite in 1950 during the American advance toward the Yalu river and during India's blatant provocations in 1962 conform closely to the model. In many respects, Chinese behavior during the American initial escalation of the Vietnam War also supports their conclusions. But the Taiwan Straits incident of 1958 and the Sino-Soviet border war of 1969 do not so easily fit. Two cases the authors do not extensively explore contradict their thesis: the 1954 Quemoy-Matsu problem and the 1979 "counterattack" against Vietnam. In these troublesome cases, China cannot so easily be depicted as acting purely with defensive motives. Neither can it be demonstrated that there were challenges being launched by outside forces against the Chinese political system.

The authors confuse the perceptions and justifications used by Chinese leaders to prove the righteousness of their actions with actual threats to China's existence or basic system. Gurtov and Hwang thereby inadvertently reverse the studies of the 1950s. Instead of the Chinese being the permanent aggressors, they are now to be viewed as the permanently aggrieved. No doubt the truth lies somewhere in between.

MICHAEL L. BARON
Columbia University

Russia and World Order: Strategic Choices and the Laws of Power in History *by George Liska. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. 194 pp. $14.50.*

The author, a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University, is clearly a prolific writer. During the past seven years he has published five books, and his output in the 1960s appears equally impressive. At first glance, this is a most enviable record that is not likely to be easily equaled in our profession.

For some reason, I have not been acquainted with Liska's previous writings and hence I looked forward to reading his latest work. Its title was most interesting, and I was also curious to find out whether the quality of the author's published work was as striking as its quantity. Alas, I am afraid that my expectations were not fulfilled.

To begin with, the title proved to be quite misleading: Liska has little to say about Russia and much more about everything else: the United States, Byzantium, the papacy,

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China, the Carolingian monarchy, and so on and so forth. At first, the reader tends to be bedazzled by the author's erudition and his ability to jump from the late 1970s all the way to Sparta and Athens, and back again to the Vietnam War and the OPEC crisis. In due course, however, the awe turns to ennui and mental fatigue. The reason for it is that the main body of the book consists of a series of conventional wisdoms, worn-out clichés and various incidental maxims, loosely strung together with no particular purpose in mind.

This is a pity because Liska's major thesis—that the economic threat to the West, originating in the Third World, is potentially more serious than the strategic-military threat presented by the Soviet Union—is not without interest and deserves attention. The same is true for the author's policy prescription calling for the "westernization of Russia" that would result in "a fair chance for the already accomplished initial mellowing of the Stalinist totalitarian dictatorship to be followed by the maturation of the Soviet Union as a conventional world power" (p. 5). Unfortunately, having postulated them early in the volume, the author does not develop or discuss either of the hypotheses. Instead, he goes off on a tangent in many directions and succeeds in burying his otherwise challenging thoughts under a veritable mass of more or less irrelevant historical analogies and far-fetched speculations. The end result is that the reader is left badly confused and wondering what the book is all about.

There is no doubt that Liska is a stimulating writer, capable of putting forward some interesting and unorthodox ideas. Perhaps prior to writing his next book he ought to pause a bit and clarify his own thoughts in order to make them more comprehensible to his audience.

ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI
University of California, Los Angeles

Electoral Politics in the Middle East: Issues, Voters and Elites *edited by Jacob M. Landau, Ergun Ozbudun, and Frank Tachau. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1980. 335 pp. $29.95.*

This multiauthored volume, first conceived in 1974, is an important contribution to the meager literature on comparative electoral politics in the Middle East. It is based on extensive original research in which comparative treatment is given to electoral issues, voting behavior, and parliamentary elites as they relate to the theme of modernization, especially the interaction of political institutionalization and expanding participation—a theme that is highly relevant to the three countries being analyzed: Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey.

Each author is an expert on the analytic construct and the country about which he writes (Ergil, Ozbudun, and Tachau on Turkey; Crow, Harik, and Khalaf on Lebanon, and Landau, Arian, and Gutmann on Israel). The three Middle Eastern polities are compared along each of the three electoral themes identified above with useful, well-integrated summaries at the end of each section.

At the time that the authors were conducting their research and writing their findings the three countries did indeed qualify as "democratic" republics with their politics "rea-

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sonably well institutionalized, open and non-violently competitive" (p. 4). However, the disintegration of the Lebanese polity following the 1975–1976 civil war, the return of military rule to Turkey in September 1980, and the violence-prone, debasing character of Israel's June 1981 parliamentary elections all seriously place into doubt the continuing validity of many of the democratic assumptions upon which this otherwise fine study is based. Yet this volume remains an important methodological effort as it dissects the relevance of major electoral issues demonstrating in the process the main points of resemblance and variance in each of the states, with socioeconomic problems, for example, being regarded as the most important issue in all three countries. Similarly, electoral behavior is treated systematically with an emphasis on the impact of social cleavages, modernization, and the respective party systems. One interesting, but no longer completely surprising, conclusion of the three-country comparison is the discovery that in none of these political systems did the widely acknowledged sequence between socioeconomic modernization and political institutionalization take place. "Instead of socio-economic modernisation gradually leading to more modern forms of politics, in Turkey and Israel such forms were established largely independently of, and prior to, socio-economic modernisation. In Lebanon, on the other hand, socio-economic modernisation did not lead to high levels of political institutionalisation" (p. 192).

Finally, the last section on parliamentary elites manages to draw useful comparisons among the three countries by focusing on the role of such elites in their respective power structures, their social and political backgrounds, and their behavioral patterns, value preferences, and policy outcomes. Extensive electoral data are presented and analyzed especially in the sections on voting behavior and political elites, with Turkish 1973 electoral data, for example, being particularly rich.

Although one cannot remain especially optimistic about the future of democracy in the always volatile Middle East, this study does provide a solid conceptual and empirical assessment of the performance of electoral politics in the early 1970s in what were once the region's only fully or quasi-democratic polities. The cogency of the analysis and the methodological precision demonstrated throughout renders this an important volume for political scientists in general and for specialists of comparative politics in particular.

JOHN P. ENTELIS
Fordham University

Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East *by Walid Khalidi. Cambridge, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1980. 217 pp. Cloth, $12.95; paper, $6.95.*

This book is written by a professor of political science, an Arab intellectual and an independent Palestinian leader, who has had close connections with many Lebanese and Palestinian political leaders. His scholarship and experience are well reflected in this book of remarkable distinction. It is authoritative, insightful, sensitive, most informative, and, above all, beautifully written.

The author's purpose is to delineate the contours of the forces and the actors involved in the terrible war that has inconclusively engulfed Lebanon for two years. He underlines

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the communal cleavages in Lebanese society and the strains they put on the representative system. Then by carefully tracing events in the late sixties and seventies (until 1978), he shows how the Israeli-Palestinian war on Lebanese soil has exacerbated communal strains at the political and national levels. Israeli free raids into Lebanon undermined the authority of the Lebanese government and sowed the seeds of conflict between the Muslim and Christian communities, who took opposing views on how to resolve that problem. The extraterritorial rights claimed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its felt need for popular Lebanese backing produced the same adverse effects on the domestic scene.

Khalidi also believes that social mobilization and the chronic schisms between Lebanese political veterans have had a disintegrative effect on Lebanon. While he notes that the veteran politicians from both communities have successfully cooperated and have kept conflict relatively under control since independence in 1943, he adds that protective measures in a turbulent regional environment were lacking. Thus he counsels looking outside the Lebanese box to understand what has been going on inside.

The author is to be commended for avoiding erroneous descriptions of the combatants as "right-wing Christians" and "leftist Muslims." His reference to Muslim veteran leaders as oligarchs in the latter pages of the book, however, is a departure from the balanced tone of the study.

The author's belief that both social mobilization and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict led to the Lebanese war leaves some questions unanswered. First, no values are assigned to these two factors, leaving the reader unable to tell how big was the load on the system from each. Second, the belief that social mobilization in Lebanon was disintegrative is not supported by survey results from the early seventies that show that education has narrowed the attitudinal gap between the Muslims and Christians and has produced outlooks converging on the idea of an independent Arab Lebanon. Neither the author nor Hudson, on whom Khalidi relies regarding the disintegrative thesis, provides empirical evidence in its support. Finally, how has social mobilization affected the masses of the Christian community who fought for the status quo? Were not the Muslim masses rather emboldened by the tremendous force of the Palestinian resistance and infuriated by Christian responses to Israeli attacks? It seems that the political mobilization concept explains unrest in this case better than the concept of social mobilization.

I must confess to a certain let-down feeling at the end. I would have expected from a leading Palestinian intellectual a vision regarding the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon at least as enlightening as the vision he provided regarding the future of Lebanon, which he sees as moving toward an adjustment of the pluralistic formula to new realities. One comes out with the impression that Lebanon is the last and most desperate resort of the PLO, survival or immolation in the style of the Jewish patriots who fell to Roman forces at Massada. The possibilities of breaking away from the Lebanese trap and the vicious circle of violence for other open political opportunities were regrettably unexplored.

These remarks aside, Khalidi's *Conflict and Violence* is a must for everyone interested in the Lebanese crisis.

Iliya Harik
Indiana University

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The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity *by Christine Moss Helms. Baltimore, Md., Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. 313 pp. $28.00.*

The dust jacket proclaims that Saudi Arabia demands our attention because "its authority within the Islamic world has been challenged by the Ayatollahs in Iran and [because of] its dominant position in Opec." And the author herself acknowledges that "many readers will have chosen this book solely with the intention of understanding the origin, history, and nature of the Saudi ruling family" (p. 29). Helms and her publishers have done themselves, and their readers, a disservice by misrepresenting the subject of the book. The work—originally an Oxford University dissertation in Oriental Studies—is an investigation of the establishment of Saudi authority in the Arabian Peninsula during the first decades of the twentieth century. It ends in 1930, several years before the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was proclaimed and the original oil exploration agreements were signed, to say nothing, of course, of the appearance of the "Ayatollahs in Iran."

Should there be any doubt that the book is not designed for the educated layman, two omissions seal the question. The text bristles with Arabic terms and several pages are devoted to an explanation of the transliteration system, but there is no glossary and a few words go by untranslated altogether. Moreover, despite fifteen maps and an emphasis on geography in the text, there is no complete map of the geographical regions of Saudi Arabia.

For the specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, the book exhibits many of the deficiencies of British Orientalism and few of its strengths. The premise is by now unexceptional. Several decades of revisionist history on European imperialism would lead most specialists to agree that the establishment of Saudi family preeminence in the Peninsula ought to be interpreted in terms of the interplay of European imperial interests, including their desire to set territorial boundaries, and the local disinclination, particularly among nomadic pastoralists, to see their lands divided and their rights of movement restricted. Helms persuasively argues that the original strength of the Saudi family lay with the settled populations of Central Arabia rather than with the tribal pastoralists—a contention somewhat at variance with conventional wisdom—and she does a serviceable job of describing how the family, caught between the conflicting demands of the British to the north and east and the local respresentatives of the tribes, eventually turned the novel, European-imposed circumstances to its own advantage. The research in British archives and Arabic manuscript collections appears to have been conscientious and thorough, although Helms's decision not to provide a strictly chronological discussion produces an occasionally confusing narrative, and she is unduly timid in drawing general conclusions.

Most importantly, however, the interdisciplinary approach—Helms draws on geography, linguistics, diplomatic history, anthropology, philosophy, religion, even poetry—which has given us some of the best work in British Oriental studies is here pursued with more abandon than rigor. The discussion of changes in the taxation system, for example, highlights an apparent shift from a legitimation of taxes as religious alms or tithes to a political obligation or contract between tax payer and tax collector. This is an extremely interesting notion and it cries out for comparisons based on the now rather extensive literature on taxation in early modern Europe or even the Middle East itself. There is no

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attempt at such comparison here, nor is there a clear connection between this discussion and the basic thrust of the book, although a patient reader might tease out the conclusion that rights to tax border tribes were among the Saudis' concerns in disputes with rival claimants to their allegiance.

There are several other equally provocative propositions for the student of state-building here, but they too lack comparative or theoretical development, while the nonspecialist reader interested in a short course on Saudi history in the twentieth century would do better to look elsewhere.

LISA S. ANDERSON
Columbia University

Italian Fascism and Developmental Dictatorship *by A. James Gregor. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 427 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $9.75.*

A. James Gregor has written a book that will disturb many students of fascism and Marxism. It tells readers nothing new about Italian fascism, and it heralds the approach of an increased superficiality in the study of Marxist theory and practice. The book is, effectively, divided into two sections. In the first four chapters, the author traces the trajectory of syndicalism from its Marxist origins to the spawning ground of fascism, and in the last five chapters he discusses the theoretical and empirical characteristics of Italian fascism. At the end, there is a short discussion of how Russian Bolshevism paralleled the development of Italian fascism.

The author presents a revisionist view of Italian fascism that sets out to establish: the link between the "national syndicalism" of theorists such as Roberto Michels, A.O. Olivetti, Sergio Pannunzio, Paolo Orano, and Ottavio Dinale and the "national fascism" developed by Benito Mussolini; the primacy of the goal of industrial development as the motivating element in Italian fascism's autarkic economic policies; the relative (in comparison with other countries in Western Europe) and absolute (in comparison with prefascist Italy) success of the Italian fascist regime in establishing the basis of a modern industrial economy; the conscious link between fascist practice in the fields of economic, labor, social, and cultural policies and the theory of fascism as developed by Mussolini and Alfredo Rocco. (For some unexplained reason, the theories of Giovanni Gentile, the supreme fascist social philosopher, are not even mentioned.) Gregor also tries to establish a parallel between the goals (rapid industrialization) and instruments (command economy, large public sector, and low wage scales) of fascist Italy and those adopted by the Soviet Union under Lenin and Stalin.

The basic thesis of the book is that after the death of Frederick Engels, Marxism entered a state of crisis that manifested itself, in part, in the development of revolutionary syndicalism. Syndicalism responded to the crisis by attempting to restore the economic factors—that is, the role of working-class organizations such as trade unions—to the center of Marxist analysis of revolutionary dynamic and postrevolutionary organization of society. It remains unclear, however, why syndicalism should be awarded the label of

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"natural heir" to Marxism when there were so many other contenders for the title who did not lose their revolutionary thrust over such a short span of time, as did syndicalism. Gregor describes the first syndicalism as "radically antistate, antinationalist, anticlerical, and antimilitarist" (p. 32), but by 1911 all of these positions had been substantially abandoned in the wake of syndicalism's championing of Italy's first imperialist war on the African continent for the control of Libya. Given the consequences of the Libyan war on syndicalism's potential for mass mobilization, the author does not attempt to explore other currents of thought that fueled the subsequent development of "national syndicalism" and, eventually, fascism. The basic problem with the analysis is that Gregor adopts a pure "idealist" approach to the study of the development of syndicalism without concerning himself with either the socioeconomic context of those who formulated the theory or the inability of syndicalists to root their activities in a mass base. One redeeming aspect of the analysis of the early syndicalist writers is the light that it sheds on the first attempts to conceptualize the role of socialization patterns in society, which is valuable reading for anyone interested in current research and thinking on socialization.

The last five chapters represent the weakest part of the book. No attempt is made to compare Italian fascism with other fascist experiences that sprang up during the interwar period in Eastern Europe, Latin America, or Asia. Readers are left with the question of whether Mussolini's fascism was unique or an archetype of fascist development policies throughout the world. As a result of this shortcoming, the reader is not provided with the comparative insights contained in Ernst Nolte's *Three Faces of Fascism* or the in-depth analysis and breadth of Renzo De Felice's study of Mussolini.

ROBERT LEONARDI
De Paul University

The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Starting World War II, 1937–1939 *by Gerhard L. Weinberg. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1980. 728 pp. $44.00.*

Weinberg's study begins with a survey of Germany's position in 1937, when the Nazi regime had consolidated its power and assumed the initiative abroad. It then traces Germany's steady preparations for war, setting them against the reactions of the other states, who sought to avert war or at least direct it away from themselves. Weinberg focuses on Hitler, for he believes that the origins of the war can be understood only if one understands Hitler's policies. These he reconstructs painstakingly, arguing that, with only occasional opportunistic shifts, these policies reflected a fixed set of aims and priorities. Hitler's relations with Great Britain, which, in Weinberg's view were never intended to lead to serious agreement, are explored at length, as are the efforts to tighten the links with the Axis partners. The protracted crisis over Czechoslovakia is used to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of the various powers and of the international system to which they belonged. Of particular interest is Weinberg's description of how the leading statesmen thought in the categories of World War I and tried to apply what they perceived to be its "lessons."

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This book is a sequel to Weinberg's *Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 1933–36* (1970) and, like that volume, is impressive above all for the scope and extent of the research that lies behind it. Weinberg has scoured the diplomatic archives and consulted all the published records. He has used his sources to weave a dense and often unduly detailed narrative, which lends the book an encyclopedic quality. It will appeal to specialists but not, regrettably, to a wider audience.

Weinberg writes rather traditional diplomatic history. He acknowledges that Hitler's "domestic concerns" were "part of German foreign policy," but does no more than touch on these concerns now and then. Little is said about the role of Germany's economy in Hitler's diplomacy or about the function of war in dealing with internal stresses and strains. In this respect, the book cannot compare with the recent monograph by Messerschmidt and Deist, which gives due attention to the economic and military context. Furthermore, it would seem that a study that relies primarily on diplomatic documents cannot adequately explain Hitler's policies. Hitler did not trust the professional diplomats. He conferred with a few close advisers, employed private emissaries to carry out policy, and encouraged party organizations to dabble in foreign affairs. Such unorthodox methods produced their own sources, and these usually end up not in public but in private archives. Studies like David Irving's that have used such sources show that they can be significant.

This book is the most thorough statement we have of a historical interpretation that, in rather crude form, dominated the Nuremberg trials. According to this interpretation, Hitler planned to expand Germany by conquering Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, moving step by step to eliminate all resistance to his plans, especially from the Western powers. He prepared Germany for a series of short wars, to be launched when and against whom he chose, by rearming the country, seeking out like-minded allies, and isolating potential aggressors. Though flexible in his tactics, he never deviated from his chosen path. This view was first challenged by A.J.P. Taylor some twenty years ago. For Taylor and subsequent revisionists, Hitler was a gambler who improvised as he went along, exploiting opportunities to make his way, raising tensions and waiting for results. Much of Weinberg's argument is obviously directed against Taylor. Taylor in fact may be said to be one of the central figures of the book. Yet Weinberg mentions Taylor neither in the text nor in the bibliography but only once, fleetingly, in a footnote. Weinberg remarks that he does not intend to debate other historians, since his task is to "illuminate the events of the 1930s rather than the arguments of the 1960s." This is to say that historical truth lies in what the diligent researcher finds in his documents. Does it not lie in what the historian's mind makes of the past?

CHRISTOPH M. KIMMICH
Brooklyn College, City University of New York

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Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan: A Study of Commoners in the Popular Rights Movement *by Roger W. Bowen. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980. 367 pp. $25.00.*

This analysis of rural political movements in late nineteenth-century Japan offers a revised interpretation of the critical period in modern Japanese history when new political leaders were seeking to transform their country into a modern nation-state. Whereas previous scholars have neglected "rice roots" political movements in favor of the elite and national level of politics, the author eloquently defends the importance of studying the politics of the countryside in Meiji Japan (1868–1911).

Focusing on three of approximately twelve incidents of violent protest that involved thousands of commoners in the 1880s, Bowen argues that, although these were short-lived, they were nevertheless significant because they represented a genuine ground swell of democratic sentiment. Thus, he posits the existence of radical democratic consciousness in the countryside, a view that challenges the interpretation of Scalapino, among others, but is resonant with the research of one group of Japanese scholars, the *minshū* (common people) historians. Whereas many American scholars have depicted rural Japanese in the 1880s as passive peasants whose feudal mentality of obedience contributed to the "failure" of democracy in pre-World War II Japan, Bowen (like *minshū* scholars) paints a picture of heroic farmer-merchants organized in rural-based popular rights societies, conscious of possessing political rights, and fighting in the name of these rights against the heavy-handedness of the central government.

Although rural rebellions were quickly suppressed, in Bowen's opinion they may help explain the "warm reception" the Japanese gave to later democratic practices introduced in the 1920s and again in the Occupation period. They may have also served as the ancestors of contemporary "citizens movements." Indeed, farmers fighting the use of their land to build Narita airport in the 1970s summoned the memory of one such Meiji revolt.

To prove that Meiji rural uprisings represented a genuine movement for popular participation and not merely traditional forms of protest over local grievances, Bowen points to the organized nature of Meiji rebels (they were not merely "unruly mobs") and to their ties with local branches of the Liberal party, which advocated popular assemblies and a constitution. He also attempts to discern in rebel leaders an awareness of a natural-rights doctrine. The groundwork for this receptivity to modern-style democratic theory and practice, he further suggests, lay in rural Japanese traditions of self-government.

The reader is nonetheless left with the suspicion that both the case for traditional democracy and the argument for Meiji democracy may have been overstated. Despite the wealth of impressive demographic data, Bowen fails to convince us that rebel Japanese farmers were inspired by Western democratic philosophy. His contention that a natural-rights doctrine must have filtered down to the lower classes remains nothing more than an assumption, and he is able to make only indirect connections between the three rebellions he studied and the Liberal party.

It is important to realize that rural protests characterized the minority of rural dwellers; many more localities survived the transition to Meiji unscathed by violent struggles. We do not know why some areas were more prone to rebellion than others, but a recent study in *The Journal of Japanese Studies,* by Neil Waters, suggests the answer may lie, in part,

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with the continuity of local commoner leadership, whose traditional benevolent paternalism guided village politics and smoothed relations between local areas and the central government.

One does not have to accept the author's central thesis in its entirety, however, in order to value this study. It is an excellent corrective that should stimulate further studies in local history. Combining extensive research in Japanese sources with clearly articulated ideas, this book is among the most stimulating and readable publications on modern Japanese history to appear in recent years.

GAIL LEE BERNSTEIN
University of Arizona

Making the Most of the Least: Alternative Ways to Development *edited by Leonard Berry and Robert W. Kates. New York, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980. 282 pp. $35.00.*

At a conference held in Wingate, Wisconsin, in 1975, an international group of scholars examined the prospects and problems of the least developed countries, a category of twenty-five (later enlarged to twenty-nine) states that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has derived from certain statistical indicators, including per capita income, literacy, and the share of manufacturing in total national output. Whereas the least developed countries reflect the general features of underdevelopment, they are deemed "a special case with special patterns" (p. 251). The distinctiveness of the least developed stems from—the emphasis here varies widely from author to author—bottlenecks in the external and internal political economy, extreme vulnerability to natural disasters, the lack of a resource base, and in some cases aridity and a landlocked position. Diverse contributors to this book rail against thinking of least development as a mere quantitative aggregate and underscore qualitative differences among countries in the Sahel, East Africa, the former High Commission territories of southern Africa, and the Himalayan mountain region.

Adopting an eclectic position on the thorny issue of causality, Berry and Kates conclude that no single theory explains the phenomenon of least development. Like the other contributing authors, who deny the possibility of "catch-up" in the current international order and reject a strategy of development primarily based on growth, the editors call for and elucidate noneconomic forms of development, harmonious relations between the least developed and Western countries, self-reliance (not to be confused with autarchy), and regional integration.

This book provides a searching interdisciplinary account of the possibilities and limitations of various attempts to transcend underdevelopment, as well as detailed analyses of specific problem areas—for example, nutrition and health care, water supply, natural hazards, and access to environmental information. Noteworthy contributions in respect to the constraints on development efforts are Tamas Szentes's discussion of historical responsibility and of the current role of the periphery in the world political economy, Ann Seidman's concrete data on the activities of multinational corporations in southern Africa, and Cynthia Enloe's study of internal obstacles in Asian countries.

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Some authors review material, such as the drawbacks to technical assistance, familiar to specialists in development studies without breaking new ground. More pertinent today is what is behind the World Bank's move in the 1970s to support the poorest of the poor (a tendency noted but not explained by G.K. Helleiner), as well as the enormous expansion of private bank lending to (some) Third World countries. In the conclusion, Berry and Kates argue that while underdevelopment occurred during the colonial era, in the postindependence period "a case can be made for the least developed suffering relative neglect, rather than exploitation, of colonial powers and world investors" (p. 245.) The editors thereby fail to take a clear position on competing—some theorists say irreconcilable—claims springing from vastly different epistemologies and methodologies. In light of such conceptual cloudiness, it is not evident that least development is a useful category of analysis. Regrettably, this book provides neither a systematic examination of alternative strategies of development, as the subtitle promises, nor a probing evaluation of the concept and practice of self-reliance.

These criticisms notwithstanding, *Making the Most of the Least* perceptively highlights serviceable aspects of prevailing strategies of development and offers a masterly overview of the multifaceted problems confronting many Third World countries.

JAMES H. MITTELMAN
City College, City University of New York

Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies *by Cynthia H. Enloe. Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1980. 276 pp. $19.00.*

Who will guard the guards themselves? No question may be more central to the security of individual states—or of longer duration in political systems. All governments require loyal, efficient guardians of public order. In heterogeneous societies, however, military and police allegiance to the government may be tested by the pulls of tribe, class, or region. Faced with potential fission in their coercive branches, political leaders have long been concerned with the subject of Cynthia Enloe's latest book. How they view the relationship between "state security" and ethnic boundaries forms the basis for this wide-ranging probe of political options.

The term ethnic has an eel-like quality. It is slippery, elusive, and liable to varying interpretations. Enloe uses the word broadly—possibly too broadly for the taste of many readers. Explaining that ethnicity must be explored dynamically, she tends to mute other factors of division in favor of her chosen, and complex, major variable. An ethnic group is, at root, "a collectivity whose members share a belief in common descent which is, in turn, legitimated and sustained through cultural expression" (p. 9). Government policies both affect, and are affected by, such feelings of commonality. The salience of ethnicity, and the perceived boundaries of particular groups, can be directly influenced by government actions. In asserting that certain groups are more loyal to the state than others, and that they thereby merit differential recruitment into the armed forces, the government directly affects the structures and perceptions of ethnic differences. Historic examples—the Gurkhas of the Imperial Army, the Cossacks under the Tsarist government,

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the Kurds under the Ottoman Empire and British rule, and the Irish in various branches of the British armed forces—buttress Enloe's argument. The identities of particular groups were thereby strengthened, even though members who joined the armed forces were substantially socialized into the norms of the military forces.

Analysts focusing on a single phenomenon must steer a careful course between the shoals of unquestioned unicausality and the reef of mindless multi-causality. Enloe steers, in my opinion, too close to the former. Her book is focused on *a* concept—which, to accommodate the exceptions of which she is aware, must be stretched unmercifully. Loyalty is indeed a major concern of military recruiters, but so are cost and availability. In several of the instances cited by Enloe, the Irish in the British armed forces being a major example, economic circumstances directly affected ease of recruitment. The relationships between class and ethnicity, hinted at but not explored in detail, seem especially significant for further investigation.

The saliency of ethnicity in military affairs varies along several dimensions. Modernization does not cause an inevitable decline of communalism; it can, in fact, enhance communal awareness. Under most circumstances, the calculus of ethnic costs and benefits is simple; however, when ethnicity coincides with other lines of cleavage, serious challenges arise. For example, periods of decolonization, wartime expansion of the military, peacetime demobilization, restructuring during a civil war, and post-civil war absorption of defeated troops provide major challenges. But the overall problem rests in the complex relationship between a people and its government. Ultimately, unless a "nation" has been created within boundaries of an individual state, fragmentation based on presumed kinship can erupt. More than service to the government is required for ultimate loyalty; acceptance of the state as a whole is necessary. In this fashion, Enloe commonsensically concludes what is generally an interesting book.

What implications for the future might be derived from Enloe's study? First, the heterogeneity of many Third World countries is well known, but the means of coping with it are varied and to some extent contradictory. To the extent that the governments use "ethnic arithmetic" and coalition politics, the dangers of fragmentation are diminished—but the presumed loyalty of the armed forces to political leaders may be lessened as their internal cleavages increase. Policies designed to reduce communal awareness may require decades for fruition, yet the relevant time spans for most governments are a few years. The auguries would thus seem ominous: social fragmentation and attendant praetorianism will continue to mark contemporary politics.

Second, the problems assessed in *Ethnic Soldiers* are hoary with age. Yes, individual leaders may not realize the magnitude of particular issues until they have been deposed as a result of abridging prerogatives the armed forces hold dear—but they can seek historical wisdom. The individual cases examined by Enloe are necessarily abbreviated, and to some the balance between compressed summarization and extended analysis may appear to err on the side of the former. Supplementation of her overall judgments with detailed case studies would be appropriate.

Thirdly, almost all analyses of the political role of armed forces collide with the secretive nature of coup planning and execution, and with the extraordinary sensitivity of security issues. For want of something better, scholars of civil-military relations in developing countries are (to a substantial extent) more historians or students of current

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affairs than they are sociologists; yet the protean nature of ethnicity would appear to require the insights of social psychologists and specialists in communications. What they might add to Enloe's conclusions would be extremely interesting.

CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR.
State University of New York at Buffalo

Actors and Systems: The Politics of Collective Action *by Michel Crozier and Erhard Friedberg. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1980. 333 pp. $25.00.*

The title of this book does not reflect its contents. The book is not about actors; it treats individual decision making, but does not draw analogies between individual and group decision making. Nor is it about systems theory. Indeed, cybernetics is one of the many social-science traditions held in low esteem by Crozier and Friedberg. And despite a favorable reference to Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* at the beginning of an introduction written for the American edition, the book says nothing of any significance about the problem of collective action. Indeed, there is little evidence that the authors are acquainted with the rapid interdisciplinary development of the theory of collective action during the past decade.

The book is about organizations. Crozier and Friedberg claim to offer a new approach to the study of organizations. In their view, a person's behavior reveals his or her *strategies* for achieving his or her objectives. In a group of people who have conflicting objectives, there exist *games* that limit the range of rational strategies. The key terms "strategy" and "game" seem to have broader meanings here than in game theory, meanings suggestive of Schelling's work. Crozier and Friedberg cite Schelling, but they do not develop, or even reiterate, his arguments.

To get from games to organizations, Crozier and Friedberg posit "concrete systems of action," by which they mean sets of interrelated games. An organization is one type of concrete system of action. It is distinguished from other types by "a more marked structure, the existence of more clearly defined aims, conscious awareness of the goals of the participants, and partial assumption of responsibility, at least by the leaders, for certain of the regulations" (p. 153). The reader is left with the responsibility for deciding what all of this might mean.

Crozier and Friedberg move on to discuss decision making. The advances made by Simon and by Lindblom over twenty years ago are summarized crudely and endorsed enthusiastically. Subsequent advances, including those by Simon and by Lindblom, are ignored. There is no substantial analysis of the implications of the Simon-Lindblom arguments for strategies, games, and concrete systems of action. But this part of the book does have a virtue: for the reader who already knows Simon and Lindblom, it is not opaque.

There are very few hypotheses about human behavior in this book, perhaps because, as Crozier and Friedberg repeatedly remind us, they believe in free will. Instead of hypotheses, the book is filled with tedious and elusive conceptualization, case studies that

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demonstrate beyond doubt that the conceptualization is not entirely vacuous, and invalid or insubstantial attacks on a variety of existing perspectives on organizations. *Actors and Systems* is a jumble of pretentious claims and loose, overly abstract arguments, reminiscent of a style of "theorizing" that political science and sociology have outgrown.

JAN SMITH
Ohio Wesleyan University

World Inflation and the Developing Countries *by William R. Cline, and Associates. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1981. 266 pp. Cloth, $15.95; paper, $5.95.*

Inflation emerged as an important issue in the world economy in the 1970s. The commodity-price boom during 1972–1974 and the oil-price increases of 1973–1974 were two important factors in the inflationary process and its aftermath. The developing countries were both beneficiaries and victims of these developments in the world economy. This volume presents a detailed analysis of the transmission of world inflation into developing countries and their response to it. As is usually the case with the Brookings studies, it is a very competent effort.

The volume contains four chapters (and an appendix) which give a comparative view of the various aspects of the global inflation in the 1970s. After laying the framework for the studies in the introductory chapter, William Cline, the principal author of this volume and coordinator of other papers, discusses in chapter 2 the effects of inflation on, among other things, terms of trade, distribution of world income, and external debt of developing countries. His two conclusions are worth mentioning: if oil prices are eliminated, the terms of trade improved for three-fourths of the countries examined; and there has been a reduction in the real value of the debt owed to industrial countries. In chapter 3, Surjit S. Bhalla examines the transmission of inflation into developing countries. He finds that large increases in developing countries' foreign reserves in 1972 led to high increases in domestic money supply which, in turn, had a strong and systematic effect on the price level. These conclusions are buttressed by detailed chapters on Brazil (by Cline), India (Bhalla), Central America (Siri and Dominguez), and Malaysia (Chander, Robless, and Teh). If one were to pick out a common theme among these country studies, it would be that inflation was largely imported.

The papers in this volume are of generally high quality. They contain much useful analysis and interesting insights. Some of the year-by-year recitation of facts, however, could possibly have been omitted without detracting from the quality of the analysis. Moreover, some of the conclusions the authors draw from their statistical work are not as unequivocal as they indicate. This point is illustrated by an examination of their treatment of the validity of the monetarist model of inflation. For example, it is stated, correctly, that the money-supply variables are not statistically significant in explaining inflation (p. 158). It is also asserted, however, that "the statistical monetarist model of Indian inflation augmented by variables for import and food price inflation finds that these two variables, in addition to monetary variables, are significant in explaining inflation"

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(p. 160). A closer look at the statistical evidence indicates that in most cases the growth of money supply is not a statistically significant variable. While there is a room for disagreement about what constitutes a "monetarist model," there should be little divergence concerning statistical evidence. The fact that statistical evidence does not provide unambiguous support to the monetarist model should have been made clear in the text.

This volume repeatedly mentions the inflation problem of the "1970s" but, with a few exceptions, the events and information included do not go beyond 1976, although the book was published in January 1981. The second half of the 1970s is at least as important as the first half because it included the second oil price shock (1979–1980). This is worth noting because developing countries did not have the luxury of borrowing their way out of the problems created by the second oil price shock as they largely did in response to the first. These critical remarks are not intended to and should not detract from this volume's valuable contribution to our understanding of an important turning point in the world economy. Indeed, it is hoped that the Brookings Institution would undertake a similar study that examines the second oil price shock and its ramifications.

KRISHAN SAINI
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War: Germany, Britain, France, and Eastern Europe, 1930–1939 *by David E. Kaiser. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 346 pp. Cloth, $25.00; paper, $12.50.*

This impressive volume traces the economic diplomacy of the great European powers toward Eastern Europe in the decade before World War II. The focus is on Germany's aggressive trade expansion and the lethargic response of Britain and France. Kaiser correctly points out that Germany's economic offensive began two years before Hitler's rise to power and aimed at achieving essentially political goals, particularly the restoration of Germany's great-power status. But Hitler made a difference. He regarded Germany's informal economic domination of Eastern Europe as but a prelude to the conquest of a great landed empire. He shaped his policies, especially his program of rearmament and arms exports, to prepare for this conquest. These policies, in turn, had the triple effect of increasing Germany's trade with the east, equipping it for war, and making war an attractive way to resolve some of the economic difficulties—the food, labor, and raw material shortages, and the balance of payments problem—that Hitler's policies had helped to create. For Hitler, in other words, rearmament and economic expansion were the means chosen to prepare for a war of conquest; and their economic results, in his eyes at least, made that war seem inevitable. The argument is circular but convincing. Kaiser shows persuasively how Hitler imposed a consensus on German foreign policy, how he skillfully coordinated all facets of that policy, and, most importantly, how he used economic diplomacy to achieve political ends.

But as Kaiser points out, skill alone cannot account for Hitler's success. Other factors, especially the failure of French and British diplomacy, cleared the road for German ex-

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pansion and war. While Hitler extended Germany's economic and political influence in Eastern Europe, the British and French concentrated on restoring their depressed economies, shoring up their imperial ties, and avoiding new commitments. They adopted such policies as tariff restriction, imperial preference, and opposition to arms exports that penalized the Eastern European states. These policies, together with their weak response to Germany's rearmament and remilitarization of the Rhineland, eroded Anglo-French influence in Eastern Europe, drove the countries of that region toward a reconciliation with Hitler, and greatly facilitated Germany's expansion eastward. At the heart of Anglo-French diplomacy was a widespread fear of another war, a belief that their interests in Eastern Europe were not worth the risk of a major conflagration, and, concomitantly, a readiness to reach a reconciliation with the Germans even at the expense of the Eastern European states. Unlike their German counterparts, those British and French officials who favored a more aggressive policy could not impose a concensus on their bureaucratic rivals. Both governments had difficulty coordinating their economic and political policies. In Britain, the result was a policy of procrastination and ambiguity; in France, a reluctance to act without British support.

There is much more to Kaiser's book than can be summarized here. It is chock-full of insights on a range of subjects: the motives influencing Soviet diplomacy, the thinking behind Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, the reversal of Anglo-French policy in 1939, and the economic origins of the war. The book is impressively documented with British, French, and German archival materials. Kaiser is especially good at delineating bureaucratic rivalries and the linkages between political goals and economic diplomacy. One sometimes wishes for a little information on the American side; but this is a small complaint against an excellent monograph.

MICHAEL J. HOGAN
Miami University, Ohio

Marxist Ideology and Soviet Criminal Law *by R. W. Makepeace. Totowa, N.J., Barnes and Noble Books, 1980. 319 pp. $26.50.*

This book represents a welcome addition to the literature of Soviet criminal law. Its purpose, as the title suggests, is to relate Marxist ideology to Soviet criminal law, and in this respect Makepeace's effort is not entirely successful. This problem is not particularly the author's fault, except in the sense that he chose this subject to investigate. As he states in the introduction, "Marx and Engels did not say a great deal about law" (p. 12), a formulation that he repeats frequently throughout the book with regard to particular aspects of criminal law. In attempting to relate ideological pronouncements to criminal law and to Soviet law in general, however, the author provides a fresh perspective on the latter which makes for quite interesting reading.

After two introductory chapters on Marxist theory and on Lenin, respectively, Makepeace follows a familiar chronological treatment with chapters on "The First Period," 1917–1921; the New Economic Plan (NEP); the 1930s; the 1940s to the death of Stalin; and from 1953 to the present. Each of these periods is covered in a sound and

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scholarly way, with meticulous references to Russian and English sources. Makepeace tacitly acknowledges his considerable debt to Western authors who have previously written on the subject with his numerous references to such authors as Beerman, Berman, Fuller, Hazard, Juviler, Lapenna, Morgan, and others.

While the major focus is on criminal law, Makepeace's discussion actually encompasses the main developments in Soviet law in general. At times, however, one comes away with the feeling that the author has not delivered on what he has promised. He states at the outset that one of the areas of criminal law that he will concentrate on is "counter-revolutionary crime." But when readers reach the forty-six-page chapter on the 1930s, they find that fewer than five pages have been devoted to the Great Purges. The most detailed analysis is of the period since 1953, and it seems likely that this part of the book will be most useful to the reader.

The book is attractively printed and produced. Only a few printing or spelling errors (for example, "Pyataskov" for Pyatakov, p. 143) came to my attention.

DONALD D. BARRY
Lehigh University

The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece *by Bruce R. Kuniholm. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1980. 439 pp. Cloth, $27.50; paper, $10.50.*

This detailed study of the origins of the cold war in the Near East is meticulously researched and thoroughly documented. Where other authors have placed their emphasis on the postwar period, Kuniholm explores developments in Greece, Turkey, and Iran within the context of "Great Power" rivalry. He gives attention to earlier domestic and regional events that shed light on these countries' struggles in order to define their national destiny despite external pressures. In particular, Kuniholm focuses on traditional Soviet patterns of pursuing national interests in the northern tier which closely mirror prior Russian pursuits in the area, and he discusses the underlying historical theme of division of the area into acknowledged spheres of interest.

Kuniholm also sheds light on United States policy formation as a reasoned response to Soviet pressures. While he makes it clear there were contradictions and inconsistencies in American policy, his work would seem to support the inception of the idea of containment, if not its later rationalization. Kuniholm also tantalizingly dips into the area of psycho-history when he touches on the influence of particular personalities on events in the region. Stalin's early role in diplomatic negotiations showed a strong imperialistic bent. Was he motivated by his Georgian heritage? As for President Roosevelt and the American leadership, one wants to know more about the influences that shaped their perceptions and misconceptions.

Many of the questions raised in this book are of particular significance to the issues of détente, the American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan administration's attempts to get "tough," and the awareness on the part of American decision

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makers of just how vital are American interests in the Near East. This is an important book to read and a valuable addition to the literature on the cold war.

SYLVIA KOWITT CROSBIE
Van Nuys, California

REFERENCE BOOKS AND SOURCE MATERIALS RECEIVED

The Catholic Left in Latin America: A Comprehensive Bibliography *compiled by Therrin C. Dahlin, Gary P. Gillum, and Mark L. Grover. Boston, Mass., G.K. Hall and Co., 1981. 410 pp. $35.00.*

The Europa Year Book 1981: A World Survey, 2 volumes *prepared by Europa Publications. London, Europa Publications Ltd., 1981. 3,645 pp. $180.00.*

The Military Balance 1980–1981 *prepared by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980. 119 pp. paper, $15.00.*

The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, vol. 35: 1915–1916 *edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1981. 563 pp. $30.00.*

Public Policy: A Guide to Information Sources *edited by William J. Murin, Gerald Michael Greenfield, and John D. Buenker. Detroit, Mich., Gale Research Company, 1981. 283 pp. $36.00.*

Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 3: 1980 *edited by Louis Kriesberg. Greenwich, Conn., Jai Press Inc., 1981. 243 pp. $34.50.*

The Soviet Air and Strategic Rocket Forces, 1939–80: A Guide to Sources in English *compiled by Myron J. Smith, Jr. Santa Barbara, Calif., American Bibliographical Center—Clio Press, 1981. 321 pp. $45.00.*

State Elective Officials and the Legislatures: 1981–82 *prepared by The Council of State Governments. Lexington, Ky., The Council of State Governments, 1981. 163 pp. $12.00.*

Strategic Survey 1979 *prepared by The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980. 139 pp. $12.50.*

The Year Book of World Affairs 1981 *edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1981. 288 pp. $41.25.*

U.S. Information Moscow, vol. 3 (Spring-Winter 1981–82) *edited by Ann P. Friedland. Mountain View, Calif., The Dime's Group, Inc., 1981. 505 pp. $9.95.*

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Correspondence

The Logic of Party Democracy

To the Editor:

In his review of my book (Fall 1980), John Petrocik makes several comments about its contents that are grossly misleading or simply wrong. I wish to correct some of his misinformation.

Firstly, Petrocik claims I only *assert* "facts and relationships" despite my extensive footnotes. Since the first five chapters present a theoretical justification for intraparty democracy, it is scarcely surprising that this analytic exercise does not provide new "data" ("The Data Gatherers – An Everyday Story of Political Philosphers?"). Furthermore, his specific comments about my "assertions" are misleading; for example, both the argument about interest groups and that about the "public interest" perspective of amateur activists are widely acknowledged. Of course, we do not know how amateurs would act in fully democratic parties. However, unless Petrocik believes we should examine only problems for which appropriate "data" can be collected, this point is irrelevant. I would reject that kind of positivism. That arguments about the *justification* for intraparty democracy are important in politics is clearly demonstrated by the current dispute within the British Labour party.

Secondly, Petrocik contends that the evidence does not support the hypotheses. As there are no major parties that are even moderately democratic in the respects with which I was concerned, no one would expect any case study could "prove" the hypotheses. Nevertheless, an appropriate example was chosen for the study. That this party organization was in decline is unfortunate for those who like clear-cut examples, but not those who are prepared to examine complex evidence. This evidence did not show that the activists were "irrelevant to the influence of party on policies and officeholders."

Thirdly, Petrocik is simply incorrect in stating that data from a 1976 survey are the focus of the analysis in the "empirical" chapters; even a cursory reading of chapters 7 and 8 would reveal this.

Alan Ware
University of Warwick

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